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ABSTRACT
Technology Based Audit Tools: Implications for Audit Quality
Annie L. Witte
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Rae D. Anderson Professor Jay C. Thibodeau, Ph.D., CPA
Department of Accountancy

Technology as an exogenous shock has proven to have pervasive effects on auditing
firms, practitioners, regulators, and global markets. However, the dynamic nature of
technology makes it uniquely challenging to articulate technology’s largescale
implications on the auditing profession in recent times. Understanding how current
technology has helped shape the contemporary auditing profession is vital to identify points
of inflection within the industry (i.e., areas of risk and change), and key to elucidating the
future of where the field is going.
The first paper (sole-authored) is a literature review that synthesizes auditing
studies across methodologies, including archival, experimental, and qualitative methods.
Such studies discretely consider technological circumstances unique to the auditing
profession; however, to date, no comprehensive review exists that synthesizes what these
technological changes mean for audit quality. I map prior literature to the Center for Audit
Quality’s (CAQ) recommended Audit Quality Indicators.
In the second paper (sole-authored) I investigate how in-charge auditors in NGNFs
engage in institutional work using technology-based audit tools (TBATs) to impact audit
quality. Using semi-structured interviews in tandem with institutional theory, I identify
factors that are associated with in-charge auditors’ propensity to engage in institutional
work, being actions that contribute to the development, continuance, and/or breach of
viii

established practices. My results reveal patterns of common motivators, resources, and
outcomes of in-charges’ institutional work to impact audit quality at a process level.
Findings have important implications for theory, as I find evidence that institutional work
can arise from nontraditional sources of less powerful and individual actors.
The third paper (co-authored) investigates the roles that audit partners of NGNFs
play in shaping the technological future of auditing through the lens of institutional theory.
Using an experiential survey, we explore the nature of these institutional isomorphic
pressures as they occur in unison with the theory of institutional work. We uncover a
surprisingly synergistic, as opposed to paradoxical, relationship between how isomorphic
pressures foster conformity amidst innovation stemming from within these firms. Data
suggest partners engage in creating and maintaining acts of institutional work that are
motivated by professional marketplace expectations and ambiguity stemming from
technology within the field.
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PART I: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND AUDIT QUALITY: A
RESEARCH SYNTHESIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
I.

INTRODUCTION

Technological changes are creating numerous and significant research
opportunities within the auditing domain. As auditors encounter sophisticated client
systems, there is a new demand for knowledge about how to provide assurance on complex
client systems while also leveraging increasingly advanced technologies and data analytics
during audit test work. Information technology (IT) will also be prompting audit
researchers to consider a reexamination of certain well-established findings in the extant
literature. By revolutionizing audit work processes, types of audit evidence, and client
systems, developing IT infrastructure within firms (e.g., audit systems and methodologies)
disrupts the extant literary canon of findings that scholars have come to accept (Arnold
2016). Furthermore, IT-driven changes in the profession likely have both positive and
negative implications on audit quality.
For example, experimental and qualitative findings suggest that electronic
communication changes the nature of how auditors gather evidence, such as forgoing inperson interviews in favor of quick e-mail responses (Arnold 2016; Westermann, Bedard,
and Early 2015). Technology has also altered how audit staff receive review points from
superiors, because review notes are often given in electronic formats without the
opportunity for a face-to-face discussion (Payne, Ramsay, and Bamber 2010; Brazel,
Agoglia, and Hatfield 2004). Although efficiencies may be gained in both of the
aforementioned circumstances, there may be tradeoffs associated with effectiveness that
detract from audit quality.
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The increasing prevalence of technology in auditing contexts also begs new
behavioral questions. This is because technology does not operate in a vacuum; instead,
technology requires interaction with humans (i.e. auditors) who facilitate inputs by
communicating directly with systems and who interpret electronic outputs (e.g. system
generated reports). To identify potential future research streams, it is vital to first conduct
an examination of past and current research to develop a comprehensive understanding of
what we know about information technology1 (IT) and audit quality to date. In that spirit,
the purpose of this research paper is to synthesize the auditing literature, primarily from
the 21st century, to assess IT’s impact on audit quality.
There is an expansive amount of literature in the auditing domain discussing the
implications of the increased use of technology in the audit environment and how it affects
audit quality. Yet, while IT generally is expected to streamline and improve audit quality,
prior research provides mixed evidence. Furthermore, governing accounting and auditing
bodies have communicated an urgency to gain an understanding of how technology is
changing the audit process in order to assess new strengths, risks, and opportunities
associated with IT in practice as a means of enhancing audit quality (PCAOB 2013; CAQ
2014a; AICPA 2015). Therefore this literature review is timely in helping academics and
practitioners gain a broad awareness of how technology impacts audit quality. The
literature review examines the interaction between technology, manifested in audit firm
practices and client business systems, and audit practitioners as it impacts audit quality. To

Information technology is the “automated means of originating, processing, storing, and communicating
information, and includes recording devices, communication systems, computer systems (including hardware
and software components and data), and other electronic devices’’ (AICPA 2007, AU 319.02). Examples of
IT in practice include electronic audit decision aids, electronic audit workpapers, electronic review, audit
support systems, and continuous auditing systems.
1

2

best encourage research in this domain, I map my review to the Center for Audit Quality’s
(CAQ 2014b) four audit quality indicators (AQIs)2 which the CAQ defines as integral
components of a comprehensive audit quality definition: 1) Firm Leadership and Tone at
the Top, 2) Engagement Team Knowledge, Experience, and Workload, 3) Monitoring, and
4) Auditor Reporting. Additionally, I identify an emerging fifth audit quality indicator, Big
Data and Nontraditional Audit Evidence, while also suggesting future research
opportunities in each indicator category. Similar to Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik,
and Velury (2013), I do not suggest a single definition of audit quality, but rather take an
evaluative approach to assess these identified tenets of audit quality alongside the auditing
literary canon as to what translates into high or low audit quality.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.1 ABOUT HERE]
The importance of examining how IT impacts the audit is uniquely relevant from
two perspectives: 1) how auditors and audit firms3 are leveraging technology to support
the audit function, and 2) how auditors are responding to increasingly complex client IT
systems and competencies. Implications for audit quality are likely both direct and indirect.
Such a real-time exchange and recording of information within client systems forces
auditors to familiarize themselves with new audit techniques to adequately assess client
controls, as auditing around the computer ceases to become a viable alternative (Alles
2015). In addition to the need to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 to

In April 2014, the CAQ released a memorandum titled “CAQ Approach to Audit Quality Indicators”
preempted by its 2013 letter to the PCAOB (and prompted by the PCAOB’s ongoing Audit Quality Indicators
initiative) to contribute to the discussion about what key matters contribute to audit quality. In this
memorandum, the CAQ shares its suggested AQIs that are being pursued in its pilot-testing initiative. The
AQI’s were developed through outreach efforts with investors, audit committees, and other stakeholder
groups.
3
Throughout this article the term “firm” will exclusively be reserved to indicate audit firm, and the term
“client” will be taken to mean the business/issuer being audited.
2

3

adequately test client controls which can often only be done through the use of
computerized audit software (Alles 2015), a driving force behind audit firm decisions to
promote IT-centric practices is to gain a competitive advantage within the audit industry,
while also mitigating risks through the implementation of structured audit support systems.
The largest audit firms in the world are eager to implement new technologies into
their audit engagements. For example, Big 4 audit firms have released communications in
the form of public memorandums and short videos that discuss the implications of greater
IT investments embedded in the audit, explain how/why organizations should approach
integrating Big Data and data analytics in the audit process, or champion the firm’s capacity
to utilize sophisticated audit tools capable of analyzing and synthesizing expansive data to
better serve clients (Deloitte 2016; EY 2015, 2016; KPMG 2012; PwC 2015). In 2013,
KPMG notably formed KPMG Capital to invest in Big Data to develop sophisticated data
analytic service offerings to clients (Savvas 2013). Big 4 and other large audit firms have
even taken to social media outlets such as Twitter and Facebook to promote knowledge
sharing and branding efforts (Eschenbrenner, Nah, and Telaprolu 2015) in attempts to be
perceived as industry leaders among their client base, while also achieving a better
economy of scale, because technology enables firms to provide services to a greater
number of clients.
This literature review converges on several important takeaways. Currently, one
way that firms communicate their tone at the top is through the manifestation and design
of audit support systems and IT processes – and their underlying restrictiveness. Such
systems serve as a mechanism to increase appropriate consensus in practice and reduce
audit risk, thereby supporting audit quality. Although auditors are empowered with the new
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tools in practice, workflow processes are becoming dominated by IT. This heavy reliance
on IT is potentially damaging to audit quality. Specifically, it may be disruptive to the
stability of a firm’s organizational hierarchy if IT protocols are inconsistently followed,
may inhibit the development of professional judgment and the acquisition of technical
auditing knowledge in less experienced staffers, and may create communication obstacles
between levels of auditor personnel as well as between auditors and clients. So, while
technology is often positively associated with audit quality, the returns in efficiency and
effectiveness are not without costs. Both research and practice should remain committed
to examining the full implications of new technologies being integrated into practice to
present a balanced assessment of IT’s impact on audit quality.
This paper is organized into eight sections. Section II explains the method used to
identify the sample of literature reviewed. Sections III, IV, V, and VI synthesize literature
related to the aforementioned CAQ’s (2014b) AQIs, Firm Leadership and Tone at the Top,
Engagement Team Knowledge, Experience, and Workload, Monitoring, and Auditor
Reporting, respectively. Section VII introduces a proposed fifth AQI, Big Data and
Nontraditional Audit Evidence, and synthesizes related literature. Additionally, future
research avenues are discussed within each AQI section. Finally, section VIII provides
concluding remarks and summarizes implications derived from this review.
II.

METHOD AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

This paper presents a review of the relevant literature on the topic of how IT has
impacted audit quality over time. I first identified a preliminary sample of literature
spanning from 2000 through 2016 by conducting and tracking searches in Google Scholar
that included keywords such as Information Technology Audit Quality, Electronic Audit
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Decision Aids, Electronic Audit Workpapers, Audit Support Systems, Audit Technology,
Continuous Auditing, and Auditor Judgments and Information Technology. Given the rapid
evolutionary nature of IT, it was appropriate to start with a contemporary examination of
the literature (i.e. after the year 2000) before expanding my search to earlier years.
From this initial sample, I then identified additional relevant keywords and theory
underscoring technology’s development in auditing dating as far back as the 1980’s. I
continued to search across databases including Google Scholar, EBSCO, and the Social
Science Research Network (SSRN), while also reviewing the references listed in identified
papers to assemble my complete sample of literature, which was finalized in August 2016.
It was important to explore literature across a wide breadth of accounting and auditing
journals to mitigate the risk that I would not capture literature that may have contradictory
findings with top journals.
I constructed a descriptive spreadsheet that summarized key findings, implications,
and limitations of the literature as recommended in Andiola, Bedard, and Hux (2016).
Using this spreadsheet, I coded referenced pieces of literature as they related to audit
quality into relevant domains to identify commonalities among and disparities between
articles.4 Thus, the literature review is organized around the four AQIs developed by the
CAQ, and a proposed fifth AQI that emerged from the research synthesis. Figure 1.2
summarizes extant literature by AQI.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.2 ABOUT HERE]

4

Initially, I considered associating spheres of the identified literature with the PCAOB concept release on
audit quality indicators (PCAOB 2015), but as I reviewed the literature I found that it was well aligned with
the framework of audit quality indicators as suggested by the Center for Audit Quality’s Audit Quality
Indicators (CAQ 2014b) project.
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In total, I reviewed 97 scholarly journal articles, seven working papers, and five
book chapters with publication years spanning from 19865 through 2016, with the bulk of
examined literature (over 70 percent) published between 2006 and 2016. I collected
literature across various methodologies including archival, theoretical, experimental,
qualitative, questionnaire, and mixed methods to construct a rich representation of the past
and current technological landscape in the auditing domain. As figure 1.3 demonstrates,
extant accounting literature across methodologies is numerous with implications from
studies that give attention to the intersection of IT and audit quality in relation to audit
firms, practitioners, clients, and financial statement end users. These findings illustrate the
pervasiveness of technology within auditing and accounting related research studies, and
the need for an associated literature review.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.3 ABOUT HERE]
III.

FIRM LEADERSHIP AND TONE AT THE TOP

The Center for Audit Quality’s first named audit quality indicator is Firm
Leadership and Tone at the Top. The CAQ asserts that “the audit firm’s leadership, through
its tone at the top, emphasizes the importance of audit quality, adherence to professional
standards, independence and objectivity, and holds itself accountable for the effectiveness
of the audit firm’s system of quality control,” (CAQ 2014b, 3). The idea that an audit firm’s
tone at the top impacts audit quality is well-accepted, as governing bodies outside of the
CAQ, such as the PCAOB (2008), have also emphasized that audit quality is influenced by
firms’ tone at the top. However, disrupted and restructured firm standards may alter
auditors’ perception of a firm’s tone at the top (Bamber and Iyer 2009), and consequently,

5

Some seminal literature from the 1980s and 1990s was important to include in this review as the
underlying theories remained applicable to modern research findings and practice.
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impact audit quality. One such threat to audit quality has come about because audit firms
are reorganizing the audit process at a rapid pace to incorporate new technologies to
facilitate compliance with auditing standards and to gain a competitive advantage over rival
firms (Bierstaker, Burnaby, and Thibodeau 2001; Carson and Dowling 2012; Dowling and
Leech 2014; Kotb and Roberts 2011; Trompeter and Wright 2010).
Auditors may perceive a firm’s investment in additional technology as an
investment in useful tools that support the audit; alternatively, auditors may feel that their
job autonomy is threatened by increased audit firm structure if the added technology is too
restrictive. The latter scenario can be detrimental to audit quality because auditors must
abide by professional standards and exercise appropriate professional judgment to achieve
a high quality audit. Bamber and Iyer (2009) empirically examine the relationship between
tone at the top and job autonomy, and find that auditors who perceive a firm’s tone at the
top as conducive to audit effectiveness are positively associated with reporting greater job
autonomy, which can help support an effective audit. Therefore, it is important to review
what literature finds about how audit firms’ tone at the top is manifested and communicated
to practitioners through the increasing integration of technology in firm practices
embedded within audit firm structure.

3.1. Audit Firm Structure
The infusion of technology into company-wide audit processes is one means by
which a firm’s tone at the top is enacted. Therefore, it is important to consider the audit
firm structure literature. Audit firm structure has previously been defined in terms of the
amount and type of guidance available to auditors in the form of firm policies, decision
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aids, and manuals, with less structured firms allowing audit teams a greater expanse of
professional judgment and autonomy (Hermanson 1997; Kinney 1986; Cushing and
Loebbecke 1986). Audit firm structure has greatly influenced the development and
integration of IT practices within audit firms since computerized systems first became
available in the 1980s (Kinney 1986; Carson and Dowling 2012; Dowling and Leech 2007;
Hermanson 1997). The structured or unstructured nature of a firm can be determined by
the level of restrictiveness embedded in firm processes and audit support systems. Audit
support systems are systems that operationalize a firm’s audit methodology to facilitate
effective and efficient audits by integrating a firm’s workpapers, office process guidelines,
and audit resources in one centralized location (Bedard, Ettredge, and Johnstone 2006). In
effect, these audit support systems attempt to impose firms’ national office policy on local
audit firm locations to support consistency across offices. Prior literature has argued that
more structure may facilitate higher quality audits by reducing risk and fostering consensus
(Hermanson 1997; Icerman and Hillison 1991; Morris and Nichols 1988), because
increased structure gives auditors less leeway in determining how to respond to anomalies
discovered during audit test work.
Big 4 firms are more likely than smaller firms to use computer-related audit
procedures and to engage IT audit specialists (Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe 2008, 2009),
both of which can enhance the effectiveness of the audit and improve audit quality (Rosli,
Yeow, and Siew 2012; Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Lowe 2014; Hux 2016). Larger firms are
also more likely to perceive the use of IT in audits as important (Janvrin et al. 2008). These
differences are possibly a reflection of firms’ unified tone at the top promoting greater firm
structure and providing more audit resources, as well as these firms’ complex client bases.
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In a study by Dowling and Leech (2007) who polled Big 4 firms and one large midtier firm, all firms communicated a belief that firms’ support systems facilitate the audit
process despite the varying degrees of system restrictiveness (low versus high) among
firms. However, firms with highly restrictive audit support systems also considered the
systems themselves as a type of enforcement of firm methodologies to promote a high
quality audit (Dowling and Leech 2007). So, while auditors are cognizant of the level of
restrictiveness embedded in firm audit support systems, a more restrictive tone at the top
communicated often contributes to improved audit quality. These findings offer initial
evidence that tone at the top may support audit quality by way of increased technological
structure on audit engagements without a related loss of auditors’ sense of job autonomy
(which could have resulted in quality threatening behavior and negatively impacted audit
quality).
As audit firms increasingly employ information and communication technology
(ICT) tools in the audit, there have been improvements in productivity and related cost
savings (Banker et al. 2002; Chang et al. 2011). These activities have also begun to change
the organizational structure of audit firms (Omoteso, Patel, and Scott 2010). For example,
ICT tools have allowed audit firms to maintain work productivities with a reduced
administrative and non-professional staff (Omoteso et al. 2010). Meanwhile, the number
of senior-level personnel (e.g. senior managers, directors, and partners) has continued to
grow within firms, because there is an increased demand for professional judgment and
decision making on complex audit items (Omoteso et al. 2010). However, within upper
ranks of the audit firm, greater audit automation threatens the stability of firms’ leadership
structure and the tone at the top (Omoteso et al. 2010). A unified firm leadership may
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become disaggregated over time as virtual meetings replace face-to-face interactions and
firm communications become more passive as they take the form of e-mails and electronic
newsletters.
Additionally, wide dissemination of information via electronic communication may
enable local firms to increase competencies at varying rates, which may undermine a
cohesive tone at the top. In instances where high-level personnel become more specialized
in order to keep pace with relevant technologies in specific industries relevant to their
market, it may become more difficult for firms to develop and maintain universal templates
and methodologies. Furthermore, as technology-related skillsets are being prized as
requirements for auditor promotions within firms, some auditors have reported already
noticing a shift in power from traditional firm leaders, such as partners, to younger staff
members (seniors and managers) in the organization with high levels of ICT competencies
(Omoteso et al. 2010). This differently weighted organizational hierarchy may prove
unstable, and threaten a unified tone at the top and thus audit quality. Alternatively, the
tone at the top may change in the long run. The long-term implications of a disaggregated
or changing audit firm’s tone at the top could negatively impact audit quality if firm
methodologies become ambiguous, overly complex, or unable to be generalized across firm
engagements.

3.1.1. Future directions of auditing research on audit firm structure
RQ1. Is large investment in technology alongside frequently shifting firm processes
disruptive to firms’ tone at the top? Do auditors become resistant to firm policy changes if
they occur too frequently, and if so, how does this impact audit quality?
RQ2. Is there more or less conformity in audit workpapers across offices of firms with a
greater emphasis on technology, and how does this compare with intra-office conformity
of these firms? Is this apparent to a greater extent in one industry or service line over
another?
11

RQ3. How has technological competence of firm leaders (e.g. senior managers, directors,
and partners) evolved in the last decade? What types of skillsets are more valued, the
ability to navigate software or implement and interpret toolkits? Is there any offsetting
loss of technical competence in the employees with greater technology skillsets?

3.2. IT and Auditing Standard Compliance
Current auditing standards and regulatory bodies encourage audit firms to utilize
IT procedures and to engage IT audit specialists (Janvrin et al. 2008; AICPA 2014).
However, many auditing standards are antiquated and out of date with current technology,
because they do not adequately incorporate relevant technological capabilities (Byrnes,
Ames, Vasarhelyi, and Warren 2015; Krahel and Titera 2015; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and
Tuttle 2015). For example, auditors must physically view client inventory regardless of
controls, but if sound controls are in place with RFID6 tags then doing so may be a waste
of resources (Vasarhelyi et al. 2015). Despite the missed opportunity of auditing standards
not thoroughly integrating IT capabilities (e.g. valuation of items in electronic markets to
more accurately compute depreciation; video surveillance from inventory warehouses to
confirm client inventory processes) (Vasarhelyi et al. 2015), audit firms have pursued
dramatic investments in IT. Examples of such investments since the early 2000s include
changeovers from paper files to paperless environments, deployments of complex audit
support systems, and offerings of firm trainings on advanced audit analytics across
organizations to attain gains in efficiency, effectiveness, and improved audit quality
(Banker et al. 2002; Bierstaker et al. 2001; Omoteso et al. 2010).
Big 4 audit firms’ tones at the top consistently emphasize a technological focus in
best practices and a commitment to continued technological advancement by improving

6

Radiofrequency identification
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efficiencies and effectiveness and through risk management as a means of achieving a high
quality audit (KPMG 2014; KPMG 2012; Deloitte 2016). Investments in electronic work
environments and strong audit support systems may contribute to audit quality by
facilitating compliance with auditing standards such as the following:
•

AS 1215: Audit Documentation (PCAOB 2004), because audit support systems
enable auditors to easily store and share relevant audit documentation which is
retained on an internal server (Bedard et al. 2006; Westermann et al. 2015),

•

AS 1101: Audit Risk, (PCAOB 2010a), because firms are able to leverage
electronic systems in their client acceptance and retention process to mitigate
unacceptable levels of audit risk (Bell, Bedard, Johnstone, and Smith 2002), and

•

AS 2810: Evaluating Audit Results (PCAOB 2010b), because electronic decision
aids can assist audit staff with interpreting audit test work results (Bedard, Deis,
Curtis, and Jenkins 2008).
However, despite audit firms having communicated the benefits of technology

through the tone at the top and implementation of structured support systems, research has
previously reported that some partners avoid using electronic systems on some
engagements, at least when the system is relatively new (Bedard et al. 2006). This is likely
because higher level engagement team members, such as managers and partners, encounter
more difficulties when trying to use electronic systems (Bedard et al. 2006). As a result,
managers and partners are more likely to engage in behaviors that may undermine the
electronic environment such as creating workpaper review notes and storing audit
documentation outside of the system (Bedard et al. 2006). Such behaviors, known as
quality-threatening behaviors (QTB), can detract from audit quality and potentially lead to
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an audit failure when a firm’s current risk monitoring system is not effectively tracking
and eliminating these actions (Bedard et al. 2008). Importantly, much of the research in
this area is over a decade old. Therefore, it remains an open question whether QTB are
becoming more pervasive of an issue as technology evolves, or less pervasive of an issue
as a younger and more technologically savvy generation of individuals assume higher ranks
in audit firms. Manager and partner workaround behaviors can best be explained by a
direct relationship between task self-efficacy and ease of use for workpapers (Bedard,
Ettredge, Jackson, and Johnstone 2006), such that partners are more likely to work outside
of systems when they have low levels of competence related to using more complex
workpapers.
Although struggling to use the systems themselves, managers and partners may still
agree with and support the use of a firm’s electronic system for the majority of the
remaining professionals of the organization. In a qualitative study by Westermann et al.
(2015), the authors find that many partners perceive IT as having a positive influence on
the audit profession. Specifically, partners noted that technology helps standardize firm
methodologies and helps firms develop repositories for best practices by creating an
extensive knowledge base available for auditors to access when presented with critical
audit decision points, while simultaneously streamlining audit processes (Westermann et
al. 2015).
Nonetheless, unless partners and managers are verbally promoting appropriate use,
their workaround behaviors may send a detrimental message regarding appropriate
electronic system use to lower level employees and undermine the firm’s tone at the top
regarding appropriate use of technology. While a more recent study by Bierstaker et al.
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(2014) does not find social influence7 as a determing factor in whether or not auditors use
computer-assisted audit techniques (CAATs), prior research finds that explicit supervisory
support in learning new technologies can have a direct impact on whether or not a new
technology is learned (Loraas and Wolfe 2006). Auditor perceptions of influential firm
personnel and engagement team members’ attitudes toward the appropriate use of
electronic systems influence auditor intentions and subsequent behavior with using an audit
support system (Dowling 2009; Curtis and Payne 2008; Rosli et al. 2012). Therefore for
firms to effectively reap the benefits of IT’s capacity to support audit quality by easing
compliance with regulatory guidelines, it is integral that firm leaders communicate the
importance of appropriate use of audit support systems through the firm’s tone at the top.
3.2.1. Future directions of auditing research on IT and auditing standard
compliance
RQ4. Are QTBs occurring at a greater frequency in more structured or IT heavy
environments? Is the nature of QTBs static or dynamic subject to variations in client
characteristics or industries?
RQ5. How are firms supporting the link between audit support systems and meeting
current auditing standards through firm policies? Do auditors interpret related policies as
vital to abiding by auditing standards and contributing to audit quality, or do they perceive
the policies as tedious? Does this interpretation vary across auditor level or experience?
How do attitudes of auditors interact with these relationships?
IV. ENGAGEMENT TEAM KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, AND
WORKLOAD
The Center for Audit Quality’s second AQI is Engagement Team Knowledge,
Experience, and Workload, meaning “Professional staff are knowledgeable, experienced,
and have sufficient time to perform quality audits,” (CAQ 2014b, 3). To perform high
quality audits, audit engagement teams must be adequately staffed with knowledgeable and

7

Measured by auditor ratings of a) people who influence auditor behavior, b) people who are important to
the auditor, c) firm senior managers, and d) the firm support itself related to the use of CAATs.
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experienced members who can effectively leverage technology to facilitate the audit.
Auditor knowledge and expertise directly impact audit quality (Knechel et al. 2013),
because auditors with domain-specific knowledge that applies to either a given client, task,
or industry, exercise higher quality judgments (Bonner 1990; Knechel et al. 2013).
However, auditor knowledge and judgment and decision making are no longer independent
from technology, because auditors are required to utilize audit support systems and follow
electronic firm processes to successfully abide by modern firm methodologies while
making critical judgments. Therefore, it is essential that academics and practitioners alike
understand how audit firm engagement team knowledge, experience, and workloads are
impacted by the increased use of technologies within audit firms, and how this intersection
translates to improvements or impairments in audit quality. I discuss these engagement
team factors according to the dimensions of the second AQI as designed by the CAQ
(2014b): a) Knowledge and Experience of Key Engagement Team Members, b) Audit Firm
Training Requirements, c) Trends in Engagement Hours and Related Timing, d) Allocation
of Resources by Significant Risk Areas, e) Specialists and National Office Personnel
Involvement by Significant Risk Areas, and f) Key Engagement Team Members’
Workloads.

4.1. Knowledge and Experience of Key Engagement Team Members
Auditing firms have long been known for hiring high-achieving business college
graduates (Hermanson, Hill, and Ivancevich 2002), and firms, such as PwC (2015), will
progressively demand a new hire pool with increasingly varied specialties (e.g. text mining
and HTML scraping, optimization, predictive analysis and machine learning, and advanced
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database and data handling methods) as technological advances diversify the skill sets
auditors need to succeed in public accounting. Big 4 and other large auditing firms are
taking to social media sites including Facebook and Twitter to pursue onboarding strategies
as a means of garnering interest from technologically sophisticated millennial employee
prospects (Eschenbrenner et al. 2015). Omoteso et al. (2010) find that accounting staff with
high levels of technological competencies and expertise emerge as firm leaders, and such
skills are now critical to being promoted within audit firms. These findings indicate that
audit personnel with IT knowledge are essential for the successful completion of the
modern audit, therefore the type of human capital required to contribute to audit quality
has evolved to be an auditor who has advanced IT and data analytic knowledge (Chang et
al. 2011; Knechel et al. 2013).
However, a study from Westermann et al. (2015) suggests that the implications of
technology’s impact on audit firm employee expertise are mixed. On one hand, partners
are impressed with new auditors’ pre-hire abilities that enable them to easily learn and
utilize technologies that support the audit and rapidly gather information through the use
of technology. These skills can translate into greater effectiveness and efficiencies gained
throughout an audit, thereby improving audit quality (Westermann et al. 2015). On the
other hand, some partners perceive a decline in auditing knowledge among younger
auditing staff members, because growing up in the digital age may have fostered an
expectation of instant access to answers and information in young practitioners. Partners
worry that young auditors are not willing to deeply research auditing matters or that
inexperienced practitioners might be reluctant to spend sufficient time processing new
information to comprehend dense auditing content. Instead, partners believe that newer
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auditors are relying on technology for fast or convenient answers that may impede the
young auditors’ development of expertise in auditing (Westermann et al. 2015). Without
the adequate development of appropriate knowledge structures in auditing, this new
generation of auditing staff may struggle to make high quality judgment and decisions on
complex audit matters necessary to support audit quality.
Furthermore, overreliance on technology and audit support systems may inhibit
learning (Mălăescu and Sutton 2015; Arnold 2016), because lower level audit staff may
have not yet acquired an understanding of how to do their jobs without subconscious
prompting embedded in audit support systems through the use of formalized decision aids,
templates, and checklists (Rose 2002). Arnold, Collier, Leech, and Sutton (2004) find that
decision aid use ironically best serves expert users, as decision aids alleviate biases in
expert users but exacerbate biases in novice decision makers. Abdolmohammadi and Usoff
(2001) find that although reliance on decision aids is increasing over time, human
processing is widely preferred among highly experienced managers and partners from
various international accounting firms; therefore, the users most likely to benefit from
decision aids may not be integrating them into audit practices to improve audit quality. The
decision aid users who trust their own expertise and believe that they will outperform aids
are unlikely to rely on decision aids (Rose 2002). Conversely, decision aid implementation
in firms can result in overreliance on the aid and less critical judgment, mechanistic
behavior, and an increase in hidden costs associated with training and unstable technologies
when employed by inexperienced users (Bedard et al. 2008; Dowling and Leech 2007;
Arnold 2016).
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This is especially problematic because decision aids are most often employed by
lower level employees, which may cause less experienced auditors to make systematic
errors in auditing judgment and decisions because they do not have enough knowledge to
recognize decision aid limitations or properly interpret the decision aid outputs (Arnold
and Sutton 1998). These suboptimal auditing judgments can potentially result in instances
of material misstatements or unreliable financial statements, thereby threatening audit
quality. Less experienced auditors are more likely to find a restrictive and highly structured
decision aid helpful, because it reduces cognitive load, increases perceived usefulness of
the decision aid, and increases the user’s intention to reuse the system (Mălăescu and
Sutton 2015). However, this is worrisome because these novice auditors subsequently fail
to develop sophisticated knowledge structures related to the relevant audit task and are
susceptible to technological dominance by the decision aid (Mălăescu and Sutton 2015).
Technological dependence is the inability to successfully complete one’s job
without the use of computers or electronic resources (Shu, Tu, and Wang 2011).
Technological dependence may reduce audit quality if auditors lack generalized audit
competencies and a baseline understanding of how IT processes support the audit.
Technological dependence is also associated with “technostress,” which is named for
instances in which technology either directly or indirectly manifests as stress that
negatively impacts individuals’ work attitudes and behaviors (Weil and Rosen 1997; Shu
et al. 2011). Technostress can theoretically damage audit quality if it prompts auditors to
engage in QTBs (Bedard et al. 2008), therefore it is important for researchers to establish
how to assist practitioners in achieving an acceptable threshold of technological
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understanding paired with task competence to mitigate issues related to technostress and
resistance in auditing (Curtis and Payne 2014).

4.1.1. Future directions of auditing research on knowledge and experience of key
engagement team members
RQ6. Are new auditors absorbing an adequate amount of technical auditing knowledge
at an appropriate rate? What are the implications for practice if technology has begun to
dominate the ability of younger professional staffers to make professional judgments?
RQ7. Can the development of more (or less) structured decision aids impact the extent of
reliance of the user to mitigate overreliance in novice users and under-reliance in expert
users?

4.2. Audit Firm Training Requirements
IT has dramatically impacted how firms train audit personnel and the learning
formats available to staff. Auditors can fulfill CPE requirements using electronic learning
environments and by attending group virtual training sessions, which have the benefits of
standardizing training to ensure relevant content is included in slides and sharing well
organized electronic resources with training participants (Westermann et al. 2015). Firms
also house e-learning tools and vast repositories of resources for auditors to freely access,
so expertise is shared across member firm networks (Carson 2009; Westermann et al.
2015). However, some audit partners express concern about the lack of in-the-classroom
training paired with electronic training, because auditors may be multitasking by checking
e-mails or working on engagements during virtual trainings instead of attentively listening,
thereby deteriorating the quality of knowledge gained (Westermann et al. 2015).
Apart from CPE training on auditing content, many firms also offer in-house
training beyond on-the-job learning experiences related to the usability of electronic firm
workpapers and audit support systems modules. Trainings in electronic audit work systems
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are found to improve computer self-efficacy and task self-efficacy in preparers, whereas
reviewers do not experience a similar improvement in task self-efficacy (Bedard, Jackson,
Ettredge, and Johnstone 2003). Greater computer self-efficacy is associated with increased
auditor perceptions of ease of use of systems for both preparers and reviewers, which
decreases the likelihood that end users will work around or outside of systems (Bedard et
al. 2003). Furthermore, increased task self-efficacy is associated with increased ease of use
of systems for preparers (Bedard et al. 2003). Therefore, firm trainings on electronic
systems and audit support systems can help audit professionals, especially preparers,
increase self-efficacy related to computers and tasks to support appropriate use of these
systems (Dowling 2009; Bedard et al. 2003). Appropriate use contributes to audit quality
because it is aligned with firm methodologies, and helps ensure that proper audit
procedures, especially those related to documentation, have been thoroughly completed.
Apart from giving consideration to CPE trainings and internal firm support system
trainings, extant research indicates that non-specialist auditors struggle with information
system (IS) applications, and that firms should increase technical trainings to compensate
for underdeveloped IS curricula in universities (Curtis, Jenkins, Bedard, and Deis 2009;
PwC 2015). Janvrin et al. (2008) find that although auditors use many electronic tools
including electronic workpapers, internet searches, and audit applications to support the
audit, there are also electronic applications that auditors assess as valuable but use
infrequently (e.g. risk assessment, internal control evaluation, and client relationship
management). Janvrin et al. (2008) suspect that if auditors received greater training on
certain audit support system capabilities such as fraud review, audit planning, and client
acceptance (all of which the auditors noted as important but rarely used), auditors would
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likely incorporate these applications into the audit to a greater extent to improve audit
quality. Findings from Bierstaker et al. (2014) suggest that training auditors in Computer
Assisted Audit Techniques (CAATs) and increasing employee education related to how
CAATs operationally contribute to audit quality by improving effectiveness and
efficiencies, because auditor outcome expectations, facilitating expectations, and
performance expectations influence the likelihood that auditors will utilize CAATs on an
engagement.

4.2.1. Future directions of auditing research on audit firm training requirements
RQ8. Is there a difference in the quality of knowledge acquired by auditors who attend
CPEs online versus in-person? Are there differences if an in-class attendee does not use a
laptop versus one that does? Is the quality of content retained superior if training
participants are told to expect to take a test at the end of a course?
RQ9. What areas of internal firm trainings currently exist with regard to audit support
systems and what content areas of missing? How have firm trainings evolved alongside
changing support systems? How can internal firm trainings be designed to ensure
knowledge acquisition and learning to support audit quality?

4.3. Trends in Engagement Hours and Related Timing
Audit productivity has increased with greater implementation of IT in the audit
process (Chang, Chen, Duh, and Li 2011; Banker et al. 2002) alongside many
improvements that contribute to audit quality. One of the most notable improvements in
auditing supported by IT relates to the rapid dissemination of information (Westermann et
al. 2015). Firm knowledge sharing memos and best practices are captured and available for
all audit employees to view in electronic repositories internally among audit professionals,
further facilitating a rapidly paced audit with instant access to necessary resources
(Westermann et al. 2015; Carson 2009). E-mails are commonplace between audit
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professionals and clients, and they enable auditors to quickly gather answers on audit items
from clients (Westermann et al. 2015; Arnold 2016), however such instances of non-rich
medium exchanges could be detrimental to audit quality if auditors are missing either
verbal or visual cues from clients that might point to relevant evidence on an engagement.
While auditor engagement and utilization hours remain consistently high (Sweeney
and Summers 2002; Westermann et al. 2015), the timing of audit work is in a state of flux
as auditors respond to clients’ continuous audit systems and also adjust to new
methodologies that incorporate IT-related audit information. Traditional client transaction
paper trails are disappearing, so auditors have been forced to adopt a greater number of
CAATs and electronic audit techniques to adjust for the shorter lag times within client
systems (Chiu et al. 2014; Rezaee, Sharbatoghlie, Elam, and McMickle 2002). The
importance of shifting audit engagement timing will continue to remain relevant as auditors
begin to incorporate continuous audit evidence into analytical procedures (Rose, Rose,
Sanderson, and Thibodeau 2017). Appropriate timing of the introduction of information
that may be in an unfamiliar format (Kelton, Pennington, and Tuttle 2010) is also critical
to support audit quality, because the timing of unfamiliar forms of evidence can impact
whether or not auditors are able to successfully understand the implications of
nontraditional audit evidence to properly integrate the evidence into audit plans (Rose et
al. 2017). Future research should take a new focus on how the timing of audit procedures
and collection of electronic evidence should be adjusted to best account for the
simultaneous auditing nature of many client systems.

4.3.1. Future directions of auditing research on trends in engagement hours and
related timing
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RQ10. Is fraud more likely to occur when auditors rely heavily on electronic exchanges
instead of face-to-face exchanges with clients? What about restatements? What contexts
are particularly susceptible to clients obscuring information through written electronic
statements versus in-person communications?
RQ11. How can the timing of audit procedures and collection of electronic evidence be
adjusted based on continuous auditing systems? How does client size or industry impact
this timing? What are the implications of audit quality?

4.4. Allocation of Resources by Significant Risk Areas
To maintain a high level of audit quality, audit firms must give careful
consideration to audit risk, client business risk, and auditor business risk (Johnstone and
Bedard 2003) prior to accepting clients. This helps the audit firm ensure that it has adequate
resources to allocate to a given client to provide a reasonable level of assurance on a client’s
financials (Johnstone 2000; Bell et al. 2002). Electronic client acceptance and retention
decision aids have been embedded into audit support systems for more than a decade (Bell
et al. 2002) as a first step that enables audit firms to systematically compare and benchmark
client portfolio risks. While partners ultimately bear responsibility for accepting and
retaining clients, these electronic decision aids support audit quality by providing clear
risk-based metrics to audit firm decision makers that enable audit firms to enact strategies
that reduce risk as a component of engagement planning or avoid unacceptable levels of
risk altogether.
Auditors perceive using technology in technical and administrative procedures on
audit engagements to be highly important in assessing client and audit risks, and also
perceive IT as a major contributor to enhancing audit quality (Abou-El-Sood, Kotb, and
Allam 2015). Trompeter and Wright (2010) classify technological developments as
enablers of change within the audit process, and find that auditors are increasingly using
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technology-driven analytical procedures to identify audit risks after client engagements
have been accepted. IT-related analytical procedures help auditors gather more timely
information that covers a wider breadth of data as firms are able to develop increasingly
precise quantitative expectations that can help point to inconsistencies or risk areas early
in the audit planning stage (Trompeter and Wright 2010).
When auditors assess client control risk below the maximum level, auditors are
more likely to engage IT audit specialists as well as use computer-related audit procedures
compared to when client control risk is assessed at a maximum level (Janvrin et al. 2009).
Big 4 firms are more likely to assess control risk below the maximum (Janvrin et al. 2009),
perhaps because of greater experience with complex client IT systems, as well as access to
more resources than smaller firms. During engagements in which auditors have assessed
control risk below the maximum level, computer-related audit procedures are used to gain
an understanding of a client’s system while also testing client controls, and a large
percentage of auditors report relying on a client’s internal controls in such instances
(Janvrin et al. 2009). Findings from Janvrin et al. (2009) suggest that the level of
complexity within a client’s IT system influences how auditors use computer-related audit
procedures. Auditors are more likely to use computer-related audit procedures during audit
planning and control testing, potentially because auditors may not have a paper trail
available to follow as an alternative means to test controls (Rezaee et al. 2002).
Apart from audit and client specific risks, sometimes external factors related to the
nature of an engagement impact the inherent level of complexity and risk in an audit. For
example, on an audit that requires the use of a component auditor, increased availability
and use of electronic tools are found to mitigate challenges from higher levels of
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language/cultural barriers when group auditors and component auditors are of different
countries or geographic locations (Downey and Bedard 2018). However, the same
electronic tools and technologies are not always available to all team members involved in
component audits, despite firms’ claims of consistency in electronic resources across
global audit firm networks (Downey and Bedard 2018). Investment in technology that
facilitates collaboration between group and component auditors can increase reciprocal
predictability of action that can reduce communication challenges and support audit quality
on such engagements (Downey and Bedard 2018; Srikanth and Puranam 2011). Future
research should examine the qualitative characteristics of what types of electronic tools
best reduce language/cultural barriers when component auditors are utilized to improve
audit quality on group engagements.

4.4.1. Future directions of auditing research on allocation of resources by significant
risk areas
RQ12. How do decision science systems results differ from human judgments? How are
audit client acceptance and retention decisions judged? Where do clients seek services after
rejection from a firm?
RQ13. Can training non-specialist auditors to understand how IT audit specialists add
value to the audit improve relationships between the two groups? Does greater or less
modularization in the audit improve audit quality with regard to IT audit specialists? Is
matching auditors with IT audit specialists on character traits an effective way to overcome
communication difficulties on engagements?
RQ14. What are qualitative characteristics of types of electronic tools to reduce
language/cultural barriers when component auditors are utilized to improve audit quality
on group engagements? Do trainings with the electronic in component auditors help the
auditors integrate these tools or synchronous communications in a more effective manner
that translates to improved audit quality?

4.5. Specialists and National Office Personnel Involvement by Significant Risk Areas
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Planning for IT-related risks is considered an integral component of audit quality
(Hux 2016; Stoel, Havelka, and Merhout 2012); it follows that IT audit specialists are being
increasingly used in audits, and are typically involved in the planning and risk assessment
stages of engagements (Boritz, Kochetova-Kozloski, Robinson, and Wong 2015; Brazel
and Agoglia 2007). IT audit specialists can more aptly assess IT risks compared to their
financial auditor counterparts because of their expertise in IT systems, which can be used
to help reduce overall audit risk (Selby 2010). IT audit specialists are found to participate
in initial fraud brainstorming sessions approximately 69 percent of the time (Brazel,
Carpenter, and Jenkins 2010) which contributes to brainstorming session quality.
Furthermore, brainstorming session quality is found to positively moderate the relationship
between fraud risk assessments and related audit testing (Brazel et al. 2010). IT audit
specialist participation in fraud brainstorming sessions is important because financial
statement auditors may lack an appreciation for the pervasive nature of IT-related risks that
can threaten audit quality (Hux 2016; Curtis, Jenkins, Bedard, and Deis 2009).
Auditors sometimes fail to effectively utilize IT audit specialists, perhaps because
auditors lack an adequate understanding of specialist competencies, or they may fail to
understand the value-adding nature of IT audit specialist contributions (Bauer and Estep
2015; Curtis et al. 2009). Brazel and Agoglia (2007) examine the relationship between how
accounting information system (AIS) expertise in auditors interacts with varying levels of
IT audit specialist competence and find that auditors with higher AIS expertise better
identify and react to potential AIS-specific risks when competence of computer assurance
specialists is low. Given the ubiquitous nature of technology integrated into client systems,
it is important to train auditors to a level of having high AIS expertise to ensure client AIS-
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specific risks are identified and addressed as a means of achieving a high level of audit
quality. Another strategy is to match auditors who possess greater AIS expertise with IT
audit specialists who may have lower competencies to mitigate audit risks (Brazel and
Agoglia 2007).
Apart from IT audit specialists, IT has also facilitated the sharing of specialists’
expertise across geographically dispersed firms (Carson 2009). The capacity for firms to
rapidly disseminate information and knowledge has been a bedrock in the development of
modern global audit firm networks. Global audit firm networks have allowed industry
specialists to be able to charge fee premiums for providing clients enhanced audit quality
by leveraging pooled repositories of expertise and resources (Carson 2009).

4.5.1. Future directions of auditing research on specialists and national office
personnel involvement by significant risk areas
RQ15. Does greater auditor experience or IT/IS knowledge in brainstorming sessions
contribute to the relationship between fraud risk assessments and audit testing? Are these
auditors able to adjust analytical procedures of audit plans more appropriately than less
experienced auditors in cases of clients with complex IT systems?
RQ16. Do firms with high numbers of IT audit specialists have relatively even IT
competencies across offices at the staff level, or are firms with many IT audit specialists’
concentrated in HQ locations? In what ways are IT audit specialists’ knowledge
communicated across geographic boundaries between engagements teams, and is
effectiveness of the knowledge maintained?
4.6. Key Engagement Team Members’ Workloads
Today, auditors’ workloads are formally managed through audit support systems
and synchronous communication technologies, which help support audit quality by
tracking whether or not engagement team members have adequate availability and
resources to complete a given engagement (CAQ 2014b). Although audit software can help
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reduce workpaper preparation time while improving productivity (Bedard et al. 2006;
Chang et al. 2011; Banker et al. 2002), there has not been an associated decline in
engagement hours. Instead, audit professionals continue to work a billable 40-50 hours a
week during non-busy times, and 60-80 hours a week during busy seasons (Westermann et
al. 2015; Sweeney and Summers 2002). Heavy workloads can detract from audit quality as
current literature finds that ego depletion8 accumulates over time during busy season
(Hurley 2016). Because self-control is necessary for auditors to facilitate high quality
judgment and decision-making processes (Hurley 2016), ego depletion presents a threat to
audit quality.
Consideration of auditor workloads is also important because the workload
pressures of an individual auditor may impact decisions within an engagement, including
how workpapers are reviewed or whether or not a greater extent of IT audit techniques are
implemented during an audit, which can directly impact audit quality. Agoglia, Brazel,
Hatfield, and Jackson (2010) find evidence that reviewers are less likely to conduct inperson reviews with preparers when they experience greater workload pressures and the
risk of material misstatement is low. Initially, these findings indicate that greater audit
efficiencies are gained without an offsetting loss of effectiveness, because electronic
reviews are often more convenient for reviewers and the risk of material misstatement is
deemed low (Agoglia et al. 2010). However, this response may still be problematic for
audit quality, because other studies have indicated that there is a loss of effectiveness in
workpaper preparation when audit staff anticipate an electronic review instead of an in-

8

Ego depletion is explained as “the ability and/or willingness to exercise self-control relies on a limited,
expendable cognitive resource (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, and Tice 1998). Using self-control
depletes this resource, which leads to ego depletion…” (Hurley 2016, 2)
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person review (Payne et al. 2010; Brazel et al. 2004). Although the findings from Agoglia
et al. (2010) are specific to cases in which reviewers perceived the risk of material
misstatement as low, the findings are subject to the limitation that they are based on selfreported survey results; it remains unclear how reviewers might respond to increased
workload pressures paired with risks of material misstatements that are higher than low
under more extreme circumstances such as a busy season schedule.
While risk-seeking auditors are more likely than risk-averse auditors to implement
additional technology in an engagement in the absence of external factors (e.g. a longer
budget period or communication of the attitude of a remote superior), risk-averse audit
personnel are only more likely to implement additional technology in an engagement in
which there is a heightened amount of budgetary pressure (Curtis and Payne 2008). Such
findings indicate that auditors of varying risk tolerances believe that increased use of
technology in an audit improves efficiencies overall, and may help alleviate problems
related to budgetary pressures.

4.6.1. Future directions of auditing research on key engagement team members’
workloads
RQ17. How do reviewers respond to increased workload pressures paired with high risks
of material misstatements when deciding to conduct an electronic or in-person review?
How do these choices impact audit quality?
RQ18. Does increased use of technology in an audit improve efficiencies overall? How
much of audit staff and seniors’ time is allocated to setting up electronic workspaces and
dealing with technology-related issues versus working through auditing content and
making professional judgments?
RQ19. Can continuous changes or introductions of new technology also increase workload
or create significant learning curves for staff to learn new firm processes?
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V. MONITORING
The Center for Audit Quality’s third AQI is Monitoring. The Monitoring AQI
advocates that “processes and controls are in place to assess audit engagement performance
and the sufficiency of the audit firm’s system of quality control and make any necessary
changes,” (CAQ 2014b, 3). It explicitly identifies the necessity of attention to the
following: a) Internal Quality Review Findings, and b) PCAOB Inspection Findings. With
regard to the former, audit firms have progressively employed technologies to standardize
and support audit engagement processes as a means of ensuring quality control over audits,
as well as compliance with professional standards (Dowling and Leech 2014). Because
audit support systems and electronic practices in audit firms are becoming increasingly
entwined with the audit process, it is important to consider how audit firms are internally
monitoring auditors’ use, as well as the efficacy of, IT procedures and systems.
Additionally, this monitoring process also has an external component, as firms’ quality
control and engagements are subject to review from the PCAOB. PCAOB inspections
indicate that audit firms frequently struggle with insufficient evidence and inappropriate
reliance on client internal control systems (Church and Shefchik 2012; PCAOB 2008),
which may damage audit quality if firms rely on an ineffective client control system that
results in an uncorrected misstatement.

5.1. Internal Quality Review Findings – Evidence from the Workpaper Review
Process
Computerized audit environments and decision aids positively impact audit quality
by supporting the standardization and consistency of audit work, compliance with auditing
standards and firm methodologies, and the development of repositories of audit
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documentation to support workpaper and engagement reviews (Dowling and Leech 2007;
Bedard et al. 2008). Audit support systems are inherently monitoring structures because
the systems allow audit firms to track auditors’ work and force compliance with audit firm
processes (Bedard et al. 2008; Kinney 1986). Some research indicates that electronic files
give reviewers enhanced ability to review the quality of the work performed relative to
reviewing paper files (Pierce and Sweeney 2005), and that electronic audit tools have
improved audit quality monitoring during audit engagements (Bedard et al. 2008).
Although electronic reviews may be more convenient (Agoglia et al. 2010), there
is evidence to suggest that an electronic work environment may undermine audit quality
by indirectly reducing the quality of a preparer’s workpapers subject to review. Brazel et
al. (2004) find that auditors expecting an electronic review versus a face-to-face review
exercised lower quality judgments, were more likely to be influenced by prior year
workpapers, felt less accountable for their work, and were less concerned with audit
effectiveness. Payne et al. (2010) reinforce these findings, as auditors anticipating a faceto-face review outperform auditors expecting a written review. Specifically, auditors
anticipating a face-to-face review are able to better focus on more cognitively demanding
conclusion-oriented procedures that enable the auditors to identify a pattern indicative of
fraud. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that reviewers may not be able to overcome
deficient documentation quality that occurs because of the form of review the preparer
expects. Thus, when preparers sacrifice effectiveness in their workpaper preparation
because they anticipate a written (i.e. non face-to-face) review, the subsequent reviewer is
also more likely to exhibit low quality judgments because workpaper documentation
compiled by the preparer is inadequate (Agoglia, Hatfield, and Brazel 2009; Trotman,

32

Bauer, and Humphreys 2015). Lastly, Bible, Graham, and Rosman (2005) find that
reviewers in an electronic environment are less likely to find seeded errors than reviewers
working in a paper environment. This is especially troublesome, since reviewers who opt
to use paper instead of electronic copies of workpapers are also technically working outside
of the audit support system (which may be at odds with firm policies).
However, there may be effective strategies that auditors can employ to compensate
for the additional cognitive demands associated with greater complexity in electronic
environments. Auditors who perform well in electronic environments process information
more and navigate the workpapers less than their paper environment peers who also
perform well; conversely, there do not appear to be differences in processing or navigating
activities between task environments for auditors who did not perform well in the electronic
environment (Rosman, Biggs, Graham, and Bible 2007). These findings indicate that
auditors must prioritize different actions to attain the same level of performance when
switching between a paper and an electronic presentation; training auditors in how to
adequately engage in processing versus navigating may help alleviate any loss in quality
associated with the increased cognitive demands imparted on auditors in an electronic
environment.
Notably, a study by Dowling and Leech (2014) goes further and calls into question
findings that indicate electronic reviews are generally less effective than paper reviews,
because these studies fail to give consideration to different audit support system designs.
Instead, Dowling and Leech (2014) find that the design of electronic audit support systems
can increase the effectiveness of audit reviews and the timeliness and frequency of
communication between preparers and reviewers. Importantly, when auditors report that
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they view the system as enabling and not coercive, job autonomy and important for feelings
of accountability over work increase (Dowling and Leech 2014; Bamber and Iyer 2009).
While the findings of Dowling and Leech (2014) call a new focus to examining
various types of electronic support systems to determine which ones are more conducive
to the review, there is an inherent drawback with such electronic support systems. The
increased frequency of communication between preparers and reviewers can threaten the
nature of the audit review as an independent monitoring quality control mechanism. That
is, the increased interactions between preparers and reviewers can sometimes result in
preparers stylizing workpapers to subconsciously persuade reviewers that workpapers are
appropriately prepared despite a lack of adequate supporting documentation (Dowling and
Leech 2014; Trotman et al. 2015). Preparers and reviewers who extensively interact
regarding a set of workpapers may also experience a loss of independent thought if
preparers attempt to align their judgments with those of reviewers (Dowling and Leech
2014). Audit quality is undermined when the review process’s role as a mechanism for
independent quality control is subjugated by such behaviors.

5.1.1. Future directions of auditing research on internal quality review findings –
evidence from the workpaper review process
RQ20. How can the electronic review process be improved in areas where it falls short
relative to paper-based reviews? What specific audit support system designs or features
embedded in audit supports systems can support the review process?
RQ21. How does the relationship between the preparer and reviewer impact workpaper
quality, and to what extent does this influence audit quality? Are certain stylistic choices
objectively preferable over others to support an effective audit?

5.2. PCAOB Inspection Findings
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Apart from supporting a firm’s internal capability to monitor engagements, audit
support systems and electronic tools can also improve external audit quality monitoring by
providing extensive documentation repositories for PCAOB inspectors to access (Bedard
et al. 2008; Church and Shefchik 2012; Dowling and Leech 2014). Strict audit process
controls around documentation are a response to regulations and inspection expectations
to comply with audit quality control standards (Church and Shefchik 2012; Dowling and
Leech 2014). Although quality control criticisms have not been made public, each large
firm (Deloitte, PwC, Ernst & Young, KPMG, BDO, Crowe Horwath, Grant Thornton, and
RSM) has received quality control criticisms in each inspection year included in the sample
from 2004 through 2009 (Church and Shefchik 2012). Therefore, while the quality control
issues have been remediated or the firm has at the very least progressed toward achieving
the identified quality control objective (PCAOB 2006), these findings indicate that firms
must continually strive to achieve a high level of evolving quality control standards over
the audit process as time progresses.
Perhaps more interesting to consider is the nature of the more frequent secondary
audit deficiencies, which are deficiencies “that are common to specific auditing
procedures” (Church and Shefchik 2012, 53), documented within PCAOB inspection
reports. A review of inspection reports of the aforementioned eight firms between 2004
through 2009 reveals that firms often exercise an inappropriate reliance on client computer
system produced reports without appropriately testing to confirm if the reports are
complete and accurate, or if the client system producing the report can be relied upon
(Church and Shefchik 2012; PCAOB 2008). Troublingly, the frequency of secondary
deficiencies has increased on average over the years, whereas the number of primary

35

deficiencies (deficiencies common to testing accounting areas) has either been decreasing
or stable over the years (Church and Shefchik 2012). These trends indicate that although
PCAOB inspections likely contribute to audit quality by requiring audit firms to maintain
an ever-increasing baseline of satisfactory quality control related to audit procedures and
audit test work, deficiencies related to IT and evolving complexities of client IT systems
are growing challenges that auditors must continually reassess.

5.2.1. Future directions of auditing research on PCAOB Inspection Findings
RQ22. Regarding secondary audit deficiencies: to what extent are auditors inappropriately
relying on client systems because they are failing to keep up with the increasing
sophistication of client IT systems year over year versus auditors who are not recognizing
systems that mandate deeper testing?
RQ23. Are audit firms reluctant to document certain sensitive audit matters out of fear of
increased exposure from PCAOB reviews or litigation cases? Is there a difference in firm
language or processes between how sensitive matters are retained in audit support systems?
VI. AUDITOR REPORTING
Within the auditing literature, a more visible dimension of audit quality is measured
by audit report tenets, including the frequency of disclosed material weaknesses and
identified internal control deficiencies, the market’s reaction to auditor reports, audit fees,
audit report lag times, and the issuance of going concern opinions (DeFond and Zhang
2014). Accordingly, the Center for Audit Quality’s fourth AQI is Auditor Reporting (CAQ
2014b). The purpose of Auditor Reporting is to produce reports which are “reliable, useful,
and timely; auditor communications are effective” (CAQ 2014b, 3). With regard to auditor
reporting, evidence has shown that IT has altered the nature of discovered control
deficiencies and how auditors respond to IT-related deficiencies (Bedard and Graham
2011; Bedard, Hoitash, Hoitash, and Westermann 2012; Geerts, Graham, Mauldin,
McCarthy, and Richardson 2013), as well as the amount of audit fees reported and audit
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report lag time (Han, Rezaee, Xue and Zhang 2016; Chang et al. 2011; Masli, Peters,
Richardson, and Sanchez 2010).

6.1. Client IT-related Material Internal Control Quality
The nature of client IT systems underscores audit quality, because these systems’
controls are often the first line of defense for mitigating the risk of misstatements. For
businesses that rely heavily on computers (e.g. electronic vendors, professional service
firms, and technology firms), missing and poorly designed controls, as well as excessive
workloads for accounting personnel are often found to be the cause of misstatements
(Messier, Eilifsen, and Austen 2004). When client IT controls fail, the deficiencies have
far-reaching effects which can threaten the accuracy of financial statements (Geerts et al.
2013; Haislip, Masli, Richardson, and Watson 2015). Such deficiencies place a greater
demand on auditor resources to ascertain the validity of recorded transactions. Using
proprietary data from 76 audit engagements for 44 small accelerated filers during 20042005, Bedard and Graham (2011) find that 854 or 21.4 percent of all deficiencies identified
in the sample of companies were entity-level IT general controls, of which 121 were
significant deficiencies and seven were material weaknesses. Additionally, at year-end,
21.7 percent of these controls remained as outstanding deficiencies or weaknesses (Geerts
et al. 2013; Bedard and Graham 2011). Bedard et al. (2012) echo similar findings in a study
that analyzed only publicly disclosed material weaknesses between 2004 and 2006. Of the
companies that reported entity-level material weaknesses related to IT, 27.2 percent of the
disclosed MW remained uncorrected (Bedard et al. 2012). These findings indicate that both
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small and large companies alike either choose not to remediate or do not have the resources
to correct roughly a quarter of pervasive entity-level IT issues.
Such findings are important to consider, because entity-level deficiencies and
weaknesses call management’s capacity to generate accurate financials into question.
These weaknesses are pervasive control issues that impact multiple layers of an
organization’s financial reporting (Hammersley, Myers, and Zhou 2012). Investors should
be most concerned about MWs in IT among several others (e.g. segregation of duties,
account reconciliations, taxation, revenues, and inventory), because these types of
deficiencies may strain audit resources beyond their capacity to detect significant errors
and reduce audit quality since it reduces the probability that an auditor will be able to detect
a breach in a client’s system (DeAngelo 1981).
Client IT MWs also have short-term effects on earnings quality by way of abnormal
accruals (Bedard et al. 2012), and clients with IT internal control weaknesses are associated
with lower accounting earnings compared to clients that have strong IT internal controls
(Stoel and Muhanna 2011). After classifying IT-related versus non-IT-related MWs from
490 firms and mapping them to the COSO framework, Klamm and Watson (2009) find
that clients with IT-related weak components disclose a greater number of MWs and
misstatements compared to clients that do not have IT-related weak components. Studies
have also confirmed that clients with IT MWs are more likely to report higher numbers of
MWs that are more severe and longer lasting than clients without IT MWs (Geerts et al.
2013; Klamm and Watson 2009; Bedard et al. 2012). Collectively, these studies reiterate
that client IT-related internal controls have a far reaching impact on preventing (or failing
to prevent) misstatements and material weaknesses from manifesting.
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Greater internal control monitoring technology in client systems is associated with
a decreased likelihood of MWs (Masli et al. 2010). It is also associated with more
optimistic auditor judgment regarding the effectiveness of client integration of IT in its
404(a) process, as associated internal control deficiencies are categorized as less severe
(Bedard and Graham 2011; Chen, Smith, Cao, and Xia 2014). Therefore, it is in clients’
best interest to invest in and pursue robust internal control monitoring technology to
improve earnings quality, as well as auditor and investor trust in IT controls over financial
reporting. Doing so can support audit quality because auditors can better rely on high
quality control systems while giving greater attention to high risk areas of the audit.
When client IT controls do fail, auditors should be cognizant that certain
management persuasion tactics, such as management admitting that a control deficiency
occurred rather than denying it, are associated with auditor judgments of a lower severity
in the classification of the IT-related control deviation (Wolfe, Mauldin, and Diaz 2009).
Management persuasion tactics in concession (e.g. admitting that there is an issue when an
IT control fails) are also associated with auditor perceptions that management’s
explanation is more viable (Wolfe et al. 2009). There are no similar findings for manual
control deviations, signaling that the IT-related nature of the control deficiency allows
management to reap the benefits of a potentially unconscious and systematic bias that exists
because it was an IT-related control.
This response in auditors can likely be attributed to theories of accountability and
fairness that underscore why human versus technologically driven errors prompt a more
subjective view as to what could have gone differently. Human behavior is more
discretionary and one can easily engage in counter-factual thinking, imagining how an
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issue could have been avoided had the people involved made different choices (Naquin and
Kurtzberg 2004). Auditors are more likely to engage in counterfactual thinking when
assessing human errors compared to technology-related errors (Naquin and Kurtzberg
2004), because it is more difficult to imagine a machine or IT system engaging in a
subjective choice that led to an issue. Therefore, it seems like such an error could not have
been avoided. Thus, when auditors encounter IT-related weaknesses in client systems,
auditors may be more likely to forgive the error versus a manual mistake of similar
magnitude, potentially undermining the quality of the audit if IT-related client weaknesses
are not appropriately categorized. Future research should analyze this bias and also
determine strategies to help auditors avoid it.
Despite organizational behavior literature findings that human-related failures are
judged more harshly than technology-related failures (Naquin and Kurtzberg 2004), Csuite executives, such as CEOs and CFOs who were removed from client management
subsequent to a publicly reported IT MW, are less likely to find equivalent jobs versus
CEOs and CFOs that were removed following the disclosure of a non-IT related MW
(Haislip et al. 2015). This conflict in findings indicates that either the market does not
necessarily subscribe to the same theoretical basis as auditors or that the market is able to
overcome the unconscious bias when it comes to interpreting the underlying implications
of inadequate IT internal control systems and related weaknesses. Perhaps because
investors are presented with a big picture view in the financial statements of only material
IT weaknesses, this enables them to extrapolate how such deficiencies may have a wide
breadth of influence on a firm’s financial statements. Because audit quality is sometimes
defined as “the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both (a) discover
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a breach in the client's accounting system, and (b) report the breach” (DeAngelo 1981,
186), it is difficult to argue that the market’s negative reactions to client IT weaknesses are
not an indication of audit quality. If the market perceives that an auditor’s ability to
accurately detect or report a breach in clients’ systems as compromised, then audit quality
has been negatively impacted. A strong client IT internal control system is essential to
generate perceptions of high audit quality, firm stability and high earnings quality in the
market, and can even be viewed as a strategic mechanism to garner public trust in an
organization (Stoel and Muhanna 2011).

6.1.1. Future directions of auditing research on client IT related material internal
control quality
RQ24. Does management try to position control failures as resulting from an IT-related
issue of as a strategy to illicit a less severe classification of the deficiency from auditors?
Are managers more likely to expose an IT-related weakness in a system to divert auditor
resources away from other control issues?
RQ25. Can auditors be trained to overcome judgment biases associated with assessing
technology-related errors as less severe versus ones attributable to human error? Are audit
brainstorming sessions accounting for the differences in these types of failures?
RQ26. Are certain client or auditor characteristics more strongly associated with
presence of technological or human based errors?

6.2. Client Competencies in IT and the Related Impact on Audit Fees and Audit
Report Lag
A common argument for the importance and relevance of IT associated with the
audit process relates to gains in efficiencies and effectiveness, because greater automation
should streamline processes while reducing the potential for human error (Bierstaker et al.
2014; Chang et al. 2011; Banker et al. 2002). Although more structured audit support
systems cannot be as readily applied to complex audit clients, structured audit support
systems can impact audit fees. Audit fees are a widely studied dimension of audit quality,
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as numerous articles find that higher audit fees are associated with improved audit quality.
Higher audit fees and increased audit report lag are both associated with greater effort
(Eshleman and Guo 2014; Keune and Johnstone 2012; Knechel and Payne 2001), because
auditors are able to reduce risk through added effort without detriment to auditor
independence, as measured by reduced discretionary accruals and reduced propensities to
meet or beat earnings expectations (Eshleman and Guo 2014; Keune and Johnstone 2012).
Auditors also earn higher audit fees when utilizing more experienced engagement team
members, or by requiring fee premiums for riskier clients (DeFond and Zhang 2014).
When audit firms deploy structured support systems (Banker at al. 2002; Bedard et
al. 2006; Carson and Dowling 2012; Dowling and Leech 2007), audit fees decrease because
audit firms begin competing on price as a result of the efficiencies gained in a structured
support system (Carson and Dowling 2012).

However, audit firms experiencing

productivity gains related to audit support systems and technologies that facilitate the audit
do not necessarily pass on such savings to clients. Audit firms that are national industry
specialists with structured audit support systems receive a fee premium from clients over
firms that are not specialists with structured audit support systems (Carson and Dowling
2012). It has yet to be empirically demonstrated to what extent (if any) structured audit
support systems reduce audit lag time as a means of assessing purely efficiencies gains.
Despite studies that associate higher audit fees with better audit quality and lower
audit fees with reduced audit quality (Keune and Johnstone 2012), there is an expectation
that audit fees should decrease while audit quality is improved as clients and audit firms
alike utilize more technologies and increasingly skilled human capital to reap productivity
gains (Banker et al. 2002; Chang et al. 2011). However, greater adoption of IT
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infrastructures by clients across industries also means that there is increasing complexity
within client systems, which may create unconventional risks (e.g. electronic security)
(Han et al. 2016; Kotb and Roberts 2011). Such risks could theoretically increase audit
fees, and increase audit report lag.
Han et al. (2016) find that client investments in IT share a positive relationship with
audit fees, including abnormal audit fees, because auditors must spend additional time and
effort understanding client systems. Auditors must also address new risks related to client
investments in IT (Bedard, Graham, and Jackson 2005) such as weak access controls,
multi-level password controls, and firewall security that are unique to electronic
environments. Consequently, auditor tenure moderates the relationship between audit fees
and client IT investments, because auditors are able to work more efficiently on familiar
clients (Han et al. 2016). It should be noted that Han et al. (2016) measure client IT
investment by way of IT infrastructure counts of hardware and software as done in prior
literature (Kleis, Chwelos, Ramierz, and Cockburn 2012; Xue, Ray and Sambamurthy
2012). Going beyond a client’s mere ownership of IT infrastructure, internal control
monitoring technology and high IT capabilities in more technologically savvy clients that
are IT innovators are found to mitigate audit fee increases (Chen et al. 2014; Lee,
Whitworth, and Hermanson 2015; Masli et al. 2010). This is likely by way of effectively
designed client IT controls that auditors can use to either reduce risk premiums and/or rely
on to reduce audit test work. These findings point to a more reliable IT infrastructure and
improved audit quality since auditors can allocate greater resources to other value-adding
activities on the engagement (Merhout and Havelka 2008).
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Meanwhile, current research finds that client IT capabilities generally translate into
decreases in audit report lag indicating improved audit quality. Masli et al. (2010) find that
the implementation of client internal control monitoring technology is associated with
smaller increases in audit report lag. However, Chen et al. (2014) do not find that high IT
capabilities in clients are able to mitigate audit report lag increases directly. Auditors
experiencing efficiency gains related to a client’s IT capabilities may be relying on a
client’s control systems to a greater extent (Bedard and Graham 2011) and reducing the
associated risk premium related to the client which would account for the reduction in audit
fees, but would not necessarily translate into a similar impact on audit report lag if auditors
perform additional test work (Chen et al. 2014). More specifically, Chen et al. (2014) find
that a client’s IT capabilities can indirectly serve to reduce audit report lag by way of
effectiveness of internal control and the components of effective internal control. Lee et al.
(2015) also find that clients identified as IT innovators experience reduced audit report lag.
Future research should work to develop a consensus on how client IT competencies impact
audit report lag by examining additional audit delay models and attempting to discern the
specific types of client IT capabilities that translate into reduced (or increased) audit report
lag.

6.2.1. Future directions of auditing research on client competencies in IT and the
related impact on audit fees and audit report lag
RQ27. How do structured audit support systems impact audit report lag time, and is the
related impact consistent across different industries?
RQ28. How does the technological competence of an audit client in tandem with heavy
investment in IT infrastructure impact audit quality? What impact does this have on audit
fees and audit report lag?
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VII. BIG DATA AND NONTRADITIONAL AUDIT EVIDENCE
In addition to the four AQIs suggested by the CAQ (2014b), I propose an emerging
fifth audit quality indicator, Big Data and Nontraditional Audit Evidence. Information
asymmetry occurs when there are parties involved in a transaction who have unequal access
to or knowledge of relevant information (Akerloff 1970). Extant accounting literature has
demonstrates that there is information asymmetry between inside and outside investors,
which has tangible implications, such as the reduction of a firm’s stock price when
information asymmetry is high (LaFond and Watts 2008).

Therefore, information

asymmetry exists on a large scale in financial markets, as market participants attempt to
overcome the information gap of “…users’ desire and the information available through
the audited financial statements, other corporate disclosures, and the auditor’s report”
(Bédard, Coram, Espahbodi, and Mock 2016, 255). As auditors begin to explore leveraging
increasing amounts of Big Data and exercise new capabilities to integrate atypical audit
evidence, such as social media and corporate e-mail sentiment into audit workpaper files,
audit quality has significant potential to be improved. This is because there would be a
reduction in information asymmetry and the information gap between corporate insiders
and external users of the financial statements (Crawley and Wahlen 2014).
One way to reduce information asymmetry is through credible signaling (Spence
1973), which can improve the relevance of the auditor’s report. This is directly transferable
to auditing, because as LaFond and Watts (2008, 479) explain “In settings with higher
information asymmetries, the role of accounting is not to report equity values, but instead
to provide verifiable information useful for assessing alternative information sources on
equity values and mitigating agency costs.” Big Data and other external nontraditional
sources of audit evidence are often large-scale data that are inherently difficult to
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manipulate (Cao et al. 2015; Yoon, Hoogduin, and Zhang 2015); therefore, they are
credible sources of information and can reduce information asymmetry when incorporated
into the audit. Such data could help auditors provide a higher level of assurance on accounts
that may have previously lacked corroborative evidence. Social media as a subset of big
data can also serve as a platform to facilitate the flow of information between firms and
audit report users (Alexander and Gentry 2014). This will positively impact audit quality
because the usability of the financial statements to investors will be improved with the
inclusion of additional credible evidence in the audit process to support companies’
financial statement positions, as well as rapid dissertation of related information
(Lombardi, Bloch, and Vasarhelyi 2015; 2014).
Because the nature of many businesses, such as e-commerce companies, is evolving
with a technological emphasis, traditional auditing techniques may start to lose
effectiveness (AICPA 2012) in their capacity to enable auditors to provide reasonable
assurance on management assertions as auditors struggle to gain a comprehensive
understanding of clients’ business practices (Yoon et al. 2015; Kotb and Roberts 2011). As
technological advances push industries forward, the auditing profession will be inundated
with both pressures and opportunities to incorporate new technologies to further automate,
monitor, and develop audit procedures while also trying to assess information from clients’
continuous audit processes (Dzuranin and Mălăescu 2016).
One of the more recent opportunities arises from the advent of Big Data, as
corporations collect growing amounts of internal data (Cao, Chychyla, and Stewart 2015)
and exogenous Big Data sources become increasingly accessible (Brown-Liburd and
Vasarhelyi 2015). Big Data is data that can be defined qualitatively in terms of the four Vs:
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“massive Volume or size of the database, high Velocity of data added on a continuous
basis, large Variety of types of data, and uncertain Veracity” (Zhang, Yang, and
Appelbaum 2015, 469; Laney 2001; IBM 2012). As of 2013, over 98 percent of stored
information was captured electronically and this percentage will likely continue to grow
(Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013; Warren, Moffitt, and Byrnes 2015).
Confirmatory and predictive evidence is contained in telephone records and emails, security footage, GPS logs and RFID tags, and even social media postings (BrownLiburd and Vasarhelyi 2015; Eschenbrenner et al. 2015; Krahel and Titera 2015; Yoon et
al. 2015). Big Data provide opportunities for auditors to creatively develop new analytical
procedures such as benchmarking client website traffic data to that of competitors or
analyzing social media sentiments of a company (Rose et al. 2017; Yoon et al. 2015). A
disproportionate cost-benefit analysis once nullified the prospect of population testing in
favor of sampling (PCAOB 2011) because population testing was viewed as “a costly
method of last resort” (Krahel and Titera 2015, 417); however, now more sophisticated
technologies and audit analytics have enabled auditors to reexamine the viability of
population testing to substantially reduce risk in certain instances (Krahel and Titera 2015).
Techniques to draw information from Big Data for inclusion as complementary
audit evidence include pattern recognition, data mining, and natural-language processing
(Yoon et al. 2015). In a field study by Jans, Alles, and Vasarhelyi (2014), process mining
of event logs as an analytical procedure uncovered many instances of audit-relevant
information that internal auditors previously missed, signaling its potential use as a valueadded analytical procedure. However, it is important to note that auditors must become
trained in how to successfully use process-mining techniques and also learn to make
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“exceptions of exceptions” when process mining identifies an overwhelming number of
initial exceptions (Earley 2015; Dzuranin and Mălăescu 2016).
Data mining techniques can also be employed within going concern prediction
models (Martens, Bruynseels, Baesens, Willekens, and Vanthienen 2008). As Francis
(2004) points out, auditors are typically conservative when considering a company’s
capacity to continue in the following year, often erring on the side that a business will go
under. While a majority of going concern reports issued are type I errors (i.e., false
positives, which represent going concern reports issued to firms that persist), type II errors
(i.e., false negatives) are also frequent as demonstrated by the fact that 70 percent of
bankrupted companies do not receive going concern reports (Francis 2004). Martens et al.
(2008) find that a decision aid derived from AntMiner+ provides a higher level of
comprehensibility and intuitiveness compared to other techniques for going concern
prediction (C4.5, Logistic Regression, Support Vector Machines, and Majority Vote) with
prediction accuracy of the original sample of 97.16 percent that is not significantly different
from the other more complex and less user friendly procedures at the 5 percent significance
level. While such a technique will not immediately correct type I or type II error rates
significantly, it can help auditors gain a more tacit understanding of issuing a going concern
report and improve audit efficiency without a relative loss of effectiveness.
Some practitioners have called for updates in accounting and auditing standards to
support the transition that client accounting managers and auditors will undergo to integrate
Big Data and various electronic mediums more deeply into analytic processes. Krahel and
Titera (2015) argue that both accounting and auditing standards must take a renewed focus
on incoming data related to transactions, while simultaneously easing regulations related
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to presentation to best serve financial statement users. In fact, regulatory changes related
to issuers disseminating information in a nontraditional format has already begun, because
social media postings are now a recognized channel of distribution for financial
information (Trinkle, Crossler, and Bélanger 2015; SEC 2008, 2013; Alexander and
Gentry. 2014). This is an important consideration, since the release of information in these
formats is often not audited and nonprofessional investors may experience an expectation
gap in believing that information contained in a release is in fact audited in these instances
(Arnold 2016). Further, a recent study from Trinkle et al. (2015) finds that sentiments in
comments associated with these voluntary financial disclosures shared by social media can
influence nonprofessional investors. If studies find that these unaudited communications
can negatively impact the nonprofessional investor, then it seems likely that auditing
standards attached to these postings are a possible response to protect these investors;
otherwise, the auditing profession may find itself losing public credibility (Arnold 2016).
Aforementioned instances of population-level testing or process mining
promulgated by new auditing standards will help improve audit standardization and audit
quality in a new technologically advanced assurance landscape. Alles (2015) argues that
auditing standards are one of the biggest facilitators to the use of Big Data in audits because
they do not expressly constrain auditors from using Big Data. However, until auditing
standards explicitly suggest the use of Big Data, audit firms may be vulnerable to lagging
behind clients and other industries when it comes to utilizing advanced analytics until
greater pressure amasses from regulators or clients (Alles 2015; AICPA 2012). This is
partially because current standards do not provide guidelines about how Big Data can be
leveraged to establish adequate audit evidence that is compliant with AS 1215: Audit
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Documentation (PCAOB 2004) in light of the substantial availability of information
(Griffin and Wright 2015). Therefore, it falls to academics to help standard setters and
policy makers navigate the untapped potential embedded in a more rapid adoption of Big
Data analytics into the audit to help the audit profession keep pace with businesses. Future
research investigating how proposed audit standards that recommend the use of Big Data
when available can facilitate the development of effective auditing standards while also
educating practitioners about the inherent value in Big Data audit analytics.
However, the lack of personnel trained in Big Data audit analytics presents a major
obstacle to more rapid integration of Big Data into the audit (Alles 2015; Earley 2015).
Auditors may be overwhelmed with the complexity and unstructured nature of Big Data
(Brown-Liburd, Issa, and Lombardi 2015; Vasarhelyi et al. 2015), because humans have a
limited capacity to process large amounts of information (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015).
Information overload can lead to deficient audit judgments and cause auditors to give
undeserved attention to irrelevant information; meanwhile, unstructured data may cause
auditors to favor overly simplistic solutions in ambiguity-intolerant auditors (BrownLiburd et al. 2015). Future research should work to develop Big Data decision aids to help
alleviate the cognitive pressures associated with Big Data in hopes of helping auditors
avoid inappropriate heuristics and biases that may negatively impact audit quality. Based
on previous literature around decision aids (Rose 2002; Mălăescu and Sutton 2015), these
new decision aids should be designed with consideration of the auditor’s level of expertise
to mitigate issues related to overreliance or misuse. Additionally, training auditors on how
to effectively use decision aids might also help auditors avoid instances of technological
dominance in novice users or failure to integrate decision aids among experienced users.
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Academia will need to rapidly respond to a rising demand for increased data
analytic skills to empower new practitioners with the competency to recognize patterns in
Big Data so they can process information in an efficient and effective manner (BrownLiburd et al. 2015; Cao et al. 2015; Griffin and Wright 2015; Krahel and Titera 2015;
Vasarhleyi et al. 2015; Yoon et al. 2015). PwC’s (2015) whitepaper entitled, “Data Driven:
What students need to succeed in a rapidly changing business world,” emphasizes that
students will need to attain a higher level of technical competence than that previously seen
in audit professionals, and advocates for an increase in statistics and computational analytic
courses within undergraduate and graduate level curricula. To succeed in practice, auditors
will require an analytical mind with technical competencies, paired with business and
global acumen, as well as the capacity to build relationships (PwC 2015). For now,
increased contextual experience and firm trainings can help current practitioners acquire
the skills they need to start using Big Data (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015).
In addition to training auditors in how to use analytic tools, firms will also need to
develop new methodologies and processes while partnering with Big Data firms to
maintain audit efficiencies during implementation stages (Brown-Liburd et al. 2015;
Earley 2015). At the forefront of Big Data behavioral research is Rose et al. (2016), who
find that auditors are able to more successfully incorporate implications from Big Data
visualization evidence that contradicts management assertions into the audit plan when
presented with the Big Data visualizations subsequent to traditional audit evidence versus
before traditional audit evidence. Such behavioral insights related to the application of Big
Data in practice are vital to assist audit firms with updating firm processes so that they
facilitate comprehension and alleviate the risk of judgment biases.
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Additional concerns related to the efficacy of Big Data’s use in auditing are the
integrity and representativeness of the data (Dzuranin and Mălăescu 2016; Warren et al.
2015; Eschenbrenner et al. 2015; Wang and Cuthbertson 2015). For example, users of
social media websites are often not representative of an entire customer population (Yoon
et al. 2015). However, this concern is somewhat mitigated by the inherent nature of Big
Data’s composition as being of many sources (Cao et al. 2015), often externally created,
and gathered by auditors directly (Yoon et al. 2015). Access to and storage of data can also
create risks (Dzuranin and Mălăescu 2016); use of Big Data may increase litigation risks,
as audit firms and potentially audit clients develop Big Data archives that prosecutors may
data mine to collect evidence and calculate damages (Warren et al. 2015). Litigation
exposure related privacy issues associated with Big Data also poses a threat, so auditors
must carefully communicate expectations with clients and related parties (Cao et al. 2015;
Yoon et al. 2015).
Despite the risks, audit firms are publicly eager to integrate Big Data capabilities
into some audit services. Deloitte promotes its analytics and visualization solutions such
as STAR, Deloitte Optix, and Deloitte Signal, as well as its audit applications that include
Icount, Deloitte Online and Deloitte Connect, Argus, and Disclosure Analytics (Deloitte
2016), while EY advocates for its competitive edge through the integration of its
proprietary analytics software into the audit (EY 2016). KPMG and PwC have also both
released memorandums regarding the impact of Big Data on audits, clients, and firm
practitioners (KPMG 2012; KPMG 2014; PwC 2015). Firms are eager to leverage Big Data
to improve the audit, but it remains to be seen how auditing standards will respond to the
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reality of Big Data and its implications as they relate to audit evidence, audit processes,
and audit quality as a whole.

7.1. Future directions of auditing research on Big Data and nontraditional audit
evidence
RQ29. Where and how can auditors incorporate Big Data and nontraditional audit evidence
into analytical procedures or detailed audit test work to improve audit quality? Such
research can inform regulators and standard setters as to where auditing standards can
incorporate Big Data.
RQ30. Can training auditors in how to avoid judgment biases such as information overload
and shortcut heuristic processing help mitigate the risk that auditors will become
subjugated to these judgment traps when working with complex and large sources of data,
such as Big Data or nontraditional audit evidence?
RQ31. How do investors respond to voluntary disclosures involving Big Data? To what
extent would investors respond to Big Data evidence integrated into the audit as
corroborative evidence?
RQ32. What skillsets comprise a complete engagement team in future audits that
incorporate Big Data and data analytics? How will firms incorporate data analytics into
software (i.e. will they update proprietary software or purchase add-ons from third parties)?
VIII. CONCLUSION
This research synthesis has contributed to auditing literature by providing a
thorough examination and review of the extant literature relating technology to a
comprehensive characterization of audit quality as captured by the Center for Audit
Quality’s audit quality indicators (2014b) 1) Firm Leadership and Tone at the Top, 2)
Engagement Team Knowledge, Experience, and Workload, 3) Monitoring, and 4) Auditor
Reporting. This mapping helps elucidate the linkage between technology and audit quality,
while also ensuring that a thorough examination of audit quality is considered. Because
there was an entire subset of literature that was not represented by the designated CAQ’s
audit quality indicators, I also contribute to the literature by proposing an emerging fifth
audit quality indicator, Big Data and Nontraditional Audit Evidence. This indicator can
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contribute to audit quality by improving the usability of financial statements through the
reduction of information asymmetry. Finally, I contribute to the literature through this
synthesis by suggesting future avenues of research that are integral to understanding how
technology will continue to influence the audit engagement and how it may be managed.
Such research will be necessary to help policy makers and standard setters develop
regulations that assist auditors during a time of rapid technological growth while
maintaining audit quality.
There are at least three limitations to consider when reflecting on this literature
review. There is an unavoidable validity issue of the publication bias (Andiola et al. 2016),
since studies with null findings and/or contradictory findings are less likely to be published.
This issue is associated with the second limitation which is that relevant literature may not
have been included in this review (Andiola et al. 2016); however, care was taken to track
search terms in multiple databases as well as cross checking article reference lists to
develop a comprehensive catalogue of articles and germane literature.

Finally, this

synthesis captures a moment in time, a point that is especially pertinent when discussing a
subject that by its nature is prone to rapid change, technology. Therefore, the insights
developed in this synthesis should be used as a starting point for future researchers to
quickly attain a thorough understanding and synopsis of how technology has impacted
audit quality to date, while also serving as a springboard for new research.
Findings from this literature review indicate that auditors generally perceive IT
tools as conducive to the audit, and the level of restrictiveness in audit support systems is
indicative of firms’ tone at the top. In practice, technology helps audit firms achieve
compliance with auditing standards, gain efficiencies in engagements, and increases
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productivity overall. However, overreliance on technology may cause young practitioners
to be subjugated to technological dominance, potentially threatening audit quality.
Furthermore, PCAOB inspections reveal that auditors often inappropriately rely on client
systems or fail to adequately test complex client IT internal controls. The latter is especially
problematic, as deficient client IT controls have been shown to have far-reaching and
detrimental effects on financial reporting. Figure 1.4 summarizes key outcomes associated
with the implementation of IT in the audit on audit quality.
[INSERT FIGURE 1.4 ABOUT HERE]
Therefore, it is vital that auditors continue to improve system competencies to
develop higher levels of IT skill sets and advanced audit techniques to respond to complex
client systems. Auditors and educators should look to invest greater time to helping
practitioners learn more sophisticated analytical skills to ensure that auditors are able to
leverage Big Data and nontraditional audit evidence in a meaningful fashion. Auditing
researchers should facilitate discussions with accounting firms to understand how the audit
process is evolving as a means of identifying contemporaneous issues that need attention
from academics such as identifying new judgment biases related to technology, validating
best practices in an electronic audit, and improving the usability of financials through
nontraditional audit evidence.
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FIGURE 1.1
Audit Quality Indicators
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FIGURE 1.2
Extant Auditing and Accounting Literature Related to IT Categorized by AQI
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FIGURE 1.3
Method used in Extant Auditing and Accounting Literature Related to Information
Technology
Number of observations = 104
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FIGURE 1.4
Outcomes Associated with Information Technology’s Impact on Audit Quality: Costs and Benefits

59

PART II: TECHNOLOGY-BASED AUDIT TOOLS: INSTITUTIONAL WORK
AND AUDIT QUALITY IN NON-GLOBAL NETWORK FIRMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this qualitative study, I examine dynamic processes of institutional change
prompted by technological advances in the audit workplace, through the lens of
institutional theory. Although institutional theory’s origins stem from the study of
conformity among organizations, we continue to witness the rise of industry leaders among
similar organizations. Why do some organizations, and some individuals within
organizations, succeed in embracing and mastering the continuing changes associated with
technological advances? The theory of “institutional work” has emerged as a stream of
literature under the umbrella of institutional theory to address this question, exploring how
change is experienced by institutions, institutional concepts, and the institutional fields that
house these items (Seo and Creed 2002). I study how responsive behaviors of institutional
agents (in this setting, in-charge auditors) amass to actions that prompt how institutions
(i.e., audit firms themselves), institutional concepts (e.g., audit quality), and the
institutional field of the auditing profession undergo change. In the parlance of institutional
theory, technological change is an “institutional disruptor,” and auditors’ reactions to such
disruptions are the essence of institutional work. The purpose of this study is to examine
auditors’ responses to technology, and to consider how the institutional concept of audit
quality is impacted.
Technology is of particular importance to auditing, because of its ubiquitous impact
on audit practices across firms around the globe. Although technology is often assumed to
enhance audit quality, prior research suggests mixed evidence regarding its ability to
improve effectiveness and efficiency in practice (Arnold 2016; Bedard Deis, Curtis, and
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Jenkins 2008; Dowling and Leech 2007; Downey and Bedard 2018; Earley 2015).
Specifically, firms can experience unforeseen growing pains when implementing new
technology, such as resistance to appropriate use of technology tools (Dowling 2009;
Bedard, Ettredge, and Johnstone 2006), and the development of new audit risks directly
related to technology (PCAOB 2013). Non-global network firms (NGNFs) (i.e., firms other
than the “Global 7”) engage a significant market share of audit and assurance clients, and
thus audit quality for those firms has implications for investors, clients, regulators, and the
public market alike (Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zhang 2011). Furthermore, recent
research suggests these NGNFs have continued to increase their market share over public
company audits (DeFond, Francis, and Hallman 2018). It follows that these NGNFs should
continue to increase their investments in technology-based audit tools (TBATs)9, and
develop related TBAT processes and networks to meet the needs of their expanding client
base (Lowe, Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Jenkins 2018; Bills, Hayne, and Stein 2018).
Our understanding of the modern technological landscape within auditing firms has
become opaque with the evolution of TBATs, as extant literature struggles to reflect rapid
changes in how auditors engage with these tools on a daily basis to impact audit quality.
Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe (2008, 2009) and Lowe et al. (2018) are among the few
studies that explicitly consider technology use across audit firms of different sizes, and
these surveys offer an initial depiction of the state of technology use in audit firms.
Therefore, providing a rich description of how auditors use TBATs, as well as how related
TBAT processes evolve, are significant contributions of this study. This study also
contributes to the literature by bringing institutional theory to life in a professional setting.

9

Technology-based audit tools (TBATs) include computer-aided audit tool systems (CAATS), computer
systems and various technology-based practice aids leveraged in the audit process.
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I provide data to address Hwang and Colyvas’s (2011) call to identify how institutional
agents’ interests materialize and how they become a collective (if at all) as an important
area of mapping the process of institutional work in a real-world context. More specifically,
findings from this study extend theory by offering insights as to how an inconspicuous
institutional agent, such as an in-charge auditor, can impart lasting institutional work to
influence an institutional field by altering its concepts. Results from this study provide a
challenge to the assumption that institutional work must originate from agents predisposed
to high levels of organizational power. Finally, this study contributes to an outstanding
theatrical debate by suggesting non-industry leaders and their members are indeed
important constituents of institutional work.
I investigate the use of TBATs employed by NGNFs across a spectrum of firm sizes
using mixed methods. I collect data using a pre-interview survey to complement results of
semi-structured interviews in which in-charge auditors discuss two process experiences:
one in which TBAT use enhanced an engagement, and another in which TBAT use
hindered an engagement. To develop my research instrument and analyze results, I
consider how institutional agents impart change on an institutional core concept: audit
quality. I identify what motivates in-charge auditors to engage in institutional work, and
how these antecedents relate to different domains of institutional work. I also make
suggestions for practice to encourage acts of institutional work that may improve audit
quality.
Findings suggest audit firm culture, engagement budgets, and trainings are several
of the most important antecedents of in-charges’ institutional work that impact audit
quality. Participants from NGNFs are more likely to engage in creating and maintaining
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institutional work that has a positive impact on audit quality when firms communicate
cultures dedicated to TBAT innovation and actively solicit feedback related to TBATs.
Interestingly, a few participants report creating forms of institutional work as a response to
budgetary pressures. These auditors proactively seek out interactions with audit clients and
third-party TBAT vendors to overcome technology issues and facilitate TBAT workflows.
These interactions generally focus on ways to ensure client data are compatible with TBAT
capabilities, to avoid disruptions during engagements; such encounters offer practical
implications firms may consider to support audit quality. Findings also suggest that the
quality and complexity of training and available TBAT resources impact in-charges’
likelihood of engaging in acts of institutional work. Some participants suggest trainings at
present are rudimentary and lack real-world applicability, which can result in acts of
disruptive institutional work that threaten audit quality. Firms will need to be mindful when
designing training teams and content to address emerging hazards of implementing new
TBATs on engagements.
The remainder of this paper is organized into five sections. Section II discusses the
background literature and theoretical foundation as they relate to two research questions.
Section III explains the research method, including participants and design of the
instrument. Section IV provides an overview of results. Section V offers implications for
practice. Finally, section IV puts forth concluding remarks.
II.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

Literature Review
While some prior research examines technology use and its impact on the audit
process and audit quality among global-network firms (GNFs) (i.e., the Big 4, BDO, Grant
Thornton, and RSM) (e.g., Dowling 2009; Dowling and Leech 2007, 2014; Carson and
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Dowling 2012; Downey and Bedard 2018), research that explores how technology has
influenced audit practices in non-global network firms (NGNFs) (i.e., firms other than the
GNFs) is scarce (DeFond, Francis, and Hallman 2018).10 Scholars and professional bodies
alike (e.g., the American Institute of CPAs; AICPA) have advocated for studying NGNFs
(Tysiac 2015), because the lack of research examining these firms clouds our
understanding of their capabilities, demands, and opportunities to engage in technological
innovations, as well as their ability to correct technological missteps as a means of
supporting audit quality. Additionally, the more recent transition of NGNFs to a TBAT
orientation makes them a better and more relevant population to study than GNFs, as
related growing pains are fresh for observation.
Janvrin et al. (2008, 2009) and Lowe et al. (2018) are the only studies of which I
am aware that specifically consider the role of TBATs in NGNFs. Janvrin et al. (2008)
survey auditors from a mixed sample of Big 4, national, regional, and local firms, and find
that auditors of Big 4 firms place a greater emphasis on IT tools in the audit process relative
to auditors of smaller firms. However, the Janvrin et al.’s (2008, 2009) studies are over a
decade old, and it remains unknown how the use of technology in audit processes differ
between firm types. In a follow-up to these studies, Lowe et al. (2018) find national firms
report having the greatest level of use and perceived importance of IT use related to audit
applications. These findings suggest NGNFs have transitioned to integrate increasing

The scholarly focus on the GNFs is due to several factors, including GNFs’ large market share of audit
clients, relationships with researchers that facilitates access to data, and ease of market stratification. But this
focus leads to an incomplete understanding of the audit market, as we cannot assume findings from studies
of GNFs generalize to NGNFs. Contrasting levels of resources available to invest in IT infrastructure between
GNFs versus NGNFs (DeFond 2010; Bedard et al. 2008; Janvrin et al. 2008, 2009), and the disparate level
of power and influence the PCAOB has over GNFs relative to NGNFs given these firms’ predominately
private client bases (Lennox and Pittman 2010; DeFond 2010; Janvrin et al. 2008), have likely led to
differences in forms of audit technology and related processes between respective firm types.
10
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amounts of technology into the audit process to levels similar to GNFs, serving as an
important motivator to this research.
Institutional Theory
Institutional theory provides a valuable theoretical lens in which to examine the
responsive behaviors of auditors as a result of increasingly technologically driven audit
processes.11 Historically, institutional theory has emphasized the necessity of conformity
of an organization to other peer organizations as a means of survival (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Oliver 1991). Isomorphic forces (i.e., mimetic, normative, and coercive pressures)
cause organizations to become increasingly similar over time (Scott 2013). Despite
institutional theory’s implications about the adaptation of organizations toward a common
form, real world organizations are not static. Indeed, institutions, institutional concepts,
and institutional fields evolve over time. Such dynamism at first appears paradoxical within
the ambit of institutional theory’s core notion of assimilation; however, the concept of
institutional work offers a theoretical explanation for such changes (Oliver 1991;
Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Seo and Creed 2002).
Institutional Work
Institutional change refers not only to change within organizations themselves, but
also includes change across the institutional field and the field’s unique institutional
concepts. Importantly, institutional change does not exist in a vacuum prompted by
superstructure forces, but rather is prompted by organizationally relevant and individual

11

This study does not rely on the widely used unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (Davis
1989), as it is difficult to identify ex ante the ways in which this theory would be extended in the setting of
NGNFs. Additionally, the methodology of semi-structured interviews does not lend to the use of the TAM.
Alternatively, application of institutional theory can put theory to practice by helping us grow our
understanding of how institutional work occurs at a process level – whereas literature to date has heavily
theorized rather than applied institutional work in a professional context.
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players who engage in what is known as institutional work. Institutional work is defined as
“purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining, and
disrupting institutions” (p 215, Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). However, identification of
institutional work as purely “purposive” has more recently been revised by its founding
fathers (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009; 2011) and challenged by scholars (Smets and
Jarzabkowski 2013). I therefore follow the suggestion from Lawrence et al. (2009) to adopt
a definition of institutional work based on its effects when analyzing micro-processes, thus
including agents’ intentional and unintentional institutional works.
Institutional change likely occurs because of both macro-macro events (structure
and field-level forces influencing the institution), as well as micro-macro events (individual
agents influencing the institution). With attention to the latter, research suggests that
individual agents can impart change on institutions as these organizations encounter
exogenous shocks. Technological change as an exogenous shock likely represents a
disruptive event, as organizations wrestle with the challenge of implementing new
technologies in a seamless manner (Malsch and Gendron 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence
2010). During this transitional time, it seems likely that institutional agents will engage in
actions (i.e., work) that contribute to the development of new organizational practices (i.e.,
creation), the continuance of organizational practices (i.e., maintenance), and/or the breach
of established organizational practices (i.e., disruption) (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010;
Hayne and Free 2014).
In an accounting setting that examines how the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO) prompted different forms of institutional work among a variety of
institutional agents to impact the adoption of the enterprise risk management framework,
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Hayne and Free (2014) identify nine behaviors of creation, six behaviors of maintenance,
and three behaviors of disruption. For example, creation as institutional work includes
behaviors that educate (e.g., promulgating skills and access to vital information to educate
other agents in learning a new process), maintenance as institutional work includes
behaviors that police current practices (e.g., engaging in oversight activities performed to
enforce, audit, and monitor compliance), and disruption as institutional work includes
behaviors that undermine assumptions and beliefs (e.g., challenging perceptions associated
with costs and risks of innovation and differentiation by weakening the core assumptions
and beliefs of an institution) (Hayne and Free 2014). The scholarly literature around
institutional work comprises mostly theoretical works, with limited application of the
theory in practice (e.g., Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). The only example of which I am
aware of a functional context of institutional work in an accounting setting comes from
Hayne and Free (2014).
Public Accounting as a Context for Institutional Work
In an audit setting, the institutional field is the profession of public accounting, and
it houses institutional concepts (e.g., audit quality; auditor independence). Such concepts
are often complex and multifaceted. These concepts are unique to a field in that they are
institutionally derived from both explicitly and implicitly agreed upon meanings by
institutional players (i.e., institutions and agents of these institutions). The public
accounting profession as a field is a particularly rich setting in which to apply modern
institutional theory in a professional context, as the field encompasses a range of both
mature and evolving participants who span generations, nationalities, and cultures
(Greenwood et al 2002; Wilkinson, Arnold, and Sutton 2003; Greenwood and Suddaby
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2006; Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam 2009; Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015;
Westermann, Bedard, and Earley 2015).
These participants take multiple forms, including central organizations (i.e., which
represent industry leaders; e.g., Big N firms), peripheral organizations (i.e., non-industry
leading firms, encompassed by the term NGNFs), and boundary participants. Boundary
participants represent entities that interact with central and peripheral organizations, but
primarily operate on tangential institutional fields. In the context of public accounting,
these boundary participants include oversight bodies (e.g., PCAOB, AICPA), audit report
clients, third-party vendors (e.g., audit software developer/vendors, training firms, etc.),
and financial marketplace investors (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). To date, literature
leveraging institutional theory from an accounting firm-level perspective has exclusively
focused on the largest audit firms, which represent central organizations (e.g., Greenwood
et al. 2002; Wilkinson et al. 2003; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Kornberger, Justesen,
and Mouritsen 2011; Carter and Spence 2014; Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2015).
However, literature suggesting whether central or peripheral institutional members are
more likely to engage in significant institutional work presents an interesting question.
The ambiguity around how central and peripheral institutional players contribute to
institutional work challenges an innate assumption that marketplace leaders, such as GNFs,
unanimously shape the profession. On one hand, Greenwood et al. (2002) suggest GNFs
can initiate change because they are less captured by prevailing routines, more attuned to
emerging global opportunities, and have political resources that enable them to resist
traditional practices. Alternatively, commentaries from leading scholars (Alles 2015;
Arnold 2016), extant research (Carson and Dowling 2012; Dowling and Leech 2014), and

68

public communications from Big 4 firms (Deloitte 2016; EY 2016; KPMG 2014; PwC
2015) suggest GNFs, in spite of these resources, may ironically be more constrained than
smaller firms in their ability to engage in institutional work to promote institutional change.
These sources suggest that isomorphic pressures prompt GNFs to a greater level of
homogeneity to keep pace with one another, relative to NGNFs. Specifically, GNFs have
greater pressure from the public, clients, and regulators to aspire to a high benchmark of
technology-based audit processes, relative to their NGNF peers. The isomorphic pressures
that drive GNFs to converge their practices toward one another may mitigate risk and
increase perceptions of legitimacy when regulation is ambiguous (Griffith et al. 2015).
Additionally, these GNFs are likely entrenched in established audit practices given the
significant costs of proprietary IT-infrastructure already in place, which would suggest a
limited ability for agents of these GNFs to engage in institutional work relative to a more
agile NGNF setting.
Meanwhile, the role of NGNFs as peripheral organizations and their capacity to
engage in institutional work is unexamined but appears a promising context. The less
established nature of NGNFs’ technological structures suggests these firms and their
members may have greater capacity to engage in meaningful institutional work relative to
GNFs. The extent to which NGNFs have responded to technological disruptions infiltrating
audit practice, and how agents of these organizations engage in institutional work, are
important but unstudied issues. Greenwood et al. (2002) offer that that institutional
pressures influence NGNFs more heavily, because these firms are more dependent on
professional associations to reproduce prevailing practices and are thus embedded deeply
in institutional routines. However, despite these predictions, more recent theoretical and
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empirical research challenges these assumptions. Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) suggest
institutional innovators are often from peripheral positions in the field (i.e., non-central
organizations); which means NGNFs are likely institutional innovators within the
accounting field relative to GNFs as central organizations.
Indeed, network location theory suggests peripheral organizational players are
more likely to disengage from institutional practices (i.e., those behaviors which are
established and accepted by institutions and their agents, such as using audit checklists)
because they are: “less connected to other organizations…and thus less embedded in
institutional expectations…less aware of institutional expectations because of their weak
field-level connection to institutional processes…often disadvantaged by prevailing
arrangements and stand to benefit from change” (p 29, Greenwood and Suddaby 2006).
These ideas echo Seo and Creed’s (2002) institutional contradictions12 – as central
organizations are likely to have significant commitments to costly existing IT
infrastructures. This may cause instances of GNFs becoming unwittingly cemented with
engaging in inefficient “ceremonial” practices that are accepted as legitimate by other elite
institutions (Meyers and Rowan 1977). Such ceremonial practices are behaviors that do not
intrinsically enrich an institution, but rather these behaviors are perpetuated so an
organization can be perceived as meeting expected institutional standards of quality that
may be implicitly or explicitly established (e.g., the use of standardized templates on highly
unique clients).

12

The four sources of institutional contractions include: 1) legitimacy that undermines functional efficiency;
2) adaption that undermines adaptability; 3) intrainstitutional conformity that creates interinstitutional
incompatibilities; and 4) isomorphism that conflicts with divergent interests (Seo and Creed 2002).
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Notably, NGNFs have probably evolved to possess technological resources and
capabilities that are different from those of GNFs, as NGNFs are more apt to employ
commercially available software packages and/or join networks or outsource for IT
specialists and competencies (Bills et al. 2018; DeFond 2010; Bedard et al. 2008).
Interestingly, Dowling and Leech (2007) suggest there is evidence of significant variation
even across five large international audit firms in audit support systems and audit decision
aids deployed. Such findings suggest even greater variation in technology-based audit tool
(TBAT) usage among NGNFs. NGNFs are motivated by fierce market competition to
innovate, although less constrained to do so by coercive pressures; making NGNFs
potentially more agile as peripheral field members. This context offers important
opportunities to identify common patterns of antecedents of institutional work that
promotes organizational goals among a diverse group of NGNFs using varied TBATs.
Research Questions
Research suggests most individual agents in organizations are not institutional
entrepreneurs (i.e., they do not set out with the intention of pursuing institutional work),
but rather engage in institutional work from a practical perspective to get the job done –
indicating a wide scope of agents likely contribute to institutional change (Smets and
Jarzabkowski 2013). Importantly, we can’t assume auditors have a similar impetus or the
same opportunities to engage in institutional work across different firms (Hwang and
Colyvas 2011), thus it is important to study auditors from a variety of NGNFs to observe
the spectrum of how different factors prompt auditors to engage in institutional work.
Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013) suggest institutional work is not necessarily intentional
and highly effortful by agents, but may occur naturally as agents strive to fulfill their
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organizational duties as a means to an end – Lawrence et al. (2011) say it likely occurs in
the “everyday getting by of individuals” (p 57). This suggests it is appropriate to examine
in-charge auditors’ role in institutional work, because in-charges are largely responsible
for daily operations to facilitate engagements.
Prior literature on institutional change has been focused on institutional
entrepreneurship (i.e., interactions between and among collective institutions that produce
new structures or regimes) and outcomes, rather than micro day-to-day level changes that
occur between the agent and his/her institution. Extant research on institutional work has
often overemphasized a focus on institutional outcomes instead of institutional processes
being the core of the “institutional story” as a representation of institutions’ lifecycles
(Suddaby 2010; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Malsch and Gendron 2013). Thus, my
research questions focus on institutional work related to TBAT use at the process level of
audit engagements.
Proponents of a more purist perspective of institutional theory may argue in-charge
auditors of NGNFs cannot possibly engage in institutional work – as their actions will only
impact their individual organizations. However, I challenge this idea by suggesting these
individual agents of peripheral organizations can and do impart lasting institutional change
by way of shifting institutional paradigms of a construct: audit quality. Audit quality is a
shared institutional concept, and when individual agents impact a field level construct, they
have effected institutional change outside of their individual organizations. Among
NGNFs, audit quality is generally assessed in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of
engagements. However, it remains a question as to whether various outcomes of
institutional work in this context are positive, negative, or more likely – mixed.
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A natural sequence of inquiry suggests first to identify drivers that prompt in-charge
auditors to engage in institutional work within their respective environments, and second
to classify and catalogue forms of institutional work. This leads to my research questions:
RQ1 What factors impact in-charge auditors’ likelihood of engaging in institutional
work of creation, maintenance, or disruption to impact how TBATs are used within audit
engagements?

RQ2 In what forms of institutional work of creation, maintenance, or disruption do incharge auditors engage at a process level within audit engagements in relation to their
use of TBATs?
III.

METHOD

I used a mixed methods qualitative approach of both a pre-interview questionnaire
and semi-structured interviews to examine my research questions. Collecting survey data
paired with semi-structured interviews help validate interpretive findings (Malsch and
Salterio 2016) of the results.13 A pre-interview questionnaire enables the participant to
become acquainted with the subject of the study to facilitate rich data collection (Kenno,
McCracken, and Salterio 2017). It also allowed me to collect demographic and
complementary survey data, which enriches the interpretation of the semi-structured
interviews. Additionally, semi-structured interviews provide flexibility to explore a subject
by leveraging a list of pre-defined interview questions – while still allowing for fluidity in
the order and exact content of questions (e.g., pursing emergent lines of questioning as
appropriate) (Kenno et al. 2017).
Participants

13

I do not provide a separate analysis of the pre-interview survey outside of demographic information
because survey data is redundant with that contained in semi-structured interviews.
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I surveyed and interviewed twenty-eight in-charge auditors14 from NGNFs.
Participants with a supervisory rank are an appropriate sample to interview, because they
represent the “boots-on-the-ground” practitioners who are likely utilizing TBATs to the
highest degree among engagement team members. Theory predicts these institutional
agents are likely to engage in instances of institutional work, and such institutional work
may impact audit quality. Using auditors of NGNFs as participants further allows me to
examine the theoretical tension around whether members of peripheral organizations may
be significant drivers of change through their acts of institutional work – as agents of these
firms are often overlooked in the accounting literature. Importantly, there is a theoretical
paradox intrinsic to the idea of an individual agent imparting change on an organization –
as there is a circular relationship between agents who are in part shaped by their institutions
and yet also working to shape the organizations of which they are a part (Lawrence et al.
2009). However, agents of peripheral organizations are particularly well positioned to
engage in acts of institutional work, because I expect they are less subject to this
“embedded agent paradox.” It seems likely that in-charge auditors can effect change more
easily given the smaller organizational stage within an NGNF’s audit environment, relative
to a GNF’s audit environment, which is entrenched in proprietary technology already
dispersed on a global scale. The setting of a NGNF parallels the familiar idiom of big fish,
small pond, because in-charge auditors of NGNFs are naturally positioned to exert greater
influence than in-charge auditors of GNFs within their respective organizations.

14

Note, this number includes four audit managers and one senior manager who were recently promoted
within the last year. However, I do not distinguish these participants from others because participants were
selected based on their supervisory “in-charge” role over the audit, suggesting all participants filled similar
roles on engagements despite differences in title.
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To address my research questions, I engaged a heterogeneous sample of auditors
from a spectrum of ten different NGNFs that capture small, mid-size, and large firms. Of
participants, 10.71 (17.86) percent work for a large (small) NGNF with more (less) than
ninety-nine (eleven) offices. Participants represent a range of industry concentrations
including manufacturing (40.74 percent), services (29.63 percent), and finance, insurance,
& real estate (14.81 percent). A majority (74.07 percent) of participants hold a CPA license,
and the average (median) age of participants is 28.26 (27) years old. Comprehensive
demographic information is summarized in Table 2.1.
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Development of the research instruments
Based on prior literature and theory, I developed a pre-interview questionnaire and
interview protocol in tandem. I pilot tested both instruments on three in-charge auditors
from NGNFs. The pre-interview questionnaire provides participants with the study’s
background information and researchers’ backgrounds before collecting information about
participant demographics. The pre-interview questionnaire then reiterates the definition of
TBATs to facilitate participant comprehension on the subject matter, and asks respondents
related survey and short open-ended questions regarding TBAT opinions and usage.
Prior literature suggests it can be helpful to prime participants about discussion
topics ahead of being interviewed to facilitate understanding and discussion within an
efficient window during the interview (e.g., Hux, Bedard, and Noga 2018). Thus, to support
rich data collection, the pre-interview questionnaire closes with prompting participants to
ex ante identify two complementary experiences to be discussed during the upcoming
interview: one in which a TBAT or TBAT component facilitated the achievement of audit
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effectiveness and/or efficiency (hereafter termed the “facilitating experience”), and one in
in which a TBAT or TBAT component hindered the achievement of audit effectiveness
and/or efficiency (hereafter termed the “hindering experience”). For each, participants are
asked to rate the difficulty of identifying the experience on a ten-point Likert-scale ranging
from 1 (Not Difficult) to 10 (Very Difficult), as well as the complexity of the identified
facilitating experience and the identified hindering experience on a ten-point Likert-scale
ranging from 1 (Not Complex) to 10 (Very Complex). These questions are important to
reduce noise in the analysis, and confirm results are not being driven solely by 1) a
fundamental difference in difficulty of recalling a facilitating experience versus a hindering
experience example, nor 2) the complexity of the identified engagement example in the
context chosen to discuss. A two-tailed t-test suggests there is no difference in the difficulty
of recalling a facilitating experience versus a hindering experience example (p = 0.22).
Additionally, the complexity of identified engagements (p = 0.06) participants chose to
discuss is not significantly different.
In accordance with Kenno et al. (2017), I strategically ordered the interview
questions to ask process questions first, followed by more general and/or opinion questions
to achieve a high level of validity. Process questions rather than general questions leads to
capturing variation and accuracy of the recall (Kenno et al. 2017; e.g., Downey and Bedard
2018; Hux et al. 2018). Process questions focusing on experiences in which a TBAT or
TBAT component facilitated (hindered) the achievement of audit effectiveness and/or
efficiency were structured to be closely parallel to enhance validity between comparability
of process stories from a single participant. These process questions were also randomized
between participants. Half of participants were asked to discuss the facilitating experience
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first, while the other half of participants were asked discuss the hindering experience first.
The interview protocol is included in Appendix A.
Data collection
Two researchers and I collected data between July 2018 through November 2018.15
Participants received an electronic link to the pre-interview questionnaire to complete the
survey through Qualtrics. The pre-interview questionnaire took a median of 30 minutes to
complete. Upon each participant’s successful completion of the survey, a second researcher
and I conducted semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interviews were all
conducted via Zoom and took a median of 53 minutes to conduct. Another researcher and
I participated in each interview, with myself leading the interview while the second
researcher took detailed notes (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal 2009). Just before
the interview began, I reminded participants of their anonymity to promote candid
responses (Cassell and Symon 2004) and encouraged them to ask any questions they may
have had prior to commencing the discussion. Interviews were recorded with each
interviewee’s permission, and then professionally transcribed by a third party to facilitate
detailed analysis (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2002).
Data analysis
A second researcher and I conducted multiple rounds of dual coding on twenty-five
percent of the semi-structured interview transcripts to support accurate interpretation and
validity of data.16 I leveraged first-level and second-level provisional coding practices to

15

Semi-structured interviews are discussion-based interactions between the researcher and subject, in which
the researcher asks the participant a series of pre-ordered questions while simultaneously allowing some
flexibility for the discussion to deviate from the predefined interview questions when necessary
16
The dual coding process requires that two researchers independently code data in accordance with an
agreed coding schema.
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organize the data (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014; e.g., Durocher, Gendron, and
Picard 2015; Hazgui and Gendron 2015). I began by developing a start list17 of codes that
included process categories of institutional work related to creation, maintenance, and
disruption adapted from the framework developed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006).18
The complete coding scheme was developed through an iterative process, and is based on
expected and likely answers from a mix of prior audit technology literature (Janvrin et al.
2008, 2009; Lowe, Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Jenkins 2018; Westermann et al. 2015;
Dowling 2009; Curtis and Payne 2008; Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Lowe 2014; Hayne and
Free 2014; Bedard et al. 2006), theory (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence Suddaby,
and Leca 2011), emergent themes (Miles and Huberman 1994; Kenno et al. 2017; Power
and Gendron 2015; Malsch and Salterio 2016) and discussion between a second researcher
and myself.
Following Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) and recommendations from Langley
(1999) in process research, coders reviewed transcripts of the interviews for instances of
“practice” each auditor discussed. Practice is defined as “shared routines…that guide
behavior according to the situation…practices ‘belong’ to social groups, rather than to
individuals…” (p 192, Ziestma and Lawrence 2010). The second researcher and I identified
forms of institutional work that materialized within aspects of the engagement discussed
by coding for behaviors that resulted in outcomes of creation, maintenance, and disruption
of audit practice. Interviews with the in-charge auditors suggest they primarily engage in
five forms of creating institutional works, four forms of maintaining institutional works,

“Start lists are researcher-generated codes, based on what preparatory investigation suggests might appear
in the data before they are collected and analyzed. Provision codes can be revised, modified, deleted, or
expanded to include new code,” (Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014, 77).
18
See Hayne and Free (2014) for an example of this approach in a different context.
17
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and five forms of disrupting institutional works. Although certain acts of institutional work
can sometimes be classified within multiple domains of institutional work categories, we
code acts of institutional work so that a given act of institutional work will only be assigned
to a single primary domain (i.e., creating, maintaining, or disrupting) to facilitate analysis.
Acts of identified institutional work are classified according to one of the three domains
based on characterizations form Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) and summarized in Table
2.2.
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
We coded for factors that impacted that likelihood of institutional work by
vouching previously identified forms of institutional work back to express antecedents
participants used to explain why they engaged in acts of institutional work. The initial list
was comprised of antecedents predicted by theory, literature, and updated to include
emerging antecedents. The final listing of antecedents is included in Table 2.3.
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Dual coding of the three pilot interviews according to the initial coding scheme
resulted in an intercoder agreement of 92.38 percent (Kappa = 0.84, indicating substantial
agreement; Landis and Koch 1977). The coding scheme was then further refined through
discussion between the coders and validated with another round of dual coding (Saldaña
2015). We maintained a high level of intercoder agreement after the final round of coding,
and ultimately achieved intercoder agreement of 95.31 percent (Kappa = 0.88). Any
disagreements were reconciled through discussion between the second coder and myself. I
then coded the remaining semi-structured interviews in accordance with the final coding
scheme.
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Leveraging the frequency of each code within and across interview transcripts
recorded in NVivo facilitated my analysis of emergent themes and patterns as done in prior
literature (e.g., Hux et al. 2018). To understand how antecedents motivate different forms
of auditors’ institutional work, I used the coded data to create network maps by drawing
associations from antecedents to acts of institutional work for each participant (Miles et al.
2014; Mertler 2018). I then sorted and compiled individual network maps into three
collective network maps by domain of institutional work: creating works; maintaining
works; and disrupting works. Each collective network map compiles and translates
individual participant data into a composite summary of how antecedents within audit firms
are associated with in-charge auditors’ acts of institutional work within a given domain of
institutional work. The full models of the collective network maps for each domain of
institutional work are included in appendix B.
To enhance the interpretability and comprehension around the multidimensional
associations, I incorporated the concept of ant-trails when developing the collective
network maps, as explained by Heylighen (1999).
Imagine two parallel trails, A and B, leading to the same source. At first, an individual ant
is as likely to choose A as it is to choose B. So, on average there will be as many ants
leaving the nest through A as through B. Let us assume that path B is a little shorter than
A. In that case, the ants that followed B will come back to the nest with food a little more
quickly. Thus, the pheromones on B will be reinforced more quickly than those on A, and
the trail will become relatively stronger… Thus, the ants are constantly tracing and
updating an intricate network of trails which indicate the most efficient ways to reach
different food sources. (p 260, Heylighen 1999)

Building on the behavior underlying ant-trails, I matched the thickness of links between
each antecedent and each act of institutional work to correspond to the frequency count of
individual participants who “walked” that given path. Therefore, thicker links between

80

antecedents and acts of institutional work capture associations that are more heavily
trafficked among participants, and arguably stronger. Employing this method allows me to
identify concentrated relationships between antecedents and acts of institutional works that
are frequently traveled, while also capturing the existence of varied realities among
individual participants within a single visual aid.
This method is consistent with a constructivist approach in which individuals’
realities are socially constructed, and appropriate given the research questions’ aim to
analyze complex human behaviors in varied environments (Power and Gendron 2015). In
addition to using collective network maps as a visual aid to elucidate patterns within the
data (Sloan 2009), it also serves as a validation method to support the internal validity of
prior coding. Drawing concept maps for each participant required me to trace antecedents
forward to actions, thereby confirming the original coding assignments that were initially
applied using a vouching direction.
To consider implications for audit quality, I analyzed the data for common patterns
while considering how TBATs and related TBAT practices impact audit quality for the
participating firms. I do not retain a formal definition of audit quality. Instead I analyze
audit quality from an efficiency and effectiveness standpoint, because participating
auditors generally assess the implications of their actions using these qualifiers.
IV.

RESULTS

Results from the semi-structured interviews are presented as ordered discussions
relating antecedents of specific instances of institutional work by domain of institutional
work – first antecedents of creating institutional works, second antecedents of maintaining
institutional works, and third antecedents of disrupting institutional works. I do not provide
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a separate analysis of the pre-interview survey, because survey data was used as a
validation method and is redundant with participant-matched interviews. I also choose not
to separate results according to facilitating versus hindering engagements, because many
participants discussed facilitating and hindering aspects of process experiences within a
single engagement. As such, the data does not lend itself toward bifurcating between these
qualifiers. Following prior literature, I use the subsequent terms to signal percentage
response frequencies of participants when discussing trends: “most,” “many,” or a
“majority” with responses that are 60 percent or more; “about half” with responses that are
between 41 and 60 percent; “some” with responses between 21 and 40 percent; and “few”
for responses that are 20 percent or less (Westermann et al. 2015; Hux et al. 2018).
Antecedents of Creating Institutional Works
The most positive implications for audit quality come from auditors’ actions that
improve both assurance effectiveness and efficiency, while also impacting audit processes
beyond a single engagement. These actions arise from individuals who strive to alter and
innovate current practice as a manifestation of their belief that such a change will promote
future benefits. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) suggest institutional work that is associated
with creating behaviors take form when actors reconstruct rules, and when belief systems
are reconfigured. Most research to date has focused on creating acts of institutional work
(Lawrence et al. 2009); perhaps because they may be easier to identify given actors’ more
overt intentionality around creating behaviors. I choose to adopt an implicit connotation of
positive outcomes attached to the categorization, which also aided the initial assignment of
acts of work according to domain of institutional work. Figure 2.1 illustrates a collective
network map linking antecedents to behaviors of creating forms of institutional work.
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[INSERT FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Among eleven antecedents I identify from participant responses, I focus my discussion on
the three most strongly associated with creating acts of institutional works: engagement
budget, audit firm TBAT culture, and auditor belief in TBATs as a conduit to success.
Engagement budget
Interestingly, 75 percent of participants report the engagement budget as an
important motivator for engaging in creating forms of institutional work. Most participants
share instances in which they internalized the engagement budget by responding with
actions of developing or improving a TBAT process. Participants believe doing so is
ultimately conducive toward improving the efficiency on the engagement, despite potential
short-term implementation costs. The following quotes illustrate these experiences:
…do it for a year or two and get comfortable with it, to see how much it helps and save
time ... but part of it is spending the time the first year through all of these engagements is
to try and figure out how to use it and how it helps. (TG2)
I came in, kind of revamped things a little bit and set up the workpapers to have the
currency numbers in there and have those linked to other workpapers… In the past, I think
that because engagement didn't really have that ability, it was always manual calculations
that had to be done on every balance, every workpaper, so multiply that across the whole
engagement, it adds up. I think it hindered us in the past. I think I set up the workpaper
efficiently for the next years. (TD4)
…for first year clients, it's been pretty tough to save on time, but going forward, knowing
that all that information you rolled will be there next year has been a huge help. (TG3)
However, improvements to efficiency are not the only benefits participants mention as a
result of their actions. Improvements to assurance effectiveness are often tied into new
TBAT processes, as participants report multiple instances of leveraging sophisticated
TBAT tools such as IDEA and ACL to improve audit quality. For example:
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When I did this audit and this engagement for this year, what I changed is I said, “Okay,
let's put this into IDEA.” We can search all those same things instantly and we can add to
that. Well we know our client only works Monday to Friday. Let's look for any entries that
were posted on Saturday or Sunday. We know that certain people are able to post it. Let's
look at the time stamps and look for certain people. We can add all these criteria into it,
and IDEA can search it all faster, instantly at one click in time. So, in that test alone, we
shaved hours off the test, and at the same time we expanded the scope of test by searching
more things. (TI5)
Interview data also sheds light on unforeseen, but important ways improved TBATs
processes support audit quality. As the participant in the example below explains, a newly
applied TBAT process can enable him to test 100 percent of a sample. The following quote
recounts this experience:
From testing a sample that may not be representative to testing the entire thing; not only
quicker, but obviously more effective… It's good, it's fun anytime you can increase
efficiencies. I think it’s exciting especially when you can show the client. That's the other
thing, it makes the conversation with the client so much easier when you say, “Well we
looked at these 20 of the 2,000 accounts, and 5 were bad…” Well they don't agree with
that. But if you can sit there and look at 100 percent [of accounts] and say, “Well here's
the 300 accounts that haven’t been paid. What are you going to do about it?” Then they
can agree. They don't have a choice but to agree. (TC2)
Of course, audit effectiveness will be improved in these instances, but perhaps more
remarkable is how implications of this use of a TBAT ripples out to influence subsequent
interactions with the client. As TBAT processes become more sophisticated and able to
mine, capture, and analyze a broader scope of data, they increase auditors’ relative
bargaining power during auditor-client negotiations. This is because subjectivity around
disputed items is less obscured from prior constraints around testing.
Another benefit is that efficient and effective TBATs also free up resources within
an engagement team. Auditors can focus their time on complex areas and interact with
clients on a meaningful level. One audit reiterates this point below:
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And I think I mentioned this earlier, not spending so much time massaging the data, but
spending more time interacting with the client and talking about the data. So, I'm all for
speeding up that side of things so I can get in and spend more time with the client. (TI4)
Although a few participants report getting positive feedback from superiors related
to efficiencies gained, a couple of participants felt their efforts to improve efficiencies were
overlooked. There is also a notable lack of participants who suggest they are positively
acknowledged for how new TBAT processes have enhanced effectiveness on the audit.
The following quotes from in-charge auditors illustrate perceptions around their superiors’
disconnect with how TBATs are used on engagements:
It was just me on the job though, and the manager ... I think she was probably one of the
examples I was using, where she didn't really use IDEA that much herself, so she didn't
really understand how much time it did save. (TF5)
…if we installed this software 2 or 3 years ago and they've been a manager or partner for
4 or 5 years, then they might not even know that we have access to it. (TD5)
I've had comments from my partner before. When he looks at my charged time on how long
I spent on journal entry testing, he's made jokes about how the senior manager before me
took eight hours to do it, and I'll only charge two hours. There's a huge gap of what we
used to charge when everyone was doing it manually, and what people are doing now.
(TC1)
Audit firm TBAT culture
A majority of participants suggest that their firm’s culture and tone at the top around
TBATs impacts how they engage with TBATs on assurance engagements. Respondents
report that when firms directly communicate a consistent and strong firm commitment to
TBAT innovation, they are more likely to perform TBAT-related actions that improve both
assurance effectiveness and efficiency. The following quotes suggest in-charges are acutely
aware of their audit firms integrating TBATs into the fabric of the firm’s culture:
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We have a culture at the firm where we're quite open about discussing issues that we
have. So, you could walk down the hallway and you'll hear someone complaining about
something and that isn't necessarily seen as negative. (TK4)
Our firm has a push for using automated technology and gaining efficiencies in our audit.
So, they're encouraging us to do that, and I'm a big fan of the technology. (TI4)
Participants who believe their firm cultivates a strong culture of support around TBATs
are most likely to engage in firm innovation efforts. Subjects who describe participating in
firm innovation efforts also report that their audit firms expressly solicit feedback from
employees related to TBATs, either through hosting firm innovation teams/events, running
TBAT focus groups, or developing formalized TBAT feedback outlets. The following
quotes offer examples of different innovation outlets firms are establishing:
…as a result of the topic that was being worked on, it got me invited to our firm's first ever
innovation tournament that was held. There were 30 people from across the firm and
including the CEO and all the other big dogs. So, I got to spend two and half days with
them in an innovation tournament. (TC2)
We have like this online idea portal where people can you know, give ideas to the firm and
other employees can vote yes or no to whether it's a good idea, and so we're trying to stay
in line with our peers as far as technology and innovation goes. (TG2)
These constructive communication channels can translate into palpable benefits.
Facilitating and encouraging employees to participate in TBAT innovation can be a
windfall of ideas for audit firms to better existing TBATs by integrating helpful feedback
and observations collected. As one participant recounts:
There was one specific year where the cash reconciliation template came out, I want to say
two-and-half years ago, and it got rolled out and I believe that one was sent out via e-mail.
So, when we went to use it, I realized there wasn't a section to summarize anything that
has FDIC coverage over $250,000. So, I took it upon myself to kind of add a little table
there in the template, and then I sent it back to the person in charge who rolled it out like,
"Hey, I noticed this wasn't on there. I feel like it would be useful and here is the attachment
with my example.” And he said thank you and all that, and then a few weeks later when
they rolled out a newer version, that same exact box that I had was there. So that was kind
of nice to see that. (TD5)
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In addition to potentially improving TBAT processes that support audit quality, these
outlets can
foster positive affect among participating employees. One respondent explains below:
It makes me feel appreciated. To be able to be heard, and to have, whether it be partners
or the head of HR listen to the comments you have or the comments other people have and
really take in to account, and a lot has come from these focus groups. I mean, obviously
they're not going be able to make the improvements or suggestions that everyone has, but
they do take what people say and usually try and put them into action. (TJ5)
A few participants imply disappointment about the ultimate utility of their contributions

(i.e., feeling their ideas were ignored), as well as reservations about future participation

given time constraints:

Occasionally sometimes I think ideas tend to get stuck in there, because the whole thought
process is you want them to vet it before it goes to national. So not all ideas go to national;
which makes sense. But it does mean the process slows down a little bit. (TH6)
We have focus groups for things like our engagement software for people to explain what
the issues they're having or the difficulties or errors that they think can be improved, so I
have been part of those focus groups in the past. I don't know if necessarily right now it's
a goal to get more involved with that, again, given time constraints with training, other
areas, and just client work. (TJ5)
Apart from promoting involvement in firm innovation channels, audit firm culture
is also associated with auditors’ willingness to improve their self-efficacy on TBATs. A
third of participants who pointed to audit firm culture as an antecedent to engaging in
creating acts of institutional work, specifically suggest culture motivates them to pursue
self-learning opportunities related to TBATs. One auditor below recounts leveraging
internal and external resources to improve her TBAT skillset:
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I would spend time outside of work poking around in IDEA, but there's also using IDEA's
website. They have some tutorial and help videos. There are people who have posted videos
on YouTube, and so you can kind of go out and see how they're doing some sort of analysis
in IDEA. Then, my friends also got a handful of steps or suggestions or ideas, and so I've
gone through those and tried to use them. But for the most part, I'd say it's a lot of the selftaught trial by error...my firm is encouraging and pushing for that use. (TI4)
Notably, firm culture and tone at the top related to TBATs are not without areas
needing improvement. Several participants express frustration from experiencing a
mismatched value system, noting disinterest and avoidance of TBAT use among higherlevel personnel despite explicit messages of support for TBATs from the firms. The
following quotes illustrate these sentiments:
A lot of times I see senior level people in firms, because they've been around longer they
know a lot about their job, they tend to be weaker on software… (TH6)
I think the partners and directors aren't really familiar with the technologies and what they
can do in that kind of unfamiliarity and it makes them a little bit uncomfortable with getting
rid of their old, traditional procedures that they fully understand everything that's
happening there, and trusting this new technology that they're not too familiar with,
essentially. (TI6)
…he's a senior manager... I came from my other firm and I started using pivot tables, and
his question to me was "How do you audit a pivot table?" And I was like "If you don't audit
an Excel summation, you don't need to audit a pivot table." So, there's some people that I
think are averse to using more and more technology. They're the ones that started off using
paper and pen for audits. (TG2)
These sentiments echo findings from prior research around technology use in firms. Bedard
et al. (2006) suggest higher echelons of audit personnel are likely to experience more
difficulties using new technologies, and Bedard et al. (2008) find evidence of qualitythreatening behaviors that may detract from audit quality as audit partners fail to abide by
firm policies related to TBATs. However, the future looks bright from the eyes of in-charge
auditors. A few participants feel hopeful that as younger and more technologically savvy
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personnel move up the ranks of audit firms, it may help address this issue. The following
quotes illustrate these experiences:

As millennials come into the workplace, and they have this idea of change, we're starting
to be in positions where we have a little more sway than we used to… And now we're like
the in-charges and the managers. We're pushing that idea of change and efficiency, and
the helpfulness of what technology can do for us... it's not so much if it's not broke don't fix
it, it's that we know that the world is changing so much and that audit could be changing
so much that if there's a way that you can use the tools that we have and improve it, they
want that. I'm saying that a lot in my firm that it's much more of a spirit of change and
trying to see what we can do to improve. (TD6)
I think the younger generation is very optimistic and we're more adaptive to technology.
(TG2)

Auditor belief in TBATs as a conduit to success
About half of participants report a belief that positive actions associated with
TBATs are a conduit to professional success within their audit firms. These participants
explicitly identify this belief as a motivator for engaging in proactive behaviors related to
TBATs. Several auditors share their perspectives below:
I think the use of data analytic software is going to be huge in the future, so I'm trying to
learn it now so that I can move up quicker. (TH4)
… seeing where everything's going in public accounting. If I can have a one-step advantage
on the next person, that was also something that motivated me… technology's becoming so
overwhelmingly popular as far as block chain and mind bridge… just getting this small
step ahead of someone else that's working in the same industry I think was an opportunity
that I really couldn't pass up and which drove me to pursue it and do it as best I can and
put as much time in it as I possibly can to be effective in my normal job. (TG3)
I'm looking to move up in the firm and it looked like this was one way I could distinguish
myself. I just try to be proactive about that. I guess that's what motivated me. (TH6)
I want to get moved up, right? So, I have to train someone who's able to do my job, and
part of my job is knowing how to do journal entry testing in IDEA. So, I think it helps
everyone. It helps the firm with the knowledge, it helps them in their career, and in the
future, it helps me in my career. So, I think it's a win, win, win. (TI5)
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These participants share the belief that mastering TBATs, integrating TBATs into
engagements in new ways, and promoting new TBAT practices to others will ultimately
further their career. Interestingly, a few participants also use the interview discussion as an
opportunity to seemingly confess that they use TBATs to take over less interesting aspects
of the engagement that can be automated. These experiences suggest some auditors
perceive creating a more automated workflow process using TBATs as somehow
conflicted with fulfilling the totality of their responsibilities. One auditor shares:
Another motivation is pretty selfish reason is I want to try to spend as little of time doing
the manual stuff that nobody enjoys like formatting files and getting things ready for the
analytics. I want to dive in and do the actual analytics. Basically, what I want to do in my
career is always be value added as much as possible so every hour or minute I'm spending
just formatting, which is not necessarily value added, instead of doing analytics or giving
something that could be a little bit more valuable to clients, I think is a big motivator for
me as well. (TD4)
Perhaps more striking is that roughly half of participants do not mention TBATs as
a potential conduit to professional success as a motivator for their behaviors. This is
surprising given the overwhelming number of participants describing their firm cultures as
strongly supportive of TBATs. Indeed, not a single participant could come up with a
specific example of how TBATs are a component of their formal performance reviews.
This disconnect between audit firm public support related to TBATs versus performance
reviews that do not incorporate metrics to reward proactive TBAT behaviors may be a
missed opportunity for firms.
Antecedents of Maintaining Institutional Works
To date, maintaining actions are the most understudied domain of institutional work
(Lawrence et al. 2009). Maintaining behaviors “primarily address the maintenance of
institutions through ensuring adherence to rules systems,” (p 230, Lawrence and Suddaby
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2006) and comprise actions that perpetuate the status quo while remaining compliant with
institutional expectations. Figure 2.2 illustrates a collective network map linking
antecedents to behaviors of maintaining forms of institutional work related to TBATs.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
Among nine antecedents, I focus my discussion on the two most strongly associated with
maintaining acts of institutional works: training and on-the-job learning, and audit firm
TBAT culture.
Training and on-the-job learning
Nearly all participants discussed on-the-job learning (OTJL) in tandem with formal
training on TBATs. Auditors suggest that both are important determinants of engaging in
maintaining institutional works associated with TBAT use. This is particularly true for
behaviors that reinforce established uses of TBAT protocols within firm guidelines. As one
participant puts it:
I find them both useful and I think you need both in really anything within auditing to
effectively learn something. I think the formal training, if you've never had any experience
with it is important; because at least it kind of gives you a sense of what's going on. You're
never going to remember the specifics, which is where the on-the-job training piece comes
in. Like, someone actually sits down with you and applying it to a real situation. This is
how you go through the processes. So that first initial training gives you the big, general
overview of what it looks like and then the on-the-job, the specifics of this is actually step
by step of how you run things. (TB6)
Auditors report a preference for trainings that are conducted by experienced audit
personnel relative to trainings conducted by third-party vendors or trainers who may lack
audit experience. These auditors suggest trainings taught by auditors have more practical
utility and trainers are better able to anticipate which advanced tools can be applicable on
engagements. The quotes below explain further:
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It was taught by one of our auditors at the firm, so they're able to relate it to specific
instances on their jobs and how they use it, so that was helpful to see. (TJ5)
I would say being taught by somebody, an auditor in our firm maybe has more perspective
on where we are actually going to use it and implement it, where outside it's, "You can
click on this and this'll happen, you can try this and you'll get this result," and less of how
exactly we are going to be using it within our engagements. (TG1)
Many participants report effective trainings improve their ability to educate others on using
firm-established TBAT practices. This includes perceptions that trainings are generally
foundational, while deeper knowledge acquisition occurs via on-the-job learning and
collective educating. The following quotes illustrate these ideas:
Coming back to the office, I'm always trying to help my staff and show them, hey, here's
how we do this in ACL. It's really important that you learn how to do this, and that way,
we can continue to do it not only on this client, but any clients you have in the future. So, I
definitely try to be as proactive as I can helping the people I work with, whether they be a
level below or above me, learn how to use this software. (TC3)
I prefer to just sit down and walk through audit functions within it whereas our formal
trainings will focus on this is what it is, this is what it is capable of doing, this is how you
import. The training that I find most helpful is just sitting down with someone and running
through an actual audit procedure. That way I think is the easiest way to learn it moving
forward. (TH4)
Interview data suggest one of the most common frustrations around trainings on TBATs
stems from assumptions that auditors receive perfect or “clean” client data. Indeed, many
participants report receiving messy or “dirty” client files that are initially (and sometimes
irreparably) incompatible with firm TBAT protocols. Ultimately the lack of discussion in
training about how to strategically cope with receiving dirty client files leaves auditors
feeling frustrated. Several auditors recount their experiences below:
I think during the trainings some of the information that you're receiving is cleaner. So
again, a PDF might be readable, whereas when you get a PDF from a client, it might not
be. (TF4)
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It was frustrating. Especially because IDEA, I know, has probably a lot of other functions
that I'm still learning, that maybe could help. I think that there could be more training on
it, but like I said, at this point, just from my experience with it, it seems like such a great
audit tool, that it's almost like you wouldn't expect to have these kinds of hiccups where
you have to go in and format all the data in a certain way anyway. You would think that
there would be something in IDEA that could easily take care of that. (TF5)
That first training is just going to be very basic. Like great clean files. They have some files
in there that you don't even get from the client, they're so clean… I know some people put
feedback on there like, "You're having us import files that are so clean, and that's not
realistic.” (TC1)
A few participants also touch on other issues pertaining to trainings; noting firms offer
limited trainings and resources to explore advanced toolbox features of TBATs. One
participant also mused on why trainers failed to address a significant software error but
wondered

if:

They did not go over if you try to use the tax column. I think either, a) they weren't aware
that that was an issue, or b) they just expected that everyone would not be using or applying
that column and that they would be applying the general book balance column. (TB2)
To supplement gaps in their knowledge, several participants report collaborating with
colleagues is needed to successfully employ firm-established TBAT practices.
Manifestation of this behavioral response has interesting theoretical implications. In such
cases, an inadequate firm resource evokes maintaining behaviors as auditors strive to
protect and reestablish adherence to rules that are imperfectly administered from an
institution. When individual participants view training and OTJL as inadequate, their
baseline self-efficacy related to the TBATs propels them toward maintenance behaviors
manifested by forming a collective among peers. This suggests in-charge auditors are
indeed an important maintenance mechanism for firms when internal institutional
resources falter. Several in-charges recount acts of collaboration to leverage firmestablished TBATs below:
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Many of the seniors feel that our technology training is inadequate when it comes to new
systems. Because of that, we all try to work together to learn what we probably should've
learned in training. An example that I'll get into, on the positive effects of Teammate is the
Benford's analysis test. That's something that we were never taught in training but one of
the other seniors figured it out and has spread it through the firm from there. That's the
approach that we take, is when somebody figures out a new functionality, we try to pass it
along to the other seniors we all know it. (TH4)
We do have classes. There's a couple of us that use it a lot, and so, we do ask each other
questions about it. (TA1)
The best way that we've found is to share successes and talk with each other about what
we're seeing works well with the use of the tool, what doesn't work well… (TA3)
Taken together, interview data suggest that firm training on TBATs are susceptible
to common pitfalls including inappropriate trainer backgrounds, oversimplified training
contexts, and a void of advance TBAT trainings.
Audit firm TBAT culture
Audit firm culture and norms around TBATs not only promote creating
institutional works, but also seem to be associated with maintaining institutional works.
Half of in-charge auditors report their respective firm cultures as a significant factor as to
why they decided to use a firm TBAT to engage in maintaining normative firm practices
related to technology. As two participants explain:
It's heavily suggested. Of course, there are always situations where it's not intuitive or it's
not helpful to use IDEA. In those unique engagements, we don't use IDEA, but those are
specific cases. It is highly recommended that we use IDEA in every engagement in things
that we have to do in every engagement, like journal entry testing like we talked about in
FC we need to do. So that way, at a minimum, we incorporate that into certain tests like
journal entry testing, for example. (TI5)
It was a firm-wide initiative to use that as a sort of an unpredictability procedure. It spits
out a nice graph, which is great during exit meetings to show. It's very digestible, and it's
a good general, first look at where we should be focusing prod testing, if any. (TI6)
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Participants suggest firm culture and sentiment around accepted TBAT practices are
imparted via communication channels such as e-mails and meetings. However, firms
should be careful to reconsider rigid TBAT protocols to avoid instances of auditors being
required to apply TBATs to poorly matched client data. Multiple participants recall
instances in which they felt constrained by inflexible firm expectations and rules around
TBATs, but ultimately upheld these practices to conform to institutional norms. These
maintaining practices can have detrimental effects on audit quality in the long run if
efficiency and effectiveness are subverted to ceremonial practices (i.e., actions that are
meant to reproduce existing norms simply to achieve perceived legitimacy). The following
quotes demonstrate how firm culture influences auditors’ propensity to use firmestablished TBATs:
We get so many e-mails… and it's just where we see the firm and the industry going, and
it's mostly just letting us know that, hey there's going to be this training and this is why we
think it's a benefit to roll out… (TG2)
There is rigidity with change, but it's definitely becoming more accepted and embraced
almost that we should be using these types of software… (TF6)
We've had the client for a while but it was a new engagement team this year. It was kind of
a trial and error with that and they had new entities so there was multiple GLs, so it kind of
got all jumbled up… It's just something that I guess you still try because it's like our firm
practice to always go through IDEA with it… (TB6)
In addition to the aforementioned maintaining behaviors, several participants
suggest their audit firm culture also prompts them to engage in educating newer staff
auditors with how to use established TBATs.
I think you just help out where you can. We just have a culture where when you know
something, and somebody else needs to learn, you just pass down that knowledge. I don't
mind getting involved in training with the new hires. I do a client service training as well
(TK5)
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Everybody who hops on my team and I ask them to do a task, I'm always trying to make
sure that they understand why they're doing it and I always say, "Once you understand
why, try to think of a more efficient way." I'd say, "Hey, here's how I would use this. I would
use Active Data, or I would try to use this tool." If they don't understand what I'm talking
about, I'll walk them through it and then hopefully they keep understanding it from there
on and if not, I hope that they come to me for questions. (TD4)
Many of these participants share experiences in which former superiors taught them how
to use firm-established TBATs. This OTJL as a common practice works to instill firm
values around the importance of educating others on adhering to standard TBAT practices.
Two participants recall their experiences below:
There are two managers who just started within the last two years… they had a lot deeper
of an understanding than I did. And I just kind of leveraged that… and I just knew that they
were my go to people and they're always willing to help me… [I’ve helped] especially new
staff. I try to teach as much as possible because they're going to be in my shoes eventually;
so it's always good to get as much experience and practice as possible. Especially when
it's actually application. (TK4)
It's pretty similar to how I am with my staff, the idea is that they're trying to help you learn
how to do the job in the best way possible. It that's teaching you how to do Active Data,
and I actually had one senior that was really good and he was very good with technology,
and he would actually take extra time to show me interesting things that he had learned
with Active Data. I learned a lot from him. (TD6)
Taken together, auditors generally perceive educating firm norms to others as a fabric of
firm culture. This suggests audit firms culture as a vital mechanism to police and reaffirm
expectations surrounding established TBAT uses when on-boarding and developing
younger staff.
Antecedents of Disrupting Institutional Works
Finally, the most alarming set of behaviors is disrupting acts of institutional works.
Disrupting actions are behaviors that “attempt to undermine institutional arrangements” (p
9, Lawrence et al. 2009). These behaviors comprise actions that cause individuals to
disassociate or publicly scrutinize embedded organizational values; for example, adopting
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and voicing a cynical opinion on the utility of a firm practice. Similar to maintaining works,
disrupting works have also received relatively little scholarly attention compared to
creating acts of institutional work (Lawrence et al. 2009). This may be because disrupting
acts encompass a negative connotation, and institutional workers are thereby less likely to
acknowledge them publicly. Nevertheless, in-charge auditors were forthcoming in sharing
several distinct disrupting behaviors, suggesting data obtained from the interviews are
candid accounts. It is also important to note that although disruptive behaviors themselves
have negative connotations; these acts of institutional work do not necessarily negatively
impact audit quality. Figure 2.3 illustrates a collective network map linking antecedents to
behaviors of disrupting forms of institutional work.
[INSERT FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
Among nine antecedents, I focus my discussion on the three most strongly associated with
disrupting acts of institutional works: client data quality, prior engagement issues, and
engagement budget.
Client data quality
Most participants suggest client data quality as an important determinant of
engaging in disrupting acts of institutional work. Over a third of participants report dirty
data from clients as a common antecedent that provokes them to engage in a workaround
behavior. Two in-charges recount their experiences:
I would say the root of the issue is the client data. And again also, not only were it various
files, but the various files were being pulled from a couple different accounting systems. It
was definitely more related to the data from the client than it was ACL, or you know. (TC3)
It has been a struggle getting information from the client that works in it. So it's great if we
can get things in Excel, and be able to get it to line up great in columns, but when we get
information in a PDF or the way that a lot of the entries I wanted to test were pulled out
of the system in Notepad, and getting that into a format that we can then run within
Teammate has been the biggest challenge. (TG1)
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Without exception, these behaviors translate to a loss of efficiency, which has negative
implications for both audit firms and clients. This is true even in cases where a workaround
ultimately leads to successful use of a TBAT, because it is preceded by sunk time in making
ad hoc revisions to clean up client data. Workaround behaviors also have significant
implications for audit quality from an effectiveness perspective. Of participants who report
engaging in workaround behaviors prompted by low quality or incompatible client reports,
many recall instances of working outside of established TBAT systems, performing
normally automated processes as manual procedures, or reducing the scope of testing
procedures. The following quotes offer examples:
We ran the tests we could and then it was, honestly, we had to manually go through the GL
to identify those same tests that we ran within Smart Analyzer for some of them. It couldn't
return what we needed it to return. (TB6)
So we've addressed it by kind of narrowing the amount for this year, the data that we're
going to review. (TG1)
Sometimes IDEA's unable to get a PDF to extract properly. So instead of going through
and try to mess around with it, we just go through and manually foot everything and go
through it haphazardly select items when we go through testing. (TK4)
Several participants suggest either an unwillingness to circle back to clients for better data,
or indicate they perceive TBATs and associated processes are lacking malleability to make
pursuing such interactions worthwhile. Two auditors share their reservations in the quotes
that following:
It's just one of those things where it's frustrating when it doesn't work the right way,
because you do have to spend that extra time, but ... yeah, we're not going to go back to
the client. (TK5)
It's difficult to change something once it becomes big. It would take a lot of effort for them
to make certain tweaks. They are doing somethings. It's not like they're doing nothing. They
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have a general use software package that's not always customized and it's just seems to me
to be outdated. (TH6)

Audit firms may consider teaching engagement team members proactive alternatives to
address incompatibility issues. Indeed, a third of participants report engaging with
“boundary participants,” either clients or third-party TBAT vendors, to address
compatibility issues between client data and TBAT capabilities. Examples of such
interactions follow below:

We had the client and our team meet and just discuss, explain what we're looking for, what
exactly the issue was... We just had a big meeting and talked it through and worked pretty
well. (TA1)
You have to almost train your clients to export stuff, and sit down with the IT team. Which,
we speak two totally different languages, accounting and IT. Which I think is getting better.
We're bridging that gap a little more. (TC1
…our firm is paying for the service, we do have not a say, but we have a voice for using
the service. They want know how they can get better and I just wanted to make it known
that I have something that I want show you guys. I have a thought that I think can really
help and the company can make third party vendor more efficient. (TB5)
These retellings suggest collaborating with external parties presents a viable path for firms
to cope with and potentially remedy consistent compatibility issues between client data and
TBAT capabilities.
Prior engagement issues stemming from a TBAT
Nearly a third of all participants experience prior issues stemming from a TBAT
that prompts them to engage in disruptive institutional work. These auditors suggest they
engage in negative rhetoric related to the TBAT that caused issues on a prior engagement.
Such behavior, while seemingly benign given its likely frequent occurrence, insidiously
undermines important values of audit firms’ TBAT practices. Not only can this hinder a
firm’s ability to implement and perpetuate firm TBAT practices, but it may also curtail
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future audit firm efforts to promulgate new TBAT guidelines. In the quotes that follow,
several auditors share accounts of how negative rhetoric related to TBATs takes shape:
I then told the team to stay away from IDEA as much as they could… (TB5)
We talk a lot about how it's not user friendly, and about how it's like if you don't have good
data, then it's basically useless. (TC1)
It's usually, “oh, how is Caseware Connector not working for your today?” (TK4)
It's kind of not looked on well by the vast majority of people, except for at the higher levels,
because they can sell it to the client that, "We have this great, internally generated secure
transfer site that outlines our PBC list. It all makes sense." I'd say director and up… but
manager and down, I don't think anybody's really too keen on it. (TI6)
Engagement budget
Most participants reiterate the importance of “getting the job done,” in spite of
limited engagement hours budgeted as an antecedent of disrupting behaviors in
institutional work, which is consistent with theoretical predictions (Smets and
Jarzabkowski 2013; Lawrence et al. 2011). Therefore, it is not surprising that some incharges specifically point to the engagement budget as a common explanation for engaging
in disrupting behaviors, including avoiding interactions with boundary participants and
participating workaround behaviors. The quotes below offer examples:
…maybe if we had worked with the client's IT team and maybe had a call between them
and their accounting software provider, we might have been able to find a way for them to
export it into Excel versus us just attempting to take the PDF. (TB5)
It got to the point where we kept putting time into it, kept thinking about it, kept getting
new files from the client, we went back and forth a lot. It kind of got to the point where, at
least for this year that I'm thinking of specifically, we were unable to get that implemented
with ACL, and we'd kind of sink a lot of time into it, and then we had to still revert back to
the old manual process for that year. It ended up being more of a time sink, because we
thought we would be able to do it and just weren't able to. (TC3)
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Although interviews with in-charges suggest auditors are acutely aware of the engagement
budget, perhaps what is more surprising is that associations between the engagement
budget and disrupting behaviors are not unanimous among participants. This suggests
some audit firms are prioritizing and communicating the importance of audit quality over
that of audit productivity.
It kind of takes some time also to test out these new ideas. So, it could increase a ton on
your budget, even if you're going to gain efficiencies in future years. Sometimes partners
can be not as accepting of those changes due to those factors. But our partners are, they
understand that it takes some effort, and it takes some time and to see those changes, and
they don't want us to get behind that technology curve. They don't want us to get behind on
the way we perform audits and what we tell our clients we're capable of doing. (TC3)
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE

In addition to important theoretical contributions, results also offer a windfall of
insights about how firms can promote proactive behaviors in auditors and implement
mechanisms related to TBATs to enhance audit quality. It seems unlikely that firm
management would be apathetic toward improved audit quality stemming from increased
use of TBATs; however, at present, results suggest partners are either unaware of the full
spectrum of benefits attached to implementing TBATs on assurance engagements or
choosing not to reward auditors’ efforts to enhance engagements through the use of
TBATs.
Results offer several ways firm leaders can weave support for TBATs into firm
culture to support audit quality. Audit firms may consider delegating a small team of
partners within each office to stay abreast of emerging TBATs so they can disseminate
related knowledge to other firm management personnel. If these partners are able to operate
as technological liaisons for their office, it may help elevate higher-ups’ appreciation and
understanding for the application of TBATs, without depleting significant firm resources
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in order to gain this knowledge. Bridging the gap between partner knowledge of TBATs
and their understanding of how TBATs can support audit quality may be an important way
to continue motivating in-charge auditors to innovate on TBATs.
Firms may also wish to implement and maintain innovation channels aimed toward
soliciting feedback on current and proposed TBATs. Results suggest channels are
associated with creating forms of institutional work that promote audit quality.
Importantly, firms should be mindful to source ideas to responsive teams and reinforce the
importance of employee participation in providing constructive feedback as a firm value.
TBAT feedback channels can also be used to combat frustrated employees disseminating
negative affect related to a TBAT in a non-constructive way, firms can implement a
feedback loop to catch these sentiments. Designing TBAT feedback loops targeted at
tracking and compiling TBAT issues will help firms identify and prioritize TBAT problems
that need attention. The mere existence of such a feedback structure may in itself prove an
effective strategy to transform and stop the spread of negative affect around problematic
TBATs into a productive mechanism.
Results also suggest firm values related to TBATs are infrequently – if ever –
manifested as performance goals. Audit firms may consider integrating specific TBATrelated performance review goals as a way to reward TBAT-enhancing behaviors in
auditors. This may also provide the benefit of galvanizing audit personnel who are
apathetic or even resistant toward TBATs to pivot to proactively embrace TBAT tools and
related practices within assurance engagements. Firms should continue to build and
maintain a firm culture that promulgates long horizon perspectives on TBAT use to foster
positive forms of institutional work related to TBATs.
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In addition to strengthening the alignment between audit firm culture and TBATs
through the aforementioned mechanisms, audit firms can consider efforts to innovate
current TBAT trainings. Results suggest training teams, training materials, and level
trainings as discrete inputs that impact the ultimate quality of TBAT trainings. First, firms
may be best served by assigning training duties to teams of individuals of different
backgrounds in IT and auditing. This will ensure a training team will encompass sufficient
knowledge of TBAT capabilities while delivering content that remains relevant for its
audience of trainees. Second, firms can improve trainings by incorporating a mix of cases,
scenarios, and examples on how to use a TBAT with imperfect data inputs (e.g., incomplete
client data, non-preferred document formats, etc.). Finally, firms can segregate
foundational skills from advanced skills training programs for TBATs, while incorporating
common trouble-shooting tips in each course. Therefore, audit firms should consider
functional implications of trainers’ relative perspectives, backgrounds, and experiences
when planning formal trainings on TBATs.
VI. CONCLUSION
Findings have important implications for our theoretical understanding of how
institutional work can unfold at the process level within organizations. Data provide
convincing evidence that institutional work can indeed manifest from nontraditional
sources, being institutional agents who hold limited organizational power (e.g., in-charge
auditors). I also provide evidence of specific contextual factors that may promote
individual agents to form collectives to engage in institutional work, which has not
previously been documented in the institutional work literature. Therefore this research
contributes to literature within institutional theory by analyzing institutional work in a
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context focused on individual agents. Findings also help develop audit researchers’
understanding of the current practice environment within NGNFs as they relate to TBATs.
Practical implications of results suggest audit firms are well positioned to control
several important antecedents that are associated with three distinct forms of institutional
works: creation; maintenance; and disruption. I suggest several practice-based solutions
audit firms can implement to promote beneficial creating and maintaining behaviors related
to TBATs among in-charge auditors to support audit quality. Several recommendations
audit firms can employ include communicating and reinforcing values related to TBAT
innovation behaviors; revising TBAT training programs to account for complexities of
messy client data; and integrating performance goals to be explicitly aligned with proactive
uses of TBATs.
I also discuss strategies firms can employ to curtail ceremonial maintenance
practices and disrupting behaviors. This is important because ceremonial maintenance and
disrupting forms of institutional work threaten the institutional integrity and persistence of
not only appropriate TBAT practices within audit firms, but other areas of audit practice
within the firm. These behaviors have significant potential to severely undermine audit
quality. To lessen negative implications attached to inefficient maintenance and disrupting
behaviors, audit firms should consider pursuing the following measures: engaging with
boundary participants to address compatibility issues between client data and TBAT
capabilities; establishing internal TBAT support channels to receive, acknowledge, and
work toward alleviating common TBAT issues; and promoting a firm culture that values
long-term TBAT solutions over ad hoc and reactive workaround behaviors during
engagements.
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This study is subject to two limitations. First, analysis and presentation of
qualitative data is innately subjective. However, I pursued my instrument design,
interviews, and rigorous coding after taking significant care to revisit methodological
considerations from recent seminal works on qualitative methods (Kenno et al. 2017;
Malsch and Salterio 2016; Power and Gendron 2015; Saldaña 2015; Miles et al. 2014;
Cassell and Symon 2004; Miles and Huberman 1994) and highly regarded qualitative
accounting papers to support the internal validity of the study (e.g., Durocher et al. 2015;
Hazgui and Gendron 2015; Westermann et al. 2015). The second limitation is the broad
sample of in-charge auditors I interviewed, with between one and three participants from
each of ten separate firms. While a broad sample is appropriate for an exploratory study
using a constructivist approach (Power and Gendron 2015); without having more
participants from each type of firm, it limits my ability to generalize findings across firms,
as well as to detect differences among firms.
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TABLE 2.1: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Professional Rank

Count

Percentage

23

82.14%

Manager

4

14.29%

Senior Manager

1

3.57%

28

100.00%

Count

Percentage

Male

15

53.57%

Female

13

46.43%

Total

28

100.00%

Count

Percentage

Senior Associate

Total
Gender

Educational Background
Bachelor's Degree

14

51.85%

Coursework Beyond Bachelor's Degree

4

14.81%

Master's Degree

9

33.33%

27

100.00%

Count

Percentage

20

74.07%

Other

1

3.70%

None

6

22.22%

27

100.00%

Mean

Median

Number of Busy Seasons as a Senior

2.52

3

Total years of Audit Experience

4.83

5

28.26

27

Total Survey Responses
Professional Certifications
Certified Public Accountant

Total Survey Responses
Experience

Age
Total Survey Responses

27

Industry

Count

Percentage

Construction

1

3.70%

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

4

14.81%

Government/Nonprofit

2

7.41%

11

40.74%

Retail Trade

1

3.70%

Services

8

29.63%

27

100.00%

Manufacturing

Total Survey Responses

106

TABLE 2.2
INSTITUTIONAL WORKS BY DOMAIN
Institutional
Work

Behavior

Description
creating a new TBAT process, improving an established TBAT process, or applying a TBAT to a new
setting
reaching out to third-party software vendors or clients to facilitate the compatibility of client data with
TBAT functionality
partaking in TBAT focus groups, joining a TBAT innovation team, or giving TBAT feedback through
firm channels

Creating

developing or improving a TBAT process

Creating

interacting with boundary participants to improve TBAT processes

Creating

participating in firm TBAT innovation efforts

Creating

promoting a new TBAT process

Creating

self-directed TBAT learning

suggesting and priming others to use a new TBAT process
self-acquired TBAT knowledge; leveraging non-formal TBAT trainings to learn (e.g., optional webinars;
third-party tutorials; external resources)

Maintaining

engaging in appropriate use of established TBATs

using a firm approved TBAT within an expected or required context

Maintaining

collaborating with colleagues to solve TBAT issues

addressing issues on an ad hoc basis with others while adhering to firm norms

Maintaining

educating established TBAT practices

teaching others firm approved TBAT processes

Maintaining

promoting established TBATs

Disrupting

avoiding interactions with boundary participants

policing others to use firm TBATs where expected
failing to notify clients or third parties about persistent TBAT issues that can be resolved with joint
interactions among auditors and external parties

Disrupting

engaging in negative rhetoric related to a TBAT

promulgating negative affect about a TBAT in the workplace

Disrupting

resisting a TBAT process

consciously avoiding using a firm promoted or established TBAT

Disrupting

withholding TBAT feedback from firm channels

Disrupting

engaging in workaround behaviors

not providing TBAT feedback when firm channels are in place and user has experienced an issue
deviating from firm TBAT protocols including engaging in quality threatening behaviors, working
outside of systems, and completing processes manually
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TABLE 2.3
ANTECEDENTS OF INSTITUTIONAL WORK

Antecedents
Audit firm TBAT culture
Auditor accountability
Auditor belief in TBATs as conduit to success
Auditor TBAT expertise
Client data characteristics
Engagement budget
Perceived malleability of TBAT process
TBAT issues on prior engagement
TBAT resources
Training (both formal and informal OTJL)

Source
(i.e., emerging theme, prior literature, or theory)
Dowling (2009)
emerging theme
emerging theme
emerging theme
emerging theme
Curtis and Payne (2008); Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca (2011)
emerging theme
emerging theme
Janvrin, Bierstaker, Lowe (2008), (2009); Lowe, Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Jenkins (2018)
Dowling (2009); Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Lowe (2014)
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FIGURE 2.1: ANTECEDENTS OF CREATING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
ANTECEDENTS

CREATING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
Developing or
improving a TBAT
process

Interacting with
boundary
participants

Engagement
budget

Promoting new
TBAT process
Audit firm TBAT
culture

Participating in
firm innovation
efforts
Auditor belief in
TBATs as conduit
to success

Self-directed
TBAT learning

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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FIGURE 2.2: ANTECEDENTS OF MAINTAINING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
ANTECEDENTS

MAINTAINING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
Engaging in
appropriate use of
established
TBATs

Collaborating
with colleagues to
solve issues

Training and
OTJL

Educating
established
TBAT practices

Audit firm
TBAT culture

Promoting
established
TBAT practices

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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FIGURE 2.3: ANTECEDENTS OF DISRUPTING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
ANTECEDENTS

DISRUPTING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
Avoiding
interactions with
boundary
participants

Engagement
budget

Engaging in
negative rhetoric

Client data
characteristics
Resisting a
TBAT process

TBAT issues
on prior
engagement

Engaging in
workaround
behaviors

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR IN-CHARGE SENIOR
AUDITORS
Interview Protocol for In-Charge Senior Auditors

Interview Questions:
1. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about an assurance
engagement that best exemplifies a situation in which a TBAT or TBAT component
facilitated the achievement of audit effectiveness and/or efficiency, and what factors
motivated or enabled you to engage in actions related to those benefits.
a) Could you first describe the TBAT or TBAT component?
b) How does this TBAT relate to the performance of specific assurance procedures?
c) How did this TBAT enhance assurance effectiveness and/or efficiency on this
specific engagement?
i) How did that make you feel?
ii) How was the benefit related to the TBATs leveraged within the engagement
(e.g., use of new tool, development of new process)?
iii) If you personally took action:
(a) What factors, resources, and/or circumstances do you think motivated
you to take action?
d) Did the TBAT decrease any specific difficulties during the engagement you’re
thinking of?
e) Is use of this TBAT required in this specific context?
i) If so, is it required on all engagements and by whom?
f) What implications did this TBAT have for the client, firm, engagement team, or
you personally, and why?
i) Was the benefit related to the TBAT acknowledged by your engagement
team? If so, how?
(1) How do you talk about this TBAT when speaking with your peers?
(2) How do you feel about this TBAT?
ii) How was your performance on this engagement evaluated?
(1) Do you have any professional goals aligned with TBAT use?
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iii) Were you able to promote the benefit(s) associated with the TBAT to be
leveraged on other engagements?
(1) If you did, has this been successful? Why or why not?
(2) If you did not, why not?
g) How did you learn to operate the TBAT used on this engagement?
i) If there was a formal training:
(1) Was it representative of your real-world application of the TBAT?
(2) What amount of time elapsed between having training and application of
the TBAT on a client engagement?
ii) If you have previously helped others use this TBAT, please describe how you
have helped others learn to use this TBAT in a similar context.
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2. In the pre-interview questionnaire, we asked you to think about an assurance
engagement that best exemplifies a situation in which a TBAT or TBAT component
hindered the achievement of audit effectiveness and/or efficiency, and what factors
motivated or enabled you to engage in actions related to those difficulties.
a) Can you first describe the TBAT or TBAT component?
b) How does this TBAT relate to the performance of specific assurance procedures?
c) How did this TBAT hinder assurance effectiveness and/or efficiency on this
specific engagement?
i) How did that make you feel?
ii) How was the difficulty related to the TBATs addressed (e.g., point person,
internal or external team)?
(1) Were there any workarounds to address the difficulty related to the
TBAT?
iii) If you personally took action:
(a) What factors, resources, and/or circumstances do you think motivated
you to take action?
d) Did the TBAT increase any specific difficulties during the engagement you’re
thinking of?
e) Is use of this TBAT required in this specific context?
i) If so, is it required on all engagements and by whom?
f) What implications did this TBAT have for the client, firm, engagement team, or
you personally, and why?
i) Was the difficulty related to the TBAT acknowledged by your engagement
team? If so, how?
(1) How do you talk about this TBAT when speaking with your peers?
(2) How do you feel about this TBAT?
ii) How was your performance on this engagement evaluated?
(1) Do you have any professional goals aligned with TBAT use?
iii) Were you able to improve or work around the difficulty associated with the
TBAT on other engagements?
(1) If you did, has this been successful? Why or why not?
(2) If you did not, why not?
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g) How did you learn to operate the TBAT used on this engagement?
i) If there was a formal training:
(1) Was it representative of your real-world application of the TBAT?
(2) What amount of time elapsed between having training and application of
the TBAT on a client engagement?
ii) If you have previously helped others use this TBAT, please describe how you
have helped others learn to use this TBAT in a similar context.
b.
c.
3. Wrap-up.
Is there anything else you’d like to share with us about your experience or perceptions
of TBAT usage within the firm?
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APPENDIX B: FULL MODELS OF COLLECTIVE NETWORK MAPS
ANTECEDENTS
CREATING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS
Audit firm TBAT
culture

Auditor
accountability

Developing or
improving a TBAT
process

Auditor TBAT
expertise

Engagement
budget

Interacting with
boundary
participants

Client data
characteristics
Participating in
firm innovation
efforts

Auditor belief in TBATs
as conduit to success

Perceived malleability of
TBAT process
Promoting new
TBAT process

TBAT issues on
prior engagement

TBAT resources
Self-directed TBAT
learning

Training and OTJL

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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ANTECEDENTS

MAINTAINING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS

Audit firm
TBAT culture

Engaging in
appropriate use of
established
TBATs

Auditor
accountability

Auditor TBAT
expertise
Collaborating
with colleagues
to solve issues

Engagement
budget

Client data
characteristics
Educating
established
TBAT practices

Auditor belief in
TBATs as
conduit to
success
Physical
environment

Promoting
established
TBAT

TBAT
resources

Training and
OTJL

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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ANTECEDENTS

DISRUPTING INSTITUTIONAL WORKS

Audit firm
TBAT culture

Avoiding
interactions with
boundary
participants

Auditor
accountability

Auditor TBAT
expertise

Engaging in
negative rhetoric

Engagement
budget

Resisting a
TBAT process

Client data
characteristics

Perceived
malleability of
TBAT process

Withholding
TBAT feedback
from firm
channels

TBAT issues
on prior
engagement

Engaging in
workaround
behaviors

TBAT
resources

Training and
OTJL

denotes one participant
denotes two or more participants*
*increasing line thickness indicates greater frequency of participants
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PART III: MANAGING THE TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: HOW AUDIT
PARTNERS NURTURE, CONTROL, AND STANDARDIZE CHANGE
I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, audit firms have worked to incorporate technology-based audit tools
(hereafter, termed TBATs) into their work processes.19 An ever-growing stream of
literature demonstrates TBATs’ pervasive implications for audit quality, as they influence
and often enhance aspects of both efficiency and effectiveness. For example, technology
has revolutionized the review process with increased use of electronic reviews (e.g., Payne,
Ramsay, and Bamber 2010; Brazel, Agoglia, and Hatfield 2004), encouraged
manifestations of new audit testing including the use of Big Data (e.g., literature review is
timely in, Rose, Sanderson, and Thibodeau 2017; Vasarhelyi, Kogan, and Tuttle 2015; Yoon,

Hoogduin, and Zhang 2015), and given rise to the fully electronic nature of modern audit
support systems (e.g., Dowling 2009). In these and other applications of TBATs, firms are
attempting to leverage these tools to facilitate audit quality without subjecting the firm or
its clients to incremental risks. Possible new risks associated with TBATs include qualitythreatening behaviors by auditors (e.g., working outside of appropriate audit support
systems), malfunctioning technology processes, or legal exposure stemming from
inspections, reviews, or audit failures (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, and Jenkins 2008; Bedard,
Ettredge, and Johnstone 2006; Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Lowe 2014; Carson and Dowling
2012; Curtis and Payne 2008; Dowling 2009; Dowling and Leech 2007; 2014; Downey
and Bedard 2018). As professional leaders, partners perform actions that affect the

19

Technology-based audit tools (TBATs) include computer-aided audit tool systems (CAATS), computer
systems and various technology-based practice aids leveraged in the audit process.

119

advancement of technology both within and outside their firms, as well as guide and
manage the work of others (Brown, Earley, and Sanderson 2019; Westermann, Bedard,
and Earley 2015; Tysiac 2020).
This study contributes to the literature on technology integration by investigating
how audit partners and their firms shape the profession in the wake of evolving
technologies of the auditing world. Specifically, we first seek the perspectives of partners
about the status of audit technologies in their firms and in the profession as a whole, as
well as factors of influence over these tools. This information lays the groundwork for our
more theoretically driven analysis of the nature of work that partners and firms perform
over TBATs, as well as the factors that influence this work. Understanding how audit
personnel at the highest echelons engage with technology and exert influence over TBATs
in practice is important. Partners’ actions not only determine current audit work processes,
but also shape the future of technological integration and development in practice.
To guide our investigation of audit partners’ and their firms’ activities, we draw on
the theory of institutional work (e.g., Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Institutional works are
actions that create, maintain, or disrupt facets of organizational bodies and their respective
environments.20 Institutional work occurs when either collectives of individuals, or
individual members themselves, engage in behaviors that actively maintain or alter
established practice and protocols within a professional field. Institutional work accounts
for how organizational practices either persist via maintaining behaviors, or change via

Creating works represent “actions designed to alter abstract categorizations in which the boundaries of
meaning systems are altered,” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 221). Maintaining works represent “focus
efforts to maintain institutions on reproducing existing norms and belief systems,” (Lawrence and Suddaby
2006, 230). Disrupting works represent actions aimed at “undermining core assumptions and beliefs,”
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 237) (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2009).
20
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creating or disrupting behaviors of institutional agents and collectives. Due to technology’s
potential to disrupt the practice of auditing to public accounting, theory suggests the
auditing field represents a rich environment in which we should expect acts of institutional
work to materialize (Malsch and Gendron 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). While prior
research on technology use in auditing considers activities of less powerful individual
agents (e.g., in-charge auditors, see Witte 2020), we shift our focus to the institutional work
of audit partners, who hold leadership positions within their firms. Because partners occupy
positions of power (Brown et al. 2019; Carter and Spence 2014; Kornberger, Justesen, and
Mouritsen 2011), it follows that they take an active role in driving change within their
firms, including technological change. Further, partners also assume the role of politicalprofessional liaison when engaging with external influences such as regulators, industry
norms, and peer firms. Notably, prior research on isomorphic change in auditing (Griffith,
Hammersley, and Kadous 2015) suggests there are significant constraints on partners in
this regard. Isomorphic change captures the idea that change within an organizational field
originates externally from three isomorphic pressures that promote conformity, namely:
coercive forces (i.e., bodies that require legal compulsion), mimetic forces (i.e., conditions
that promote imitation), or normative forces (i.e., indicators of professionalism) (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983).21

21

For example, Griffith et al. (2015) suggest the PCAOB embodies a coercive force. However, PCAOB
inspection reports as an artifact of complex estimates can actually elicit a mimetic response from firms
(Griffith et al. 2015). This occurs because the embedded complexity surrounding the estimate fosters
ambiguity to establish best practices within firms. Therefore, firms cope with this uncertainty by using
PCAOB inspection reports as a litmus test of appropriateness of their practices – and try to copy complex
estimate procedures of other peer organizations as a strategy to appear more credible in their own
methodology (Griffith et al. 2015). Indeed, a recent paper by Westermann et al. (2019) offers additional
evidence that the public aspects of PCAOB inspection report have “led to uncertainty reduction strategies,”
(706) among firms, suggesting firms revise their own procedures to curtail perceived risk.
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Thus, the concepts of institutional work and isomorphism present something of a
theoretical paradox regarding the nature of audit partners’ relationship with technology
within audit and assurance engagements. Partners are simultaneously conceived as leaders
of institutional work and lemmings of their industry because they are at the mercy of
external isomorphic pressures. Prior research in organizational behavior provides little
guidance in addressing this paradox outside of admitting its existence as a point of
theoretical discussion (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). To our knowledge, no study has yet
examined these branches of institutional theory in tandem. Further, despite the importance
of the partner role in audit firms, relevant research in this setting is relatively sparse due to
difficulties in obtaining access to those individuals as research participants. Our context
offers a unique opportunity to examine how the institutional work of powerful agents, audit
partners, unfolds in light of isomorphic pressures.
To address these research objectives, we analyze survey data from 48 audit partners
about their experiences with and perceptions of TBATs. Importantly, we study partners of
non-global network firms (NGNFs) (i.e., firms other than the Big 4, BDO, Grant Thornton,
and RSM). To date, auditing literature has traditionally focused on global network firms
(GNFs). However, NGNFs are important, as they audit a large portion of the economy
(e.g., Audit Analytics data suggests NGNFs audited 39 percent of all SEC registrants in
2014; DeFond, Francis, and Hallman 2018). But importantly for our context, NGNFs
represent a highly relevant setting in which to address our research questions relating to
field-level technological changes. NGNFs and their members are likely to perform
institutional work around TBATs, because they are still in the midst of actively
transitioning from manual processes to automated audit and assurance techniques; in
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contrast, GNFs have well-established TBAT environments (Dowling and Leech 2014).
Thus, the NGNF setting offers an environment primed to observe institutional work.
We base our survey instrument on prior theoretical research in institutional theory
(e.g., Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Malsch and Gendron 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence
2010; Hayne and Free 2014) and empirical research examining TBATs in audit firms (e.g.,
Lowe, Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Jenkins 2018; Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe 2008; 2009).
We first ask partners general questions about TBAT use, as well as how they and their
firms perceive factors of influence over TBATs, to provide a description of the practicebased environment of TBATs. We then employ experiential survey questions to provide
theoretical and practical insights into their actual attempts to engage with these factors of
influence over TBATs, and motivations for these actions. If partners are indeed fully
deferring the power of their leadership to forces of isomorphic change related to TBAT
use, we should expect them to discuss abstaining from acts of institutional work or adopting
TBAT behaviors originating from external forces outside of their firms (as opposed to
engaging in institutional work instigating from within their firms). Finally, we collect data
about partners’ and their firms’ expectations about the future of TBATs.
Our results indicate that audit partners report audit firm TBAT culture, TBAT
expertise of audit personnel, and client data characteristics as three of the most important
elements influencing the widespread use of TBATs within auditing. Survey data also
reveals evidence that partners and their firms intentionally create and maintain aspects of
the aforementioned factors to support the use of TBATs. Institutional works include
mapping firm audit protocols to TBATs, increasing access to trainings and resources
related to TBATs, and educating clients to facilitate the translation of client data for use
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with TBATs. Our study contributes to the literature by unraveling the relationship between
isomorphic pressures and institutional work. We identify trends in isomorphic forces of
influence over audit partners’ and their firms’ institutional work. We find that normative
pressures and mimetic pressures do not necessarily constrain partners’ propensity engage
in institutional work, but rather can motivate creating and maintaining acts that originate
from within firms to select, develop, and implement TBATs.

Although partners

characterize themselves as optimistic about the future of TBATs, they also identify the
quality of client data and the lack of auditing standards related to TBATs as significant
challenges to furthering the use of TBATs. This study enriches our understanding of how
members of the highest echelon of audit firms shape the auditing field in light of new
technologies. Implications for practice document how firms address issues stemming from
incompatible client data, and the mismatch between performance metrics and firm-level
TBAT values.
The remainder of this paper is organized into the following sections. Section II
reviews background literature and theory underlying the motivation for this research,
section III discusses methodological details, section IV presents a discussion of results,
section V offers a supplemental discussion, and section VI provides concluding remarks.
II.

THEORY AND BACKGROUND LITERATURE

TBATs within NGNFs
Although technology and TBATs have fundamentally altered how audits are
conducted within firms of all sizes around the globe, auditing literature to date has
generally focused on studying TBATs within GNF contexts. This scholarly emphasis on
GNFs is motivated by numerous factors, including the relative size of those firms and
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importantly, greater access to data. However, recent information suggests NGNFs audit an
economically meaningful portion of all SEC registrants (i.e., approaching 40 percent;
DeFond et al. 2018), motivating recent calls (AICPA 2017) and responses (Brown et al.
2019) to examine NGNF practice environments. To date, research focused on technology
use of auditors within NGNFs is concentrated among three survey papers that study a
spectrum of firm sizes including GNFs (Lowe, Bierstaker, Janvrin, and Jenkins 2018;
Janvrin et al. 2008; 2009).
Over a decade ago, Janvrin et al. (2008) find auditors of Big 4 and national firms
value TBATs as more important relative to auditors of local and regional audit firms.
Janvrin et al. (2009) identify a greater reliance of auditors in Big 4 firms on client internal
controls relative to auditors of smaller firms, perhaps due to differences in relative client
infrastructure and/or auditor compliance related to providing assurance over clients’
internal controls. Big 4 firms are likely to audit a larger number of publicly traded clients
relative to smaller firms, thereby increasing the requirement that Big 4 firms adhere to
guidelines under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. In a follow-up study, Lowe et al. (2018)
survey 111 auditors from Big 4 (33.6%), national (24.6%), regional (19.1%), and local
firms (22.7%), and find no significant difference between the use of audit IT22 among Big
4 firms versus NGNFs. In fact, national firms report having the greatest level of use and
perceived importance of IT use related to audit applications (Lowe et al. 2018). These

22

Audit IT in Lowe et al. (2018) encompasses IT used as part of 22 audit applications (e.g., analytical
procedures; internal control evaluations; sampling), workpaper review communication modes including IT
(e.g., e-mail, phone, electronic workpapers, video conference), and group brainstorming communication
modes (e.g., face-to-face, email, videoconference, collaboration technology).
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findings suggest NGNFs have transitioned to integrate heightened levels of technology into
the audit process serving as an important motivator to research TBATs in this context.
The absence of additional academic literature focused on technology of NGNFs
creates a challenging hurdle for academics looking to posit theoretically complex research
questions in these understudied contexts. Therefore, we aim to contribute to the general
domain’s understanding of the TBAT practice environments of these firms through our
first two research questions, which will provide a foundation for future research. Extant
literature suggests partners are an embodiment of firms’ tone at the top, and thereby a
bedrock of firm quality control and overall audit quality (Brown et al. 2019). Thus, we
capture partners’ viewpoints of TBATs and their experiences of engaging with TBATs.
First, we seek partners’ general TBAT observations (e.g., TBATs they like/dislike;
perspectives about audit personnel TBAT competencies; how TBATs materialize in
employee performance metrics; etc.) and how they take measures to develop, select, and/or
implement TBATs to shine a light on the broader landscape of TBATs within NGNFs. We
state our first research question below in two parts.
RQ1a What are audit partners’ general perspectives of TBATs?
RQ1b How do audit partners personally engage with TBATs?
Second, to substantially develop and record the landscape of TBATs within
NGNFs, it is also important to identify the degree to which different factors influence
partner decisions regarding the selection and implementation of TBATs. Capturing this
data helps explain how the TBAT practice environment has come to its current form, and
suggests how the future of the environment may develop. Examining the degree of
alignment between partner values and firm values can elucidate points of contention
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between the individual and collective of firm leadership.23 Areas of disconnected values
may point to opportunities for practice to reduce frustration among members and offer
interesting theoretical insights. This discussion leads to our second research question stated
in two parts below.
RQ2a How do audit partners value factors that influence the selection and
implementation of TABTs?
RQ2b How are audit partners’ perspectives of TBATs aligned with those of their
respective firms?
Institutional work and individuals
Institutional theory is a longstanding conceptual framework that accounts for how
organizations within professional fields develop, and why they come to resemble one
another (Scott 2013; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Although institutional theory is
commonly oversimplified as a theory of conformity, a detailed review of the literature
reveals a nuanced portrayal of institutions and their organizational life cycles. While
institutions do indeed assimilate and conform toward peer organizations, they are far from
static. Indeed, institutions, institutional fields, and institutional concepts are dynamic
objects (Oliver 1991; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002; Seo and Creed 2002).24 As
with everything that experiences a life cycle, institutions inevitably undergo change –
sometimes dramatically so. Abstract institutional changes take a tangible form when

23

An implicit assumption regarding these partner values often made is that they mirror the collective of their
firm’s values of these same factors.
24
We define the following terminology for discussion in our context of the profession of public accounting:
institutions; institutional field; institutional concepts. Institutions are taken to mean audit firms, both GNFs
and NGNFs. GNFs are “central institutions,” which represent industry leaders with significant public
attention, whereas NGNFs are “peripheral institutions,” which suggest a non-central role (Greenwood et al.
2002). The institutional field applied in this context is the auditing profession and encompasses all
institutionally related objects (institutions themselves, and their concepts) (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006;
Suddaby, Gendron, and Lam 2009). Institutional concepts are unique concepts highly relevant to the
institutional field – for example audit quality or auditor independence (Witte 2020).
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industry leaders shift and established professional practices evolve. Often such changes are
precipitated by exogenous shocks from economic, social, or political forces (Malsch and
Gendron 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). Responses to these changes and attempts to
engage in efforts to influence the organizational field are often not chaotic; rather, they are
the result of institutional work.
Institutional work represents actions and behaviors of institutional agents who
strive to create, maintain, or disrupt tenets of institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006;
Perkmann and Spicer 2008; Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2011). At present, a significant
amount of literature on institutional work reflects either theoretical discussions (e.g.,
Lawrence et al. 2011; Lawrence, Leca, and Zilber 2013; Smets and Jarzabkowski 2013) or
empirical settings that focus on collectives and outcomes (Empson, Cleaver, and Allen
2013; Suddaby 2010; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Malsch and Gendron 2013).
Meanwhile, considering institutional work from an individual-level perspective continues
to remain an understudied area (Willmott 2011). However, empirically examining the
impact of individual institutional agents and their work is important, because institutional
work likely takes multiple forms as “coordinated and uncoordinated efforts of a potentially
large number of actors” (Lawrence, Suddaby, and Leca 2011, 55).
Lawrence et al. (2011) suggest institutional work may often result from the
“everyday getting by of individuals” (p. 57), while Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013)
importantly surmise that agents’ institutional work may not be intentional and highly
effortful. More recent discussion has emerged in the literature that emphasizes the
importance of studying individual persons and their related institutional work as data points
in the context of institutional change (Lawrence et al. 2011). Actions and perspectives of
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disparate individuals are indisputably less able to be anticipated without direct empirical
observation relative to those of collectives, thereby offering an opportunity to catalogue
potentially more distinct forms of institutional work.
Audit partners as institutional workers in NGNFs
Audit partners represent a key type of institutional worker within an audit firm.
Partners are highly skilled, financially incentivized to take a heightened interest in the
organizational field, and possess access to significant social, political, and capital
resources. These resources enable them to exert considerable influence on a large scale
with relative ease when compared against a subordinate employee within the firm
(Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Empson et al. 2013; Canning and O’Dwyer 2016). Such
leverage seemingly grants partners sweeping capacity to engage in institutional work that
shapes how the audit profession develops and evolves. In particular, audit partners wield
influence over their individual audit offices by serving as managing members of the firms.
Partners may also influence the audit profession (i.e., field) itself, due to their propensity
to engage with leaders of other audit offices, other audit firms, and the audit field’s
boundary participants, which include regulators, oversight bodies, and audit clients,
among others.25 This discussion leads us to our third research question:
RQ3 How do audit partners and their firms engage in institutional work to influence
practice associated with TBATs in the audit field?
Moreover, audit partners are a particularly interesting echelon of the audit hierarchy to
parse out as institutional workers, because they are subject to the considerable amounts of

25

Boundary participants are entities that engage with institutions and partake in field-level activities, but do
not represent the institutional member organizations themselves. As such, these boundary participants
represent organizations and associated individuals engaging with, but separate from, the institutions of focus
in our context: audit firms.
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isomorphic institutional pressures given their high visibility within the profession. These
isomorphic pressures encourage assimilation of practices among member institutions
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2013). Isomorphic pressures take various forms,
including normative pressures, mimetic pressures, and coercive pressures (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983), which can materialize as professionalization (i.e., normative), imitation
between audit firms (i.e., mimetic), and audit regulation within the field of auditing (i.e.,
coercive) (Fogarty 1992).
Normative pressures represent the means by which a profession gains legitimacy
via explicitly established professional protocols (e.g., licensing, training), and implicitly
defined markers of credibility among member organizations (e.g., shared meanings behind
“audit senior” versus “audit manager” among firms) (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). These
normative pressures occur when organizations are pressed to gain legitimacy around
perceptions of their own organization’s professionalism, and are often imposed by
nonprofessional clients, bosses, and regulators (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Normative
pressures will likely take shape as partners and their respective NGNFs are forced to
respond to technological innovations and the related expectations of boundary participants,
employees, and peer firms around usage of TBATs.
Mimetic pressures are forces of conformity stemming from significant uncertainty,
causing member institutions to look to one another to establish credible practices in the
wake of ambiguity (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Technological disruption in the form of
new TBATs has established a volatile and undefined audit landscape. Practitioners are
struggling to identify guidance on how to integrate the use of TBATs in a manner consistent
with standards without exposing themselves to increased legal, inspection, or audit risk
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(Alles 2015; Arnold 2016). This is particularly true for NGNFs, as these firms are less
likely to be entrenched in established TBAT practices relative to GNFs (Witte 2020).
Therefore, the context of more rapidly evolving TBATs in NGNFs offers an ideal setting
to observe and consider implications from significant mimetic pressures at play, as these
firms will likely struggle to respond to shifting technological competencies in the absence
of regulatory guidance.
Lastly, coercive pressures emerge from governing and oversight bodies (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). Organizations are in essence forced by these pressures into conforming,
as a way to gain legitimacy by abiding by established rules and regulations. Coercive
pressures in auditing take form in iterative audit and assurance standards. However, the
lack of authority from oversight bodies specifying standard usage around TBATs presents
a puzzle for audit firm leaders. These professionals are left questioning how to identify
audit practices that simultaneously align with assurance standards while mitigating risk for
the firm – as marketplace expectations propel firms to revitalize audit procedures and
workflows in light of new technologies. Meanwhile standard setters have remained largely
silent on exactly how integration of these TBATs in auditing should be integrated to best
support compliance.
Although prior literature suggests that audit partners are positioned to potentially
resist efforts from regulators to restrict autonomy within the profession (e.g., Canning and
O’Dwyer 2016), the nature of TBATs presents a unique circumstance in which audit
partners are likely cautious to develop their own rules in the absence of standards. This is
particularly important in auditing, because member firms often look to one another to
borrow best practices in an effort to meet regulators’ standards when faced with ambiguity
131

on an engagement (Griffith et al. 2015). For example, Griffith et al. (2015) find that the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspection reports likely
promulgate institutionalized but perhaps suboptimal practices associated with audits of
complex estimates. Thus, initial theoretical evidence suggests a lack of coercive pressures
may give way to mimetic pressures in the face of uncertainty (Westermann, Cohen, and
Trompeter 2019; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Taken together, this stream of literature suggests specific audit practices related to
TBATs may be both internally developed by audit firms as a reaction to vague audit
standards (i.e., practices arising from the bottom up), rather than audit standard setters
imposing specific audit practices as governing protocols (from the top down). However, in
the absence of audit standards that cover commonly used TBATs, the field is primed to
witness institutional works from a regulatory standpoint. Although we cannot know ex ante
which agents of the audit field and which of the field’s respective organizations will
develop TBAT-related regulations, the rise of TBAT standards seems positioned to evolve
given the perpetual rise of TBAT usage. This is because partners’ work is ultimately
scrutinized against any required audit and assurance standards, thus partners are uniquely
incentivized to contribute to the development of firm and also regulatory standards (e.g.,
PCAOB; AICPA) to the extent of their political and social capital. Without an established
regulatory framework around TBATs, partners have a premiere opportunity to mold how
audit practice marries TBATs into existing standards.
Thus, audit partners as a category of institutional agents highlight what appears to
be a theoretical paradox of institutional theory. On one hand, partners are naturally
positioned to be the most influential institutional workers of creating, maintaining, and
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disrupting works among the pool of institutional actors within the auditing field given their
aforementioned “institutional powers of influence,” materialized as practice expertise,
access to resources, and financial incentives. And yet audit partners are simultaneously
predicted to be constrained in effecting changes contra to organizational status quos or
influencing the field from internal sources given partners’ considerable exposure to
external isomorphic pressures. This theoretical relationship is modeled in Figure 3.1.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Prior to this study, institutional agents who occupy a position of power and who are also
the target of significant scrutiny have remained unexamined in the auditing literature, and
to our knowledge in the literature on institutional work as a whole. Therefore, we explore
the dynamic between isomorphism and institutional work with the final research question:
RQ4 What isomorphic pressures are associated with audit partners’ institutional work
related to TBATs?
III.

METHOD

Participants
We survey a total of 52 audit partners from 16 different NGNFs (see Table 3.1) and
retain a final sample of 48 participants.26 Participants were randomly selected on our behalf
by a third-party organization that facilitated the study. NGNFs are an appropriate context

26

We exclude the verbal protocol pilot to mitigate introducing researcher bias into our analysis, two
participants who did not complete the survey, and one participant who indicates he does not presently work
on assurance or audit engagements. The total final sample of 48 participants includes five pilot studies, as
there were minimal changes between the pilot survey and final survey disseminated. Malsch and Salterio
(2016) suggest this number of participants is within an appropriate range given prior studies (e.g.,
Westermann et al. 2015) and participants’ knowledge and experience are most relevant when conducting
field research. Indeed, a large number of observations approaching statistical significance are not necessarily
required to reach an appropriate level of engagement with the field (Malsch and Salterio 2016; e.g., Free,
Salterio, and Shearer 2009). Audit partners arguably have the most extensive knowledge, experience, and
influence over firm leadership decisions related to TBATs relative to other audit firm member personnel, and
are thus the ideal audit level to survey to thoroughly address our research questions.
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to study these actors, as they have less established IT infrastructures relative to those of
GNFs. Indeed, prior research finds NGNFs are likely to utilize commercially available
software packages and outsource for IT competencies as needed (Bedard et al. 2008).
Therefore, there is initial evidence to suggest NGNFs possess greater agility toward
revising TBAT programs and processes (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Seo and Creed
2002). Furthermore, Lowe et al. (2018) find evidence that NGNFs are using TBATs and
perceiving TBATs as increasingly important in the current audit environment. In fact,
Lowe et al. (2018) find that significant differences in levels of TBAT usage among national
NGNFs relative to GNFs have dissipated relative to those previously identified by Janvrin,
Bierstaker and Lowe (2008; 2009). Taken together, there is evidence from both theory and
recent practice that NGNFs present a context that is ideal for institutional work related to
TBATs.
[INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Participating partners have an average of 20.9 years of audit experience, and an
average of 7.7 years of experience as an audit partner. A quarter of partners report their
firms are subject to PCAOB inspections on an annual basis, and 62.5 percent are inspected
by the PCAOB every three years. Nearly a third of participants indicate their highest level
of education to be holding a master’s degree, 100 percent of participants are CPAs, and
12.5 percent of participants possess an additional accounting-related certification. 70.8
percent of surveyed partners are male, 18.8 percent are female, and 10.4 percent did not
report their gender.
Instrument Development and Validation
Pilot Testing and Dissemination of Final Instrument
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We developed a draft of the partner survey instrument based on findings from prior
theory suggesting behaviors of institutional work (e.g., Lawrence and Suddaby 2006;
Malsch and Gendron 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Hayne and Free 2014). We also
leveraged empirical research in auditing to inform the inclusion of relevant contextual
factors of TBATs including types of TBATs, and subjective-based questions (e.g., Lowe
et al. 2018; Janvrin et al. 2008; 2009; Witte 2020). We employed identified antecedents of
institutional work of auditors related to TBATs from Witte (2020). Six partners participated
in pilot testing. Pilot data were collected in Qualtrics in June 2019. To facilitate the
integration of feedback into the final survey, one pilot participant completed the survey in
Qualtrics as a live verbal protocol with one researcher. During this session, the participant
and researcher video-conferenced and used screenshare functionality within Zoom as the
pilot participant went through the survey. Ultimately, minimal changes were incorporated
to update the research instrument to its final form, therefore pilot studies, except for the
verbal protocol pilot, are included as part of the overall analysis.27
Survey questions on technology-based audit tools
A diagram flowcharting the survey instrument is included in Figure 3.2. Prior to
beginning the survey, partners first received background information about the study and
the definition of TBATs to foster comprehension and support internal validity of the study
(Kenno, McCracken, and Salterio 2017). Participants were then asked to attest to having
read the definition of TBATs before moving forward in the survey. The definition and

27

Excluding the pilot studies from the overall analysis does not quantitatively nor qualitatively change the
nature of our results.
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attestation statement preceding the main survey instrument are included in Appendix C.
Partners then answered demographic questions.
Questions include a mix of Likert-type scales and experiential survey items
designed to capture and describe the current TBAT-practice environment of NGNFs. We
asked partners to rate the importance of various factors (as included in panel A of Table
3.3) according to the level of influence on their decisions to select and implement TBATs.
We then asked partners to rate these factors again, but according to their beliefs about the
importance of each factor’s influence on their firm’s decisions to select and implement
TBATs. Therefore, we proxy for understanding how these factor influence firms’ decisions
based on partners’ perspectives. The specific factors are adapted from prior literature that
documents them as relevant to how practitioners engage with TBATs. We also asked
partners to report on their involvement with the development, selection, and/or
implementation of TBATs, opinions regarding audit firm TBAT culture, and the degree of
influence different engagement team members exert over the effective use of TBATs.
To detect acts of institutional work and related isomorphic pressures within the
experiential portion of our survey, we asked partners to identify up to three factors that
influence the effective use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools with wide
applicability, within a pre-defined list. The list of pre-defined factors is based on identified
antecedents of in-charge auditors’ acts of institutional work related to TBATs adopted from
Witte (2020). Because partners’ motivations and experiences may differ from those of incharge auditors, we allowed them to select up to three factors in total and also provided an
“Other” option with an optional text box. None of the partners deviated from the list of
factors provided, providing suggesting that we captured the key factors for discussion.
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After partners identified factors they perceive as important, they reported actions (i.e.,
institutional work) they or their firms took to influence each. Importantly, some partners
suggest neither they nor their firms engage in acts of institutional work to influence these
factors, so we do not include these partners in our analysis of institutional work.28
We then asked partners to explain if (and identify which) isomorphic forces
precipitated mentioned acts of institutional work. Each isomorphic force corresponds to
four practice-based manifestations within the list.29 These items are developed from prior
theory (Scott 2013; DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and related auditing literature (Griffith et
al. 2015; Arnold 2016). We interpret partner references to these motivating factors as
capturing how manifestations of isomorphic forces (among coercive pressures, mimetic
pressures, and normative pressures) are associated with acts of institutional work. Partners
were not limited in their ability to select multiple factors, allowing us to develop a weighted
response from observation points among the three isomorphic pressures. To supplement
our understanding and discussion of the TBAT landscape within firms, we also collect data
in the final segment of our survey about partner and firm-level perspectives about the longterm horizon of TBATs, perceived impediments to TBATs, and the insights regarding
TBAT competencies of various firm personnel.

28

We validate the assumption that these partners and their firms remain relatively passive with regard to
influencing named factors by comparing a sample of partners who do not report acts of institutional work
related to specific factors against earlier survey responses in which partners indicate their individual
involvement with the development, selection, and/or implementation of TBATs within their firms. Data
suggests these partners are indeed not generally involved with TBAT campaigns within their firms.
29
Normative forces are represented with the following manifestations: client or marketplace expectations
related to TBATs; employee expectations related to TBATs; peer review inspections; and professional
licensing or peer firm expectations related to TBATs. Mimetic forces are represented with the following
manifestations: ambiguity or lack of guidance from audit and assurance standards; lack of TBAT expertise;
uncertainty related to TBAT capabilities; and unstructured nature of TBATs. Coercive forces are represented
with the following manifestations: Auditing standards board guidance; auditing and assurance standard
requirements; PCAOB inspections; and PCAOB guidance.
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Final survey data were collected using Qualtrics between August and November
2019. A third party assigned each participant a unique anonymized code and granted
partners private access to the survey via an e-mailed electronic link. The final partner
survey instrument is included in Appendix D.
[INSERT FIGURE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
IV.

RESULTS

The current practice environment of TBATs within NGNFs (RQ1 and RQ2)
We first asked partners to report which TBATs they regularly use on assurance
engagements. Results show a variety of tools, including: Audit Command Language (or
ACL, now known as Galvanize software), ActiveData, Microsoft Excel with advance addins and macros, Interactive Data Extraction and Analysis (CaseWare IDEA), ProSystem fx
Engagement, TeamMate Analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) tools (e.g., MindBridge),
Tableau, and Kira among others. Partners generally perceived the most useful TBATs to
be IDEA (35 percent), Excel (17 percent), and ACL (10 percent) (untabled). Ironically,
IDEA is simultaneously designated as the most frustrating TBAT (21 percent), followed
by AI tools (13 percent). A majority of surveyed partners (65 percent) identify as being
personally involved with the development, selection, and/or implementation of TBATs
within their firms, suggesting we have a rich and appropriate sample of participants with
significant experience related to TBATs for our analysis. Of these partners, the most
common involvements with TBATs include TBAT pilot and beta testing (43.3 percent),
supervision of the development of new TBATs (20 percent), committee work generating
TBAT feedback (20 percent), construction of TBAT firm methodology (10 percent), and
other TBAT activities (6.6 percent) as tabulated in Panel A of Table 3.2. Although 71
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percent of the partners who report being personally involved with TBATs also report
engaging with individuals and bodies external to their own audit firms to influence the use
of TBATs, only 63.6 percent of these partners provide an example of such engagement as
tabulated in Panel B of Table 3.2.
[INSERT TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
The most common forms of engagement with individuals and bodies external to
their firms include interacting with peers at TBAT conferences and trainings, and
leveraging peer firms to support TBAT competencies. For example, four partners report
working with peer firms as an effort to aid their understanding of TBAT tools, thereby
influencing the selection, use, and implementation of technology ultimately adopted within
their firms. Such peer-firm collaboration takes many forms including asking TBAT
vendors to “provide references so we can contact other firms who have already
implemented a TBAT,” (TK3, age 61) and even firm-led interview studies to determine
TBAT proficiencies as explained by one partner below.
In the spring, we conducted several interviews with seven top 50 firms to understand their
use of technology, the innovative culture within their firms, etc. Learned of several
alliances that have been formed within these firms to allow them to evaluate TBATs
together, and implement [these TBATs] within each respective firm. (TP1, age 46)
Three of these four partners also confirmed their firms participate as members in multifirm network alliances and associations to strategically leverage insights and competencies
around TBATs. These experiences reinforce our understanding of the utility and document
the increasing prevalence of such associations suggested by recent literature (Bills, Hayne,
and Stein 2018; Brown et al. 2019).
To understand what elements affect partners’ use of TBATs on audit engagements,
partners were asked to rate ten unique factors regarding the extent to which each influences
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their own decision to select and implement TBATs using a ten-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (Not Important) to 10 (Very Important).30 Partners then rated these same ten factors
regarding the extent to which they believe each influences their firm’s decision to select
and implement TBATs. Results are shown in Table 3.3 Panel A. All ten factors have mean
ratings that are significantly different from the midpoint of 5.5, suggesting the identified
factors as key influencing forces on partner (and firm) choices to select and implement
TBATs as appropriate. Partners report audit firm culture related to TBATs as the most
important factor that influences their own choice to use TBATs on audit engagements with
a mean rating of 8.7, and TBAT issues on prior engagements have the lowest mean rating
at 6.1 on a ten-point Likert scale. Partners also rate audit firm culture related to TBATs as
the most important factor that influences firm decisions with a mean rating of 8.5, whereas
they rate engagement budgets as the least important factor (mean rating at 6.4) influencing
firm decisions to select and implement TBATs on the same scale.
[INSERT TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
Differences between partner and firm perspectives regarding factors of influence on
TBATs
Partner ratings reveal several statistically significant differences in ratings of
factors that influence their own decisions to select and implement TBATs, relative to those
they perceive driving their respective firm’s decisions. Partners rate auditor accountability
around using TBATs as 8.0 and TBAT expertise of audit personnel as 7.8 on importance to
their individual decisions on a ten-point Likert scale, significantly higher than

30

The ten factors were adapted from findings from Witte (2020) that emerged as significant antecedents of
in-charge auditors’ acts of institutional work related to TBATs within their audit firms.
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corresponding ratings by firms of 7.0 (p = 0.007) and 7.1 (p = 0.013), respectively. Partners
also rate TBAT training and on-the-job learning as a marginally more significant factor
influencing their TBAT selection and implementation decisions with a mean rating of 8.1
relative to decisions of their firms with a mean rating of 7.5 (p = 0.057) on the same scale.
These results suggest audit partners value trust in their engagement team’s TBAT
knowledge and engagement team members’ willingness to take ownership over the TBATs
they employ during the audit.
Indeed, partners rely heavily on the senior and managerial levels of the engagement
team to successfully implement TBATs, as shown in Table 3.3 Panel B. Partners estimate
the mean percentage influence each level of engagement team member exerts on the
effective use of TBATs in average engagements as 32 percent and 34 percent for seniors
and managers, respectively (see Panel B of Table 3.3). By contrast, partners approximate
their own influence at just 19 percent on average. This suggests audit partner decisions
(and arguably audit quality outcomes) are thus contingent on their ability to accurately
gauge their engagement team’s TBAT competency, as these partners are admittedly reliant
on the expertise of subordinates when using TBATs to support engagements. Audit quality
is conditional on an exchange of understanding and inputs from both the top and mid-levels
of engagements teams. Taken together, the variation between partners’ own importance
ratings relative to that of their firms’ ratings regarding auditor accountability around using
TBATs, TBAT expertise of audit personnel, and TBAT training and on-the-job learning
suggests audit partners may perceive their firms as less sensitive to audit personnel’s TBAT
skillsets when making choices about TBAT use on engagements.
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Two other points of inflection partners reveal regarding factors that influence their
own versus firms’ choices to use TBATs stem from the importance of client data
characteristics with a mean rating of 7.8 and malleability of TBAT processes with a mean
rating of 7.7 on a ten-point Likert scale. Partners report mean ratings on behalf of their
firms related to the same factors of client data characteristics and malleability of TBAT
processes as 7.2 (p = 0.034) and 7.0 (p = 0.055), respectively on the same scale. Again,
audit partners rate these factors as more influential in their individual decisions to select
and implement TBATs relative to importance of these factors to their overall firms’ related
decisions. The aforementioned divergences between partners’ and their firms’ perspectives
on TBAT selection and implementation pose potential problems, because our survey data
finds evidence of firms taking measures to standardize how TBATs are used within audit
processes. Partners may increasingly find themselves in precarious positions as a necessity
of complying with firm methodology by having to: 1) oversee audit work generated with
the use of TBATs by some staffers with low TBATs competencies; and/or 2) apply poorly
matched TBATs to inappropriate or unworkable client data.
Isomorphic Forces and Partners’ Institutional Work related to TBATs (RQ3 and
RQ4)
In the fourth grouping of survey questions, partners were asked to select a
maximum of the three most important factors that they believe influence the effective use
of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools with wide applicability.31 Table 3.4 Panel A

We use partners’ identified factors as a platform to capture partner and firm-level acts of institutional work.
We then assess practice-based manifestations of isomorphic pressures as antecedents of these acts to
understand how normative, mimetic, and coercive forces motivate and inform these instances of institutional
work.
31
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shows that audit partners report audit firm TBAT culture (66.7 percent), TBAT expertise of
audit personnel (37.5 percent), and client data characteristics (37.5 percent) as the three
most important factors. However, despite partners’ designation of specific factors as
important to the effective use of TBATs, some partners report themselves and their firms
remain passive as opposed to taking actions to exert influence or engage with the factor
identified.32 This is evident in the lower number of partners actually reporting instances of
individual or firm-level institutional work occurring related to each factor they selected.
Supporting data are reported in Panel B of Table 3.4.
Acts of institutional work can assume creating forms (i.e., new practices and value
systems are created), maintaining forms (i.e., norms and practices are reinforced), and
disrupting forms (i.e., values of established norms and practices are disassociated and/or
undermined) (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006). Although specific manifestations of
institutional work in our context take varied forms, we refrain from classifying types of
institutional work among the traditional domains of creating, maintaining, and disrupting
for several reasons. Indeed, prior literature suggests singular acts of institutional work may
occupy space spanning multiple categories of institutional work, such that a work may be
both a creating and maintaining behavior (Lawrence et al. 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby
2006). Partner and firm-level instances of institutional work are problematic to classify
because they often contain an implicit notion of a maintaining behavior. This arises
because of the significant organizational influence partners and other firm leaders possess.
Therefore, when partners and their firms engage in otherwise traditional creating

32

We explain our validation process and relevant assumptions earlier in the methods section within footnote
10. An example of one partner’s response who is not counted as engaging in institutional work follows: “I'm
unaware that we are trying to influence client data characteristics.” (TO3)

143

behaviors, such as developing a new TBAT process, these acts are simultaneously working
to establish and maintain a new expectation of “normal,” and are thus, also maintaining
behaviors. To classify the point in time at which an act of institutional work transitions
from the development of a new boundary (i.e., a creating behavior) to the perpetuation of
a new practice (i.e., a maintaining behavior) requires direct observation of the event, which
our design does not permit. Additionally, we did not identify any instances of disrupting
acts of institutional work, which is reasonable given partners’ position as organizational
leaders subject to considerable legal exposure. Partners are likely to curtail publicizing
disrupting actions that they or their firms take, because these acts are contrary to
fundamental practices within the profession (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence et al.
2009). Thus, to enrich our discussion, we instead identify groupings of partners’ and firms’
acts of institutional works as they relate to each factor of influence over TBATs based by
noting similarities of the content/nature of acts of institutional work. We therefore discuss
these common manifestations of partners’ and firms’ institutional works with regard to
highly concentrated references to factors of influence over TBATs.
We subhead the following three sections according to partners’ three most
frequently designated factors of influence over TBATs: audit firm culture, TBAT expertise
of personnel, and client data characteristics. Within each subsection, we organize our
analysis of partners’ and their firms’ institutional work as it relates to each factor. To
promote a thorough discussion of the additional relevant factors, we also incorporate
findings related to factors for which the frequency of partners selecting these factors as
“influential to the effective use of TBATs…” exceeds 20 percent. Therefore, we include
discussions of partners’ and firms’ acts of institutional work pertaining to TBAT training
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and on-the-job-learning (33.3 percent) and TBAT resources (29.2 percent) within our
discussion of TBAT expertise of audit personnel, because access to training and resources
are intrinsically linked to the support of expertise of personnel. Additionally, we integrate
results related to auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to success (27.1 percent) within
our discussion of audit firm TBAT culture, because we contend auditor perceptions about
professional upward mobility within their firms are intertwined with firm culture.
[INSERT TABLE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
Audit firm TBAT culture
Of the 32 partners selecting audit firm TBAT culture as having a primary impact on
the effective use of TBATs, 22 partners (68.8 percent) convey instances of either individual
or firm-level attempts to engage in institutional work to influence audit firm culture related
to TBATs. Many of these partners (40.9 percent of the 22 partners) report instances
mapping and updating TBATs to align more readily with firm policies and methodologies
used in the audit, as a means of influencing audit firm culture related to TBATs. Although
most partners report their firms doing this to support appropriate use and promote new
TBATs, some partners describe particularly visionary directives related to this process. For
example:
We are currently mapping out our procedures to determine which ones can simply be
replaced by proper use of data analytics. Then we are moving to enhanced auditing by
allowing the insights provided by data analytic tools to give us direction on which
procedures to eliminate. (TD3, age 42)
As firms strive to implement new TBATs, some are proactively adopting a long-term
horizon to improve efficiencies through simultaneous evaluation of TBATs that may be
redundant or obsolete upon the implementation of newer TBAT protocols. Over a third of
the 22 partners (36.4 percent) engaging in institutional work related to audit firm TBAT
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culture suggest that their firms are highly committed to developing and investing in TBAT
resources, including audit personnel. One example includes the development of new
partner roles, such as one firm’s “Partner of Innovation.” Several partners (13.6 percent)
reporting engaging in institutional work related to audit firm TBAT culture also mention
the importance of soliciting TBAT feedback to influence firm TBAT culture. A concurrent
paper finds evidence that audit firms soliciting feedback related to TBATs and encouraging
employees to engage in TBAT-feedback channels are vital cultural mechanisms toward
fostering a positive firm culture around TBATs (Witte 2020). These manifestations of firm
culture ultimately foster acts of institutional work among in-charge auditors (Witte 2020).
Another factor closely related to audit firm TBAT culture is how audit firms value
and internalize the importance of their audit personnel’s TBAT competencies, encapsulated
in the dimension auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to success. Among the 13
partners pointing to auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to success as an important
factor, only five (38.5 percent) report instances of institutional work related to this
dimension. Examples of related institutional works are varied and include revising firm
policies to highlight instances of TBATs overtaking manual processes to be more salient
to audit personnel, requiring auditors to justify opting out of using specific TBATs on
engagements, and rewarding TBAT competence with monetary bonuses or public
recognition. Although only 13 partners rate auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to
success as one of the top three most important factors influencing the use of TBATs within
public accounting, all partners report on whether or not they believe a staff or senior
auditor’s proficiency with TBATs is important to an auditor’s success according to a sevenpoint Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not Important) to 7 (Highly Important).
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On a seven-point Likert scale, the mean rating of 5.9 (median 6.0) is significantly
higher than the midpoint of 4.0, demonstrating partners on average do believe auditors’
TBAT proficiency is very important to auditors’ success within their respective firms.
However, partners rate the degree to which a staff or senior auditor’s proficiency with
TBATs is measured within performance evaluations in their firms as significantly lower (p
= 0.000), with a mean rating of just 3.9 (median 4.0) on a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (Not Measured) to 7 (Highly Measured). When asked to share comments regarding
their ratings, only one partner (2.1%) of the entire sample of 48 was able to confirm that
TBAT proficiency is directly measured as part of the firm’s performance evaluations of
auditors. A few partners provide particularly candid remarks regarding their firms’ lack of
integration of such metrics:
I believe this is an area in which we need to improve. I believe that the direct correlation
between performance measurement and TBATs will greatly impact accountability. (TP1,
age 46)
Staff are evaluated more on meeting budget expectations. Integration of TBATs is often not
supported by partners – as it involves a learning curve that negatively impacts the budget.
(TI2, age 46)
Therefore, although firm leaders generally share a consensus belief that TBAT
proficiency is associated with auditors’ success, these partners also readily report that these
competencies are not specifically evaluated. Instead, firms employ engagement budget
hours as an intermediary for performance, while passing over these TBAT proficiencies. It
remains an open question as to why firms’ have largely either overlooked or purposefully
opted out of measuring TBAT abilities in more formalized capacities. Firms that do indeed
capture metrics of auditor TBAT competence may provide insights as to the potential value
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of such information and whether these skillsets do indeed support more efficient and
effective audits.
Notably, not all partners feel their firms’ lack of TBAT measurement within
performance metrics is problematic. Indeed, several partners echo sentiments such as the
following:
Proficiency in TBAT's is indirectly tied to a staff or senior's performance in the sense that
if utilized, auditors will perform their job at a higher level. (TO1, age 35).

However, Witte (2020) finds that only half of in-charge auditor participants perceive that
expertise of TBATs is a conduit to success. Taken together, these findings suggest audit
partners’ general belief regarding the importance of TBAT competence to auditors’
success, and this idea as part of audit firm culture, may in fact be taken for granted or lost
in translation by subordinate staffers.

Importantly,

when

justifying

their

motivations about the institutional work they performed related to audit firm TBAT culture,
partners report the pressures to meet marketplace expectations related to TBATs and
employee expectations related to TBATs as the primary drivers of their actions. Earlier
literature suggest culture can influence employee retention (Holmes and Marsden 1996).
However, we find evidence of an endogenous relationship in which employee retention
and potentially other marketplace factors can influence firm culture. Therefore, among the
isomorphic pressures reported, partners suggest their actions related to audit firm TBAT
culture are motivated by normative pressures (66.1 percent), followed by mimetic
pressures (22 percent), and lastly by coercive pressures (11.9 percent). The importance of
normative pressures may at first be surprising, as the unstructured landscape of TBATs
within auditing may suggest that mimetic pressures should be the primary guiding force of
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institutional work in this context. However, when we specifically consider audit firm TBAT
culture as it relates to isomorphic pressures, we can dig deeper into the underlying logics
at play. Given the limited nature of regulation (coercive pressures) prevailing over audit
firm TBAT culture, firms likely turn their attention toward using TBATs for purposes of
attracting and retaining clients and valuable employees. Therefore, audit partners are highly
motivated to respond to marketplace and employee expectations to be on the forefront of
implementing TBATs effectively, as part of managing the firm’s reputation as a credible
professional organization. Firms’ responsiveness to expectations of nonprofessional
marketplace members and employees is also a sales tactic for future revenues, and thus an
integral component of firms’ business models. Indeed, audit firm TBAT culture can be
leveraged as a highly public, and thus efficient, means of mirroring normative values back
to clients and employees to assert professional legitimacy. Importantly though, these
espoused values may be incongruent with enacted cultural values within firms (Holmes
and Marsden 1996). Nevertheless, firms are pursuing unique opportunities to reach client
bases, including taking to social media platforms to advertise technological selling points
(Suddaby, Saxton, and Gunz 2015). Extant literature examining audit firm culture suggests
firms are economically motivated to market espoused values to clients that highlight
proficiencies valued in the market (Holmes and Marsden 1996; Picard, Durocher, and
Gendron 2018).
Alternatively, mimetic pressures have less bearing, ironically in spite of the
newness and ambiguity around TBATs. Perhaps because audit firm TBAT culture is more
likely to be intrinsically authentic and internally created. Audit firm TBAT culture can only
be borrowed, and therefore mimicked, in limited capacity. Thereby we can begin to
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rationalize normative pressures as more strongly incentivizing institutional work relating
to audit firm TBAT culture, relative to either mimetic or coercive pressures. Supporting
the factors of audit firm TBAT culture and auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to
success are crucial, because they are also naturally associated with partners’ designation of
another factor related to the effective use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools with
wide applicability as important: TBAT expertise of audit personnel.

TBAT expertise of audit personnel
Many audit partners (38 percent) report TBAT expertise of audit personnel as an
important factor that influences TBAT use within audit practice. Partners rate the average
staff or senior associates’ technological comfort level with using TBATs as above
moderate, with a mean rating of 4.7 (median 5.0) on a seven-point Likert scale ranging
from 1 (Not Skilled) to 7 (Highly Skilled) (untabled). Although the reporting partners rate
their individual comfort level with using TBATs similarly to their ratings of audit staff and
seniors (mean rating of 4.6; median 5.0) on the same scale, they rate the average partner’s
technological comfort level at just 3.1 (median 3.0).33 Notably, the ratings associated with
the average partner’s comfort level are significantly lower than partners’ ratings of the
comfort level of both staff and seniors (p = 0.000) and ratings of their own comfort level
(p = 0.000). When asked to justify the ratings of the average partners’ comfort level, many
partners express similar sentiments attached with succinct comments including, “Old
guys,” (TK1, age 34) and “Partners don’t like change,” (TI1, age 57). Age and resistance

Partners’ ratings of the average staff or senior associate’s technological comfort level with using TBATs,
as well as their ratings for their own comfort level, are statistically significantly higher than the midpoint of
4.0. Conversely, partners’ ratings of the average partner’s technological comfort level with using TBATs is
significantly lower than the midpoint of 4.0.
33
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to new processes are persistent themes within the data. The difference between partners’
individual ratings relative to the average partner may be reflective of self-reporting bias (or
truly a superior group of partner TBAT users) given that 39.6% of surveyed partners are
under age 41. We presume survey respondents’ ratings attached to the average partner’s
comfort levels are indeed more reflective of the true TBAT landscape of partner skill within
NGNFs relative to their self-reported ratings of competency.
A large proportion (88.9 percent) of the 18 partners who emphasize a value on
TBAT expertise of audit personnel also report specific actions to support auditors’ TBAT
competencies, with nearly all partners noting various efforts to promote TBAT trainings
within their respective audit firms. These findings complement related data in which TBAT
training and on-the-job-learning (OTJL) ranks as the fourth most important factor
influencing the effective use of TBATs for a third of surveyed participants as displayed in
Panel A of Table 3.4. Indeed, 12 of the 13 partners who report individual or firm-level acts
of institutional works to influence TBAT training and OTJL, engage in efforts to improve
trainings. Such efforts include creating additional access, content, and/or expectations
related to TBAT trainings. One partner even reports his firm is experimenting with
nontraditional platforms, including podcasting trainings, as an innovative endeavor to
connect and engage with new audit associates.
In addition to influencing TBAT expertise of audit personnel by targeting trainings,
three partners describe additional manifestations of institutional work to support TBAT
expertise of audit personnel. These partners suggest firms are formalizing audit
methodology related to TBATs and audit procedures. Partners postulate the formalization
of TBAT methodologies is a strategic tactic to increase auditors’ TBAT competency and
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use of these tools – because use of specific TBATs will be increasingly mandatory and
expressly recorded in a firm protocol of common procedures. However, as our
aforementioned discussion notes, auditors may ironically struggle to comply with firm
policies in cases where engagement staff have substandard levels of TBAT competencies,
and are thus reliant on the TBAT resources outside of the engagement team. This is
particularly important, because our survey data provide evidence that auditors’ knowledge
bases related to TBATs within NGNFs are becoming increasingly modularized. As one
partner points out, there are limited individuals who are expert users:
At this point, to become an expert TBAT user requires an investment of personal time,
because there is only so much time in the workday. So very few people end up highly skilled.
(TI3, age 47)
Of the ten partners who report engaging in institutional work related to TBAT resources,
80 percent suggest their firms are working to influence this factor by creating TBAT
champions and specialized teams. Research suggests TBAT champions are auditors who
function as appointed experts (although they may often self-select into these roles) within
a domain of firms’ technology (Dowling and Leech 2014). These champions are charged
with taking initiative to communicate functionality of firm TBATs that are broadly used,
while also serving as a general resource for audit personnel on an ad hoc basis (Dowling
and Leech 2014). Therefore, audit partners and engagement team members may be tasked
with going outside the engagement team to acquire the appropriate TBAT support needed.
Similar to isomorphic pressures inspiring partners’ acts of institutional work related
to audit firm TBAT culture, the majority of partners (52.8 percent) indicate that normative
isomorphic pressures motivate their actions related to TBAT expertise of audit personnel.
Normative pressures take shape as partners and their respective NGNFs are tasked with
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responding to technological innovations and expectations around usage by increasing
perceptions of firms’ professionalism. Audit partners primarily cite normative pressures in
the form of the importance of client and marketplace expectations, as well as employee
expectations related to TBATs, as common motivators for their actions related to TBAT
expertise of audit personnel. Our findings support theoretical predictions that audit partners
engage in institutional work associated with standardizing related dimensions of TBAT
expertise of audit personnel such as TBAT trainings and TBAT resources. Notably,
mimetic forces are of heightened salience for partners’ actions in the domain of TBAT
expertise of audit personnel (30.6 percent), relative to the role of mimetic pressures
influencing work related to audit firm TBAT culture (23.1 percent). Therefore, data suggest
ambiguity within the industry related to TBATs causes partners to look to peer firms to
identify successful implementations of TBAT trainings and applications in practice to
enhance employees’ expertise. About 17 percent of partners who report institutional work
related to TBAT expertise of audit personnel point to coercive pressures, specifically
auditing and assurance regulatory requirements, as a motivating force for their actions.
Auditor TBAT competencies remain one of multiple obstacles partners may
encounter in engaging with these tools effectively to support engagement goals and audit
quality. In the following section, we describe the difficulties partners may face when trying
to abide by firm TBAT policies when encountering client data that is poorly suited for use
with required TBATs.
Client data characteristics
Nine out of 18 partners report efforts of institutional work that relate to client data
characteristics as an influential factor driving the use of TBATs. All but one of these
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partners reference various examples of trying to engage directly with clients to address the
reality of “messy” client data and “dirty” files that are incongruent (and potentially
unreadable) by firms’ TBATs. Although client data may be unintentionally unworkable, it
is important to note that some instances of messy client data could be a strategic
obfuscation to misdirect auditor resources away from instances of managed earnings or
even fraud (Luippold, Kida, Piercy, and Smith 2015). Nevertheless, partners and their firms
are pursuing strategies to educate and clarify clients’ understanding about generating
appropriate reports that map to utilized TBATs. Partners also report digging deeper into
understanding client ERPs to gain an understanding about the nature of information that
may be available to integrate into TBAT analytics to support compliance with assurance
standards. The following partner’s quote explains further:
Our firm is beginning an initiative to more critically evaluate the quality of our clients’
data, and provide them with best practices for improving this data. We recognize that in
order for our firm to effectively use TBATs in the audit process, quality client data are
essential to achieving this objective, and the improvements in client data quality will take
time to capture, communicate, and effectuate change. (TN4, age 56)
Another partner reports an alternative method of engaging with clients to better align client
data characteristics, TBATs, and assurance standards, by tracking and cataloging data
competencies of individual assurance clients:
We've tried several efforts to help standardize client data, but this proves difficult for large
clients, multiple systems, various subledgers, subsidiaries and the varied use of charts of
accounts. We currently do request a full GL instead of a TB. And we are building a census
of knowing which clients use which accounting systems. (TD3, age 42)
Partners report the collaborative efforts they and their firms are taking to influence
client data characteristics are largely motived by mimetic isomorphic pressures (50
percent), including lack of firm TBAT expertise, uncertainty regarding TBAT capabilities,
and the unstructured nature of TBATs. When considering mimetic forces, theory predicts
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ambiguity fosters organizations to engage in activities that promote mimicry among firms.
Multiple partners mention leveraging more extensive TBATs resources from accounting
firm membership associations. This allows partners to resolve issues stemming from
uncertainty related to TBATs, as firms share best practices, competencies, and insights
within the network – thereby contributing to increasingly sophisticated (and perhaps
standardized) TBAT protocols for member firms.
Although data suggest partners are largely consistent in their perspectives and types
of efforts toward working with clients to facilitate the translation of data between client
systems and engagement team needs, one partner’s remark poses a stark contrast “[We]
cannot influence clients’ data, that's violating independence,” (TD2, age 37). This partner
opens up a latent but important debate about whether lines between auditing and consulting
may become muddied as partners assume new roles related to client data. It remains an
open question as to whether these circumstances may ultimately constitute a threat to
auditor independence, and how the future will unfold for TBATs during a period of relative
silence from standard setters.
V.

SUPPLEMENTAL DISCUSSION: THE FUTURE OF TBATS

Partners overwhelming suggest the future of TBATs presents promise to support
audit quality. Partners rate the current and future use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit
tools with wide applicability as a 6.4 on average (median 7.0) on a seven-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (Not Enthusiastic or Optimistic) to 7 (Very Enthusiastic or Optimistic).
Moreover, partners’ ratings are not significantly different from their beliefs regarding their
firms’ general views of TBATs, which they rate as a 6.3 on average (median 7.0) on the
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same scale. Despite these sunny ratings, the partners concede significant impediments exist
for TBATs, as presented in Table 3.5.
[INSERT TABLE 3.5 ABOUT HERE]
Among referenced impediments, client systems and client data reports rank high
among most partners’ concerns (68.8 percent). Poor data quality from clients is not the
only facet at play, as several partners note that clients with unsophisticated ERPs are in fact
resistant to facilitating the integration of their systems with TBATs. One partner’s insight
suggests TBATs may prove excessive for these types of clients.
I am a little skeptical about the effectiveness and efficiency for certain audit engagements,
such as smaller clients. I am not sure that all TBATs will be beneficial to all clients. (TH3,
age 55)
In addition to client systems and reports, many partners (39.6 percent) also point to
auditing and assurance standards being a significant impediment to widespread TBAT use
as exemplified by one partner’s quote below.
My biggest concern is the ability and willingness of the ASB to change the standards to
incorporate the use of TBATs in the audit standards to increase audit effectiveness and
efficiency. The current proposed audit evidence standard falls significantly short. (TI2,
age 46)
Data suggest partners seek guidance from standard setters about how to reliably apply
TBATs in engagements to simultaneously meet appropriate compliance around assurance
standards. Indeed, multiple professional organizations including the International Auditing
and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) are working to draft professional guidance in response to evolving
TBATs. The IAASB’s Technology Working Group (TWG) is specifically working to
develop non-authoritative guidance to suggest when TBATs can be used to modernize the
International Auditing Standard (ISA) 315: Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material
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Misstatement (IAASB 2020). Similarly, the PCAOB has an active project underway to
specifically consider if there is “a need for guidance, changes to PCAOB standards, or
other regulatory actions in light of the increased use of technology-based tools by auditors
and preparers” (2020). The PCAOB’s public status of the project suggests that although it
does not perceive standards as hindering (nor encouraging) technology use within the audit,
present standards do not highlight TBAT risks or pitfalls.
One partner offers an alternative perspective to the idea that current standards need
to be revised:
Practitioners in general across firms seem to think there are issues in the standards that
keep TBATs from being more widespread. I disagree. The standards implicitly ask very
fundamental questions: "Do we have sufficient appropriate evidence?" and "How do we
know?" Many of these data extraction tools give nice analysis, but if they are based on
data that is not complete or accurate, how valuable are the results? The standards are not
the problem. The problem is technology that is limited in how effectively and efficiently it
ingests data and verifies the data. (TF2, age 41)
Although tools are becoming increasingly sophisticated, an emerging subset of partners
suggests the audit standards do not present a hurdle given the underlying principles. As the
partner above explains, the standards in fact ask questions about “sufficiency” rather than
requiring auditors to use (or avoid) specific procedures – thereby the standards arguably
cover new technology implicitly. Perhaps the true elephant in the room partners are looking
for more guidance on is how to transition from simply using a new TBAT in an audit
engagement to relying on a new TBAT as part of their audit plan? Research suggests
partners are highly cognizant about risks associated with audit inspections and reviews
(Westermann et al. 2019), and the use of new TBATs likely creates ambiguity around how
these tools will be “judged.” It remains an open question as to whether practice needs to
change its expectations regarding what TBATs can accomplish, how inspection and review
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processes influence (and may be able to support) the use of TBATs, and if (and/or how)
standards should evolve to match appropriate uses of these tools.
Lastly, the third and fourth largest impediments partners call attention to are the
costs associated with TBAT implementation; i.e., financial budgets (35.4 percent) and
engagement budget hours (25 percent). Partners note the considerable lag between
implementation and ROI of new TBATs, and suggest firms may have short-term
perspectives when making related decisions.
Prior literature suggests additional structured audit methodology as it relates to technology
will be associated with a reduction in audit fees (and possibly efficiencies) (Gist 1994).
However, we find potentially contradictory evidence of this notion in present times. Our
data suggest evidence of some firms taking measures to standardize their uses of TBATs
within audits, without an associated reduction in budgeted engagement hours or related
costs. Ironically, firm-mandated TBAT use, without a reduction in other audit procedures,
may instead overwhelm time-pressured engagement teams rather than increase
efficiencies.
The use of TBATs to date have not been used to reduce testing in other areas. It has become
an additional burden and a drag on realization with no noted benefit. (TE1, age 54)
Indeed, the above candid comment implies that firms may be reluctant to curtail areas of
redundant audit testing where new TBATs are applied, perhaps due to limited guidance
from standards. This is somewhat ironic given the significant benefits associated with
advanced TBATs, including expanded and predictive audit testing (Earley 2015). It seems
likely that firms are concerned about reducing manual and older-TBAT testing procedures
in favor of newer TBATs as way to mitigate risks associated with how new TBAT
procedures may fare during inspections and reviews. As one partner reports, engagement
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budgets continue to be developed based on prior years’ budgeted hours – a finding
documented in earlier literature (e.g., Ettredge, Bedard, and Johnston 2008; Bierstaker and
Wright 2005; Hill 2001; Gist and Davidson 1999). Prior audit planning research finds
consistent evidence of reluctance to increase budgeted hours when there are budget
pressures, despite the presence of increased audit risk (Bierstaker and Wright 2005; Hill
2001; Houston 1999). There is also evidence that managers resist adequately increasing
engagement budget hours that historically produce unfavorable variances, resulting in
persistent budget pressures on auditors in the long run (Ettredge et al. 2008). Therefore, we
identify important new implications of limited engagement-hour budgets, as they may also
constrain innovation of TBAT-based audit testing procedures.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Extant literature has historically examined isomorphic change and institutional
work as separate branches of institutional theory, despite the inextricable nature of the
concepts. Our study is the first effort to our knowledge that examines institutional work in
light of isomorphic pressures in the context of a mature organizational setting of non-global
network firms within the auditing profession. Most importantly, we find that audit partners,
who embody powerful institutional workers within NGNFs, engage in institutional work
harmoniously alongside manifestations of normative, mimetic, and coercive isomorphic
forces. Using a practice-based environment, our findings contribute to the literature by
examining DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) posited theoretical paradox of how institutional
agents impart organizational change in the presence of constraining forces. Indeed, these
agents are not merely at the mercy of external isomorphic forces, but simultaneously
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internalize these outward forces as motivators of their own institutional works – and thus
manifest changes that stem from within their organizations.
Our partner participants designate audit firm culture, TBAT expertise of personnel,
and client data characteristics as the three most important factors of influence over TBATs
as primary auditing tools with aide applicability. Indeed, partners actually point to
isomorphic forces as motivating prompts for acts of institutional work – citing normative
pressures (e.g., client and employee expectations) and mimetic pressures (e.g., lack of firm
TBAT expertise, uncertainty regarding TBAT capabilities, and the unstructured nature of
TBATs) most often. Although we do not observe partners or their firms engaging in
disrupting acts of institutional work, partners throughout our sample report numerous
creating and maintaining acts of institutional work to shape factors that influence TBATs
throughout the organizational field. Institutional works include updating firm
methodologies to increasingly reference the use of TBATs, increasing auditor access to
TBAT trainings, and engaging directly with clients to address compatibility issues between
client data and TBATs.
In addition to important theoretical implications, our research also offers further
practical and scholarly contributions. We identify potential conflicts between partner
TBAT-related values and corresponding firm-level values, highlighting areas in which
firms may experience increasing risks to audit quality. Our data uncover interesting areas
for future research to explore how and why there have come to be discrepancies between
TBAT expectations and express performance metrics, as well as the extent to which auditor
TBAT competence may influence audit quality. We specifically discuss implications of
mandating the use of TBATs and the modularization of TBAT expertise within firms. Our
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data provides a rich description of the practice-based TBAT landscape within NGNFs to
aid future research avenues. Additional research should explore implications around
increased auditor-client interactions that address client data management – and specifically
how these may differ between public versus private clients. Further research can also
explore the development of TBAT-related standards while considering auditor judgment
and decision making, alongside implications for audit quality. Researchers should work
with practitioners to understand the degree to which details of audit standards influence
TBAT choices relative to concerns over potential inspection report findings.
Our study is subject to two main limitations. First, survey participants were
solicited on our behalf by a third party, and therefore may not be broadly representative of
partners of NGNFs. However, the third party confirms it selected partners randomly across
a varied spectrum of differently sized NGNFs ranging from small (firms with one office)
to large (firms with more than 100 offices). Second, we capture partners’ beliefs and
interpretations of the values and actions of their respective firms. Therefore, our access to
information of NGNF-level perspectives and behaviors is indirect and potentially subject
to bias from the perspectives of the partners surveyed. Nevertheless, the reported
perspectives of partners’ regarding their understanding of firm-level values and behaviors
has inherent worth that helps uncover areas in which partners feel misalignment with their
organizations. Future research can continue to explore variation among partners’
organizational identities among different firm-types, as well as implications for practice.
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TABLE 3.1
Participant Demographics
n = 48
Frequencies

Percent

31-40

19

39.6%

41-50

19

39.6%

50-60
> 60

9
1

18.8%
2.1%

Manufacturing

18

37.5%

Services
Retail Trade

15
1

31.3%
2.1%

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

8

16.7%

Government/Nonprofit

5

10.4%

Mining

1

2.1%

Annually

12

25.0%

Triennially

30

62.5%

N/A

6

12.5%

Bachelor's Degree

27

56.3%

Coursework Beyond Bachelor's Degree

6

12.5%

Master's Degree

15

31.3%

Certified public accountant

48

Certified information systems auditor

1

Chartered global management accountant

3

Certified fraud examiner

1

Certified management accountant

1

Other certification

6

Male

34

70.8%

Female

9

18.8%

Unspecified

5

10.4%

Years of Audit Experience
Mean = 20.9
Std. Dev. = 7.9
Age

Industry

Frequencies of PCAOB Inspections

Educational Background

Certificationa

Gender

a

Participants could list more than one certification.
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FIGURE 3.2
SURVEY INSTRUMENT FLOWCHART

2.
Demographic
Questions

1. Background
Information
• Research study
background
• TBAT definition
• Attestation
statement

•
•
•
•
•
•

Age
Experience
Industry
Education
Certification(s)
Gender

3. Practice
Environment
Questions
• Most useful
(frustrating) TBAT
• Ratings of factors
that influence
partner (firm)
TBAT-related
decisions
• Personal
involvement with
TBATs
• Opinions of firm
TBAT culture
• Allocations of
engagement team
members' influence
over the effective
use of TBATs
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4. Institutional
Work and
Isomorphic
Pressures

5.
Supplemental
Questions

• Factors of influence • Long-term horizon
over effective use of
perspectives
TBATs
• Perceived TBAT
• Acts of institutional
impediments
work influencing
• Ratings of TBAT
aforementioned
competencies of
factors
audit personnel
• Designated
isomorphic
pressures
motivating acts of
referenced
institutional work

TABLE 3.2
PANEL A: Partner involvement with the development, selection, and/or
implementation of TBATs
Frequenciesa
(n = 30)
13
6
6
3
1
1

Activity
Involved with TBAT pilots and beta testing
Committee work generating TBAT feedback
Supervising development of new TBATs
Designing firm TBAT methodology
Recruiting TBAT savvy employees
TBAT education

Percent
(n = 30)
43.3%
20.0%
20.0%
10.0%
3.3%
3.3%

a

One partner reports being personally involved, but was unable to communicate a concrete example
of his involvement. This participant is excluded from the total frequency count above.

PANEL B: Partner engagement with individuals external to their firms
to support TBATs

External individuals and bodies
Engaging with individuals at external
TBAT events
Engaging with peer audit firms
Engaging with TBAT vendors
Engaging with professional associations
Engaging with consulting firm
b

Frequenciesb
(n = 14)

Percent
(n = 14)

4
4
3
2
1

28.6%
28.6%
21.4%
14.3%
7.1%

Eight audit partners report engaging with boundary participants, but were unable to communicate a
concrete example of their involvement. These participants are excluded from the total frequency in Panel
B.
c
Percent is calculated based on frequencies related to each factor in panel A.
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APPENDIX C: ATTESTATION STATEMENT
Please read this definition prior to competing the survey:
This study will investigate the state of use of technology-based audit tools (TBATs) and
TBAT components employed by audit firms. Examples of TBATs include but are not
limited to:
• Computer-assisted auditing techniques (CAATS) like IDEA, ACL, and advanced
Excel templates and tools;
• Firm software or vendor templates for performing analytical procedures and
identifying anomalies for investigation;
• Engagement specific technology-based tools;
• Specialized audit tools such as Benford’s Law of Numbers, or Z-score (financial
liquidity) analysis;
• Computerized sample selection or statistical sampling techniques.
Note: TBATs do not include communication modes such as e-mail, phone, or video
conference.

Please confirm you have read the definition of TBATs by selecting "Yes" below.
(Participant must select “Yes” to continue with the survey.)
Yes
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APPENDIX D: FINAL SURVEY INSTRUMENT FOR AUDIT PARTNERS
First, please answer the following questions about yourself and your firm:
Number of years as a partner: ____________________
Total years of audit experience: ____________________
Current age: ___________________________
Gender:
Male
Female
Other___________
Educational Background (e.g., degrees):
Bachelor’s Degree
Coursework beyond Bachelor’s Degree
Master’s Degree
Coursework beyond Master’s Degree
Other _____________
Professional Certifications:
Certified Internal Auditor
Certified Public Accountant
Certified Information Systems Auditor
Certified Management Accountant
Certified Financial Planner
Other _____________
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Your primary industry specialization:
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Services
Government/Nonprofit
Over the past five years, what is the approximate percentage of your time spent on clients
that are:
Accelerated filers:
Non-accelerated filers:
Privately held for-profit:
Government:
Nonprofit:
Other:

____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________

Total:

_______100%________

Frequency of Firm PCAOB inspections:
Annually
Triennially
N/A

Do you have experience as an inspector in conducting peer reviews for other firms?
Yes
No
Second, please answer the following questions about your experiences and perceptions
related to TBATs:
1. What is the most useful TBAT that you use on assurance engagements:
________________
2. What is the most frustrating TBAT that you use on assurance engagements:
________________
The following capture your audit firm’s perceptions related to TBATs (vs. your
individual perceptions):
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3. Please rate the importance of each listed factor according to the level of influence on
your firm’s decision to select and implement TBATs:

[PAGE BREAK]
The following capture your individual perceptions related to TBATs (vs. your audit
firm’s perceptions):
4. Please rate the importance of each listed factor according to the level of influence on
your decision to select and implement TBATs:
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5. Have you personally been involved in the development, selection, and/or
implementation of TBATs used within your firm?
Yes
No
Please share the most recent example of how you personally contributed to the
development, selection, and/or implementation of TBATs used within your firm.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
6. Do you personally engage with people outside your firm (e.g., vendors, clients,
professional bodies, or colleagues etc.) in a manner that contributes to the
development, selection, and/or implementation decisions related to TBATs in your
firm?
Yes
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No
Please explain the nature of your most recent involvement with people outside your
firm, and how your actions ultimately contributed to the development, selection, and/or
implementation decisions related to TBATs in your firm.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__
7. How important do you believe a staff or senior auditor’s proficiency with TBATs is
to his or her success in your firm?

1

2

3

7
Not
Very
Important
Important

4

5

6

Somewhat
Important

[PAGE BREAK]
8. To what degree is a staff or senior auditor’s proficiency with TBATs measured within
performance evaluations in your firm?

1
7
Not
Highly
Measured
Measured

2

3

4

5

6

Somewhat
Measured

Please share comments regarding your rationale for your rating:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
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9. Please allocate the approximate percentage of the degree of influence each engagement
team member has over the effective use of TBATs on an average engagement.
Associate:
Senior:
Manager:
Partner:
Other:

____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________
____________________

Total:

_______100%________

10. Select a maximum of the three most important following factors you believe influence
the effective use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools with wide applicability.

Audit firm commitment or culture related to TBATs
Auditor accountability around using TBATs
TBAT expertise of audit personnel
Engagement budgets
Client data characteristics
Auditor perceptions of TBATs as a conduit to success
Malleability of TBAT processes
TBAT issues on prior engagements
TBAT resources (e.g., TBAT champions; instruction manuals; IT support etc.)
TBAT Training and on-the-job learning
Third-party TBAT vendors
Other_____________

11.

[PAGE BREAK]
[For each factor a participant identified] Please indicate how you are engaging
with the factors you chose on the prior page to support the effective use of
TBATs.

11a. [Factor 1]
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Please indicate if any of the following pressures motivated you to take action related to
[Factor 1]:
Client or marketplace expectations related to TBATs
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Employee expectations related to TBATs
Peer review inspections
Professional licensing or peer firm expectations related to TBATs
Ambiguity or lack of guidance from audit and assurance standards
Lack of TBAT expertise
Uncertainty related to TBAT capabilities
Unstructured nature of TBATs
ASB guidance
Auditing and assurance standard requirements
PCAOB inspections
PCAOB guidance
None of the above
Other ________

11b. [Factor 2]
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Please indicate if any of the following pressures motivated you to take action related to
[Factor 2]:
Client or marketplace expectations related to TBATs
Employee expectations related to TBATs
Peer review inspections
Professional licensing or peer firm expectations related to TBATs
Ambiguity or lack of guidance from audit and assurance standards
Lack of TBAT expertise
Uncertainty related to TBAT capabilities
Unstructured nature of TBATs
ASB guidance
Auditing and assurance standard requirements
PCAOB inspections
PCAOB guidance
None of the above
Other ________
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11c. [Factor 3]
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________
Please indicate if any of the following pressures motivated you to take action related to
[Factor 3]:
Client or marketplace expectations related to TBATs
Employee expectations related to TBATs
Peer review inspections
Professional licensing or peer firm expectations related to TBATs
Ambiguity or lack of guidance from audit and assurance standards
Lack of TBAT expertise
Uncertainty related to TBAT capabilities
Unstructured nature of TBATs
ASB guidance
Auditing and assurance standard requirements
PCAOB inspections
PCAOB guidance
None of the above
Other ________
12. What are your firm’s general views regarding the current and future use of TBATs in
auditing as primary audit tools with wide applicability?
1

2

7
Not
Very
Enthusiastic or Optimistic
Optimistic

3

4

5

6

Neutral
Skilled

Enthusiastic and

13. What are your general views regarding the current and future use of TBATs in
auditing as primary audit tools with wide applicability?
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1

2

7
Not
Very
Enthusiastic or Optimistic
Optimistic

3

4

5

6

Neutral
Skilled

Enthusiastic and

Please explain any differences that may exist between your views and your firm's
views regarding the current and future use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools
with wide applicability?:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______________________________
14. Select a maximum of the three impediments you perceive as the most challenging
regarding the current and future use of TBATs in auditing as primary audit tools with
wide applicability.
Audit firm culture or leadership
Auditing and Assurance standards
Budgetary constraints related to implementation
Client systems and reports
Engagement budgets
Inspection or Peer review reports
TBAT resources (i.e., availability of support from vendors; firm resources)
Third party TBAT vendors
TBAT training
Other_____________
Please share comments regarding the impediment(s) you selected:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
15. How does your firm communicate its “tone at the top” and culture regarding TBATs
(e.g., line of service meetings; e-mails; etc.)?
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
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16. How would you rate the average staff or senior associate’s technological comfort
level with using TBATs?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Not
Highly
Skilled
Skilled

Somewhat
Skilled

Please share comments regarding your rationale for your rating:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
17. How would you rate the average partner’s technological comfort level with using
TBATs?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Not
Highly
Skilled
Skilled

Somewhat
Skilled

Please share comments regarding your rationale for your rating:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
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18. How would you rate your technological comfort level with using TBATs?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
Not
Highly
Skilled
Skilled

Somewhat
Skilled

Please share comments regarding your rationale for your rating:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Thank you again for participating in the study and for responding to these questions!
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